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ABSTRACT
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by Yan Zheng WEI
Recommender systems have been widely advocated as a way of coping with the problem
of information overload for knowledge workers. Given this, multiple recommendation
methods have been developed. However, it has been shown that no one technique is
best for all users in all situations. Thus, we believe that effective recommender systems
should incorporate a wide variety of such techniques and that some form of overarching
framework should be put in place to coordinate the various recommendations so that
only the best of them (from whatever source) are presented to the user. To this end,
we show that a marketplace, in which the various recommendation methods compete
to offer their recommendations to the user, can be used in this role. Specifically, our
research is concerned with the principled design of such a marketplace (including the
auction protocol, the reward mechanism and the bidding strategies of the individual
recommender agents) and its evaluation in terms of how it can effectively coordinate
multiple methods. In addition to the market mechanisms, a reinforcement learning
strategy is developed to assist the individual recommender agents’ bidding behaviour
so as to learn the users’ interests and still maximize their revenue. Finally, we evaluate
our approach with a real market-based recommender system that is composed of a
number of typical recommendation methods and that is evaluated with real users. The
evaluation results show that our approach is indeed an effective means of coordinating
multiple different recommendation methods in one single system and is an effective way
of dealing with the problem of information overload.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
TheWorld-WideWeb (theWeb) [Berners-Lee et al., 1992] presents us with a vast array of
information. Also, regardless of the metric used (i.e., growth in the number of networks,
hosts, users, or traffic), the Internet is growing at least 10 percent per month and the
content of the Web grows by an estimated 170,000 pages daily [Turban et al., 2000]p495.
When taken together, these factors make it very hard to know what documents are
out there and finding the right one is even more problematic. This phenomenon is
known as information overload : here defined as the receipt of undesirable or non-relevant
information that results in an economic loss for the recipient [Losee, 1989].
To address this problem a range of tools to assist with indexing, retrieving and searching
techniques have been developed [Zamboni, 1998, Pinkerton, 2000, Howe and Dreilinger,
1997, Zuno, 1997]. However, the objective of efficiently and effectively delivering the
right information, to the right people, at the right time, is still a fundamental research
challenge. To this end, the research described in this thesis attempts to address the
problem by designing, developing and evaluating an overarching system that incorpo-
rates and coordinates a number of different recommendation methods to suggest recom-
mendations (section 1.1). In particular, a market-based approach is used to coordinate
the behaviour of the constituent methods that make recommendations using a variety of
techniques (section 1.2). By designing, simulating and implementing such a system, we
have advanced the state of the art in a number of important ways outline in section 1.3.
Finally, the whole document structure is listed in the end of the chapter (section 1.4).
1
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1.1 Overcoming Information Overload
The most widely used tool to assist with information overload is that of a search en-
gine. It provides a means of searching for existing information and it can exist in many
different forms. For example, Lycos (http://www.lycos.com), one of the oldest search
engines among those available today [Zamboni, 1998], extracts keywords, title, the words
found in the first few lines of text, and the most frequently-occurring words in the rest
of the document to provide users with relevant documents. WebCrawler [Pinkerton,
2000] was the first comprehensive full-text search engine for the Web. It performs index
searching based on the document contents. But the number of processed documents
is limited [Zamboni, 1998]. SavvySearch [Howe and Dreilinger, 1997] is designed to
efficiently query other search engines by carefully selecting those engines most likely
to return useful results and by responding to fluctuating load demands on the Web.
SavvySearch learns to identify which search engines are most appropriate for particular
queries, reasons about resource demands and represents an iterative parallel search strat-
egy as a simple plan. Vrisko [Zuno, 1997] is a personal knowledge manager client, which
provides facilities such as integrated searching over many search engines and relevance
(pertinence to the matter at hand) ranking of results. Vrisko allows users to specify a
context for the search. It also allows for user profiling. The profiles are updated accord-
ing to user feedback and also automatically by search results. However, with all these
searching tools, the user has to consider the large number of sources available, decide
which one to access, and interact with each one individually. This is very tedious and
inconvenient to the user [Levy et al., 1996]. Moreover, although these tools provide a
means of searching for existing information, they lack a mechanism for informing the
user about new information related to their interests. When cooped with the explod-
ing volume of digital information, it is difficult for a user who is only equipped with a
search capability to stay informed without sifting through huge amounts of incoming
information.
To overcome this problem, it is possible to exploit information filtering techniques that
can help in this context [Loeb and Terry, 1992]. Information filtering systems sort
through large volumes of continuously arriving textual information and present to the
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user only those items that are likely to satisfy his1 (or her) interest [Belkin and Croft,
1992]. Many such tools are now available over the Internet. For example, the Stanford
Information Filtering Tool (SIFT) [Yan and Garcia-Molina, 1995] provides a service ca-
pable of directing information of users’ interests to the subscribed users. It supports
full-text filtering using well-known information retrieval models (such as boolean pro-
files, vector space and relevance feedback [Salton, 1989]). The SIFT filtering engine
implements novel indexing techniques, capable of processing large volumes of informa-
tion against a large number of profiles. Agentware i3 [Autonomy, 1997] applies pattern
matching algorithms with contextual analysis in order to provide users with relevant
documents based on information about the users’ interests. SIGMA uses filtering agents
to learn the user’s interests when they query Usenet news articles (a high-volume and
high-turnover discussion list service on the Internet) [Karakoulas and Ferguson, 1996].
However, in general, such tools still tend to have the weakness of either providing too
much irrelevant information or missing relevant information [Shardanand and Maes,
1995, Resnick and Varian, 1997].
To overcome the above mentioned limitations of filtering, recommender systems have
been advocated. A recommender system is one that assists and augments the natu-
ral social process of making choices among recommendations from all kinds of sources
without sufficient personal experience of the alternatives [Resnick and Varian, 1997].
Thus, in this context, a recommendation is viewed as a reference to an item that will be
directed to the user who is looking for information. A typical recommender system ag-
gregates and directs recommendations to appropriate recipients. Given this view, it can
be seen that a recommender system’s main value lies in information aggregation and its
ability to match the recommendations with people seeking information. It differs from
conventional filtering systems in that recommendations are based upon subjective values
assigned by people, namely the quality of items, rather than more objective properties
(such as the text content of a document) of the items themselves [Resnick et al., 1994,
Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. Compared to a system that only has searching or other
simple information filtering functionalities, recommender systems require less experience
on the part of the user and less effort to specify and restrain their interests when query-
ing and operating the system [Resnick and Varian, 1997]. This is because recommender
1“His” represents “his or her” throughout the thesis. Similarly, “he” and “him” represent “he or she”
and “him or her” respectively.
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systems provide their users with recommendations that have been recognized as good
(based on their previously expressed preferences or the preferences of other users with
similar interests). Given these benefits, recommender systems have now been applied
in many application domains, including music albums [Shardanand and Maes, 1995],
video [Hill et al., 1995], Usenet news [Terveen et al., 1997, Resnick et al., 1994, Konstan
et al., 1997], and Web navigation [Kahle and Gilliat, 1997, El-Beltagy et al., 2001].
Against this background, this research is concerned with the problem of information
overload on the Web and how recommender systems can be used to help overcome this
problem. In particular, it deals with the “where to go next” problem by presenting
recommendations (represented as urls) that are relevant to the users’ current browsing
context. This method is beneficial since users often ask questions such as “what else
should I read?” and “where do other people go from here?”. By convention, such
recommendations are usually displayed in a separate window without interrupting a
user’s current navigation (Figure 1.1 is an example of the system that we have built for
this task).
To date, two typical kinds of filtering approaches are used to produce recommendations:
content-based and collaborative filtering (see section 2.1 for more details). The former
makes recommendations by analyzing the similarity between the contents of the items
that are ready to be recommended and those that have previously been marked as
liked by the user. The latter makes recommendations by putting forward items that
have been deemed appropriate by people who have similar interests to the user. Based
on these two techniques, a large number of recommendation filtering methods have
been developed (again see section 2.1 for more details). However, most conventional
recommender systems share two major weaknesses:
• Each recommender system typically embeds some specific algorithm to compute
correlations (the similarity of two relevant objects). However, there is no univer-
sally best way of doing this (and nor do we believe that there will ever be such a
method). Rather, it is always the case that some methods are better in particular
conditions and others are better in other conditions [Breese et al., 1998]. Given
this, we believe the solution is to have a suite of recommendation methods available
and to have the system automatically detect which one is the most appropriate
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Figure 1.1: Browser with Recommendations
The main window displays the user’s current context (the page being viewed). The side bar on the left
is the output of the recommender system and displays a list of urls in decreasing order of relevance to
the user’s current context.
in the prevailing context. However, such coordination is very difficult to attain,
because the outputs from these diverse methods need to be compared.
• As ever more information is available on the Web, the pool from which recom-
mendations can be made will continue to grow. However, users do not want
correspondingly more recommendations to be presented (otherwise they will be
overloaded). Thus, there is a need to be ever more selective and ensure that only
the most appropriate recommendations are put forward.
Given these observations, with the growing number of recommendation methods and
in face of evolving users’ interests, we believe the best way forward in this area is
to allow multiple recommendation methods to co-exist and to provide an overarching
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open system2 that allows new methods to be added as and when they are developed
and which coordinates their outputs such that only the best recommendations (from
whatever source or method) are presented to the user [Wei et al., 2003b, To appearb].
Specifically, we believe a market-based approach is an efficient means of achieving such
coordination because the problem of selecting appropriate recommendations to display
in the sidebar space can be viewed as one of scarce resource allocation and markets are
an efficient solution for this class of problems [Clearwater, 1996, Wellman and Wurman,
1998]. Moreover, the underlying economic theory provides an analytical framework for
predicting aggregate behaviour and designing individual information providers [Mullen
and Wellman, 1995]. Given this, this thesis is concerned with the systematic design
and evaluation of such a market-based recommender system (see section 2.5 for the
basics of market-based recommender systems). In particular, our system is capable of
recommending documents relevant to the users’ current browsing context as a way of
dealing with the problem of information overload3.
1.2 A Market-Based Approach to Recommendation
Moreau et al. [2002] showed that multiple recommendation methods can be incorporated
into a single system, and that a marketplace is capable of coordinating multiple methods
to direct the most valuable Web documents to the user’s browser. In this system,
each time a request for recommendations is made to the recommender system, a large
number of recommendations may be put forward. However, from the point of view of
the user, when seeking recommendations, it is ineffective to have too many items put
forward. Moreover, the browser sidebar space is limited. Therefore, the question of how
to accommodate so many recommendations into the limited sidebar space is the main
concern.
2An open system is one in which the structure of the system itself is capable of dynamically chang-
ing [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998]. The characteristics of such a system are that its components
are not known in advance, can change over time, and may be highly heterogeneous (in that they are
implemented by different people, at different times, using different software tools and techniques).
3In this work, we are not concerned with developing new recommendation methods. Our aim is
to efficiently coordinate existing (and future) methods so that the overall system produces the best
information to the user. We do not compare the relative performance of the methods. Rather our
concern lies with the fact that different methods make recommendations simultaneously and we let the
user decide which recommendations are good (irrespective of the specific methods they are provided by).
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Figure 1.2: The Marketplace
Good recommendation providers are encouraged and bad recommendation providers will eventually go
bankrupt.
At an abstract level, the problem of populating the limited space of the sidebar from
the large number of potential recommendations can be viewed as an example of a scarce
resource allocation problem. Given this observation, one of the best ways of allocating
resources is to sell them using free market techniques and ideas [Clearwater, 1996]. More
specifically, auctions are an excellent method of distributing resources to those who value
them most highly [Klemperer, 1999]. Here, an auction can simply be viewed as a market
institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the
basis of bids from the market participants [McAfee and McMillan, 1987]. In a typical
auction, there is an auctioneer, a seller and potential bidders. The auctioneer, acting
on behalf of the seller, wants to sell the item and get the highest possible price, while
the bidders, taking some bidding strategies to place bids, want to buy the item at the
lowest possible price [Vickrey, 1961, Milgrom, 1989, Klemperer, 1999]. In this context,
auctions are used to evaluate the recommendations, select the most valuable items and
direct them to the browser sidebar (as illustrated in Figure 1.2).
However, there is not a universal auction design that is applicable to every context.
Auctions vary from one another and these variations make the auctions more or less effi-
cient in particular types of application. In our case, the marketplace operates according
to the following metaphor. A user and the user agent acting on their behalf are selling
sidebar space where information may be displayed. Information providers are keen to
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Figure 1.3: Different Valuations of Quality
get their recommendations advertised in the user’s browser, and compete in the market-
place, ready to pay for such advertisements. Such information providers act as bidders.
Each recommendation bears a bidding price acting as one bid. The recommender system
acts as the auctioneer, ranking and selecting the most valuable items and recommending
them to the user. The user will then choose some of them according to his interests as
the next documents to be viewed. Those who provided such recommendations are the
winners in this auction and will receive some reward in return (since such documents
are deemed useful). Those documents not chosen by the user are deemed to have no
relevance to the current document and will therefore receive no reward. Thus, over the
longer-term, those agents that make good recommendations become richer and so are
able to get their recommendations advertised more frequently than the methods whose
recommendations are infrequently chosen by the user.
Given this background, however, none of the standard auction protocols can be used
directly (for reasons outlined in more detail in section 2.4). Thus, this work had to
develop a bespoke mechanism in order to realise this system (see Chapter 3 for more
details).
Before delving into the details of the system design, it is important to clarify how the
various measures of quality in the above discussion can be used to make the market
function. In more detail, how good a recommendation is and whether a system works
well are eventually decided by the user’s opinion. To this end, all recommender systems
share the same objective of improving recommendation quality. However, most of the
existing systems lack a means of: (i) Specifically defining the quality of recommendations
from the viewpoint of the user and various recommendation methods, since they may
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Figure 1.4: The Black Box Coordinating Various Methods
view the quality differently; (ii) Correlating these different qualities in a meaningful
manner. In more detail, given a recommendation provided by a recommender agent with
a specific recommendation method, a user’s valuation of the recommendation may differ
from that of the recommender agent. For example, in Figure 1.3, a recommender agent
might highly rate a recommendation and therefore direct it to the user. However, the
user may see this as a poor quality recommendation that is not very interesting. Given
this situation, it is clear that the quality of a recommendation can be viewed from two
aspects. From the viewpoint of the user, how well a recommendation satisfies the user
is termed the user perceived quality (upq). From the viewpoint of a recommender agent
with a specific recommendation method, the relevance score it computes for a particular
recommendation is termed its internal quality (inq). Moreover, the inq value produced
by different methods can vary significantly from one another. Therefore, without a
systematic means of relating the upq to the recommendation methods’ inq, it is very
difficult to provide high quality recommendations. In this research, the key challenge is to
design a reward mechanism (that reflects the user’s satisfaction of the recommendations)
so that the marketplace can correlate the upq and the inq.
In short, the key role of the marketplace developed in our system is to try and connect
these two quality values by imposing a reward regime that incentivises the recommender
agents to bid in a manner that establishes an appropriate correlation between these
values and their bid price. In this way, the marketplace can be viewed as a black box
with recommendations provided by different recommender agents as the input and only
a few best recommendations passed through to the user as the output (see Figure 1.4).
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In sum, the thesis designs and evaluates the market-based mechanism as a means of co-
ordinating recommendations4. Through experiments and evaluations, we demonstrate
that the market-based approach to recommender systems is an effective means of coor-
dinating multiple different recommendation methods in one single system and that it is
an effective way of dealing with the problem of information overload by selecting only
the best items from whatever methods to be displayed to users. Specifically, it is not an
information filtering technique, nor a hybrid recommender system, but a novel approach
to making recommendations.
1.3 Research Contributions
The work described in this thesis advances the state of the art in the following ways:
(1) The market-based approach to recommender systems provides a novel method for
effectively coordinating the behaviour of multiple recommendation methods with
diverse measures of inq. The market-based design exhibits the following properties:
• The analytical studies demonstrate that the bespoke marketplace we have de-
signed is Pareto-optimal, maximizes social welfare and is individually rational.
• The empirical studies demonstrate that the market always converges, shortlists
recommendations in decreasing order of upq, gives clear incentives and is fair
to all constituent recommender agents, and is stable.
• The user studies demonstrate that the marketplace is an effective means of
coordinating multiple different recommendation methods and the system is
able to identify the best recommendations from the user’s perspective and can
suggest them frequently to users.
(2) We differentiate the quality of recommendations by two types of measurement: the
upq and the inq. No other recommender system uses upq or provides a mechanism
for correlating inq and upq.
4The credits paid by recommender agents for advertising their recommendations and the rewards
awarded to agents to encourage them to put forward good suggestions are not a real currency. Thus,
there is not a business model concerned with these credits and rewards, they are used only for the
coordination of the recommender agents in our system.
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(3) A novel reinforcement learning strategy is developed to assist recommender agents’
bidding so that they can best satisfy the users while still maximizing their revenue.
These contributions have been published in the following papers:
• Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Learning Users’ Interests
by Quality Classification in Market-Based Recommender Systems. IEEE Trans-
actions on Knowledge and Data Engineering. To appear. This paper supports the
above contribution point (3).
• Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. A Market-Based Ap-
proach to Recommender Systems. ACM Transactions on Information Systems.
To appear. This paper supports the above contribution points (1 & 2).
• Yan ZhengWei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Learning users’ interests in
a market-based recommender system. In Proc. of the 5th International Conference
on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning (IDEAL’04), pages 833–
840, Exeter, UK, 2004a. Springer LNCS 3177. This paper supports the above
contribution point (3).
• Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Market-based recom-
mender systems: Learning users’ interests by quality classification. In Proc. of the
6th International Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2004),
pages 119–133, New York, US, 2004b. This paper supports the above contribution
point (3).
• Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Market-based recom-
mendations: Design, simulation and evaluation. In Proc. of the 5th Interna-
tional Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2003), pages 63–
78, Melbourne, Australia, 2003a. Springer LNAI 3030. This paper supports the
above contribution points (1 & 2).
• Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Recommender systems:
A market-based design. In Proc. of the 2nd International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS03), pages 600–607, Mel-
bourne, Australia, 2003b. ACM Press. This paper supports the above contribution
points (1 & 2).
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• Luc Moreau, Norliza Zaini, Jing Zhou, Nicholas R. Jennings, Yan Zheng Wei,
Wendy Hall, David De Roure, Ian Gilchrist, Mark O’Dell, Sigi Reich, Tobias Berka,
and Claudia Di Napoli. A market-based recommender system. In Proc. of the
4th International Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2002),
pages 50–67, Bologna, July 2002. This paper supports the above contribution point
(1).
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the document is structured in the following manner:
Chapter 2 presents a literature review on recommender systems, online auctions, and
market-based recommender systems. This chapter provides a detailed discussion of these
terms, and will discuss what others have done in these areas.
Chapter 3 presents the detailed design of the main components of our market-based
recommender system. It deals with the evaluation techniques, auction protocol, reward
mechanism, bidding strategy, and a discussion of the market equilibrium.
Chapter 4 establishes the experimental settings of the reward agent, the recommender
agents and the user agent to simulate the marketplace empirically. This chapter then
empirically evaluates the system design by simulations of the marketplace equipped with
multiple recommendation methods.
Chapter 5 presents a recommender agent’s problem of learning users’ interests in terms
of correlating the inqs to the upqs of its recommendations in our marketplace, develops
the strategy we build for the recommender agents, and evaluates the learning strategy.
Chapter 6 presents the user evaluation of our market-based approach to recommender
systems. Specifically, this chapter sets out a number of evaluation metrics, presents a
typical user trial of our system, configures the marketplace and three recommendation
methods, and evaluates the system using a number of real users against the metrics we
set up.
Chapter 7 draws some conclusions on the system design and presents the plan for future
work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews the state of the art in conventional recommender systems (sec-
tion 2.1) and agent-oriented approaches to recommender systems (section 2.2), outlines
the fundamental principles and concepts of auction theory (section 2.4), outlines existing
work on market-based recommender systems (section 2.5) and presents some basics of
reinforcement learning (section 2.6).
2.1 Recommender Systems
To date, a large number of recommendation techniques have been developed. These are,
however, based mainly on three kinds of filtering techniques: content-based, collaborative
and demographic (although there is also some work on hybrid filtering techniques). Each
of these categories will be discussed in turn in this section.
2.1.1 Content-Based Filtering
Conventional techniques to deal with information overload typically exploit content-
based filtering techniques. Such filtering techniques recommend items for the user based
on the descriptions of previously evaluated items. They have been widely used in mak-
ing recommendations of information items. For example, Syskill recommends Web docu-
ments based on users’ binary ratings (“hot” and “cold”) of their interests [Pazzani et al.,
1996] and Newsweeder helps users filter Usenet news articles by learning the user’s profile
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based on his ratings [Lang, 1995]. Generally speaking, however, content-based filtering
approaches have a number of weaknesses in recommending good items:
• A user’s selection is often based on the subjective attributes (such as the quality,
style or point-of-view of items) of the item [Goldberg et al., 1992], whereas content-
based approaches are based on objective attributes (such as the text content of
a document) about the items and do not take the user’s perceived valuation of
such subjective attributes into account [Montaner et al., 2003]. For example, these
methods cannot distinguish between a well written and a badly written article if
both happen to use the same terms.
• Either the items must be of some machine parsable form (e.g. text), or attributes
must have been assigned to them by hand [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. With
current technology, media such as sound, photographs, art, video or physical items
cannot be analyzed automatically for relevant attribute information. Moreover, in
most cases, it is not practical or possible to assign these attributes by hand due to
limitations of resources.
• The techniques do not have an inherent method for generating serendipitous
finds [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. They tend to recommend more of what a
user has already seen. This is because content-based methods compare potential
items with items that the user has already seen. However, the user’s interests may
beyond the scope of the previously seen items. Thus, such interesting items can
hardly be recommended to the user.
2.1.2 Collaborative Filtering
A complementary technique that is also widely used is collaborative filtering [Goldberg
et al., 1992] (or social filtering [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]). The basic idea of col-
laborative filtering is people recommending items to one another [Terveen et al., 1997].
Collaborative filtering essentially automates the process of “word-of-mouth” recommen-
dations: items are recommended to a user based upon values assigned by other people
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with similar interests. The system determines which users have similar interests via stan-
dard formulas for computing statistical correlations (e.g., ratings on items of their inter-
ests) [Goldberg et al., 1992]. Collaborative filtering overcomes some of the limitations of
content-based filtering in that the items being filtered need not be amenable to parsing
by a computer. Moreover, recommendations are based on the users’ perceived quality of
items, rather than more objective properties of the items themselves [Shardanand and
Maes, 1995].
In more detail, collaborative filtering techniques match people with similar interests and
then recommend one person’s highly evaluated items to the others [Goldberg et al., 1992,
Resnick et al., 1994]. Thus, rather than computing the similarity of items (which relies
on machine analysis of content [Herlocker et al., 2000]), collaborative filtering computes
the similarity of user’s interests. This means that subjective data about items can be
incorporated into recommendations. This, in turn, facilitates serendipitous new finds
because interesting items from other users can extend the current user’s scope of inter-
est beyond his already seen items. In addition, collaborative filtering techniques can be
used to recommend both machine parsable items (such as textual articles [Terveen et al.,
1997]) and non-machine parsable ones (such as audio and video files [Shardanand and
Maes, 1995, Hill et al., 1995]). Indeed, perhaps the greatest strength of collaborative
techniques is that they are completely independent of any machine-readable representa-
tions of the objects being recommended. Thus, they work well for complex objects such
as music and movies where variations in taste are responsible for much of the variation
in preference [Burke, 2002].
Collaborative filtering techniques have been widely used in many application domains
(not only textual documents but also non machine-parsable media products). For ex-
ample, GroupLens is a system for collaborative filtering of Usenet news to help people
find articles they will like in the huge stream of available articles [Resnick et al., 1994,
Konstan et al., 1997]. The system displays predicted scores (i.e. inqs) for the items
suggested to its users and the users give their ratings (i.e. upqs) to the articles after
they read them. The system predicts items’ scores based on the heuristic that people
who agreed in the past will probably agree in the future with people who have similar in-
terests. Based on similar techniques of predicting scores of items, MovieLens is a system
for personalized recommendations for movies [Miller et al., 2003] and Ringo for music
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albums [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. However, collaborative filtering recommender
systems can do more than finding information items for people. They can even assist
people to find other people (rather than documents) with similar interests. MEMOIR
is such an example [DeRoure et al., 2001].
However, collaborative filtering approaches also have a number of shortcomings:
• Large numbers of people must participate so as to increase the likelihood that any
one person will find other users with similar interests [Terveen and Hill, 2001] (the
sparsity problem). The difficulty of achieving a critical mass of participants makes
collaborative filtering experiments expensive.
• A user whose interests share little with others’ will receive poor recommendations
on a collaborative basis. An extreme case of this phenomenon happens when new
users start off with nothing in their profiles of interests and must train a profile
from scratch (the “cold start problem” [Resnick and Varian, 1997]). Even with a
start profile, there is still a training period before the profile accurately reflects
the user’s preferences [Maltz and Ehrlich, 1995].
• These systems suffer from the “early-rater problem” [Montaner et al., 2003]: when
a new item appears in the database, there is no way it can be recommended to
a user until more information is obtained through another user either rating it or
specifying which other items it is similar to.
2.1.3 Demographic Filtering
The demographic approach uses descriptions of people (such as occupation, age and
gender) to learn the relationship between a single item and the type of people who like
it [Krulwich, 1997]. For example, a mature, sophisticated woman is likely to prefer
an expensive leather jacket, whereas a teenage schoolgirl may prefer a cheap denim
one. To date, there is only one widely recognized system, LifeStyle, that uses such a
technique [Krulwich, 1997].
However, this method has two principal shortcomings:
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• It creates profiles by classifying users using stereotypical descriptions [Rich, 1979].
Thus, the same items are recommended to people with similar demographic pro-
files. However, in many cases, the stereotypes are too general to generate good
quality recommendations [Montaner et al., 2003].
• If the user’s interests shift over time, demographic filtering does not adapt their
profile [Koychev, 2000]. For these reasons, demographic filtering is rarely used
independently of the other filtering techniques.
2.1.4 Hybrid Approaches
As can be seen, both content-based and collaborative filtering have weaknesses. More-
over, these weaknesses tend to complement one another [Montaner et al., 2003]. Thus,
hybrid filtering systems that integrate the two approaches have been advocated [Her-
locker et al., 2000]. In a hybrid system, both objective and subjective properties of
an item are taken into account in predicting its quality when making recommenda-
tions. For example, “collaboration via contents” filterbots integrate content-based fil-
tering techniques to build virtual users in the GroupLens collaborative system when new
recommendation items lack ratings [Sarwar et al., 1998], the Fab collaborative system
maintains user profiles by using content-based analysis [Balabanovic and Shoham, 1997],
Pazzani’s system involves user collaborations to determine the ratings of predicted items
and a content-based profile to compute similarity among users [Pazzani, 1999], Popes-
cul’s system uses secondary data (e.g. document contents) to predict users’ preferences
in collaborative recommendations when there is a lack of user ratings [Popescul et al.,
2001], and Claypoole’s system employs separate collaborative and content-based recom-
menders and uses an adaptive weighted average of the two in making its selections (as
the number of users accessing an item increases, the weight of the collaborative compo-
nent tends to increase [Claypool et al., 1999]). In addition, many business systems use
a hybrid filtering approach to recommend their products and services, such as Amazon
(http://www.amazon.com) and CDnow (http://www.cdnow.com).
While hybrid systems can sometimes overcome the shortcomings of pure content-based
and pure collaborative systems, with respect to the objective and subjective properties
of recommendations, they do so in a rigid and predetermined manner. Specifically,
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such systems try to use one of the recommendation properties (either objectiveness or
subjectiveness) to complement the weaknesses of the other when the latter does not work
effectively. However, there is no automated way of determining in what circumstances
which kind of properties (objective, subjective or both) are relevant to a particular user
in their current context.
2.1.5 Conclusion
Having an understanding of the basics of the different filtering techniques used in rec-
ommender systems, we can see that there is no universally best filtering technique for
all kinds of users in all various situations. Therefore, a bespoke mechanism that incor-
porates multiple techniques and lets only the best items pass through is needed. The
related work in terms of incorporating and coordinating multiple recommendation meth-
ods is discussed in section 2.5. However, before we do this, we discuss the agent-oriented
approach to recommender systems.
2.2 Agent-Oriented Recommender Systems
As exemplified above, many recommendation methods have been developed and it is
likely that many more will become available in the future. Moreover, we can see that
many recommender systems incorporate various techniques to assist recommendations
and interactions among various entities in a system. In this way, such systems will be-
come very complex. For these reasons, from the point of view of software engineering,
there is a need to maintain the system architecture so that it can work efficiently, when
new components and more interactions amongst them become available [Jennings, 2001].
Additionally, many existing recommender systems are personalized to make the recom-
mendations more effective to the users [Shardanand and Maes, 1995, Baclace, 1991,
Sheth and Maes, 1993, Lieberman, 1995]. This is because, on the one hand, people’s in-
terests differ from one another, as well as their behaviour against the recommendations.
On the other hand, the recommender can serve a user more effectively by learning his
interests. To this end, agents are an effective conceptual model for various components
of personalized environments [Maes, 1994].
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To be more specific, here, an agent can be viewed as a computer system situated in
some environment, that is capable of autonomous actions in that environment in order
to meet its design objectives [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]. Agents have a variety of
characteristics that make them an appropriate solution for complex systems in general:
(i) They are capable of dealing with the dynamically changing characteristics of open
systems. (ii) They represent a powerful tool for making complex, large or unpredictable
systems modular [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998]. In this way, the overall problem can
be partitioned into a number of smaller and simpler components, which are easier to
develop and maintain. (iii) They assist with the human computer interaction because
they can be personalized to their owner. Agents can thus act as “expert assistants” with
respect to some application, embodying knowledge about both the application and the
users, and capable of assisting the users to achieve their goals [Jennings and Wooldridge,
1998].
In addition to these general reasons, we believe an agent-oriented approach is suitable
in this particular context, because:
1. Users can naturally be represented in the system by user agents [Maes, 1994] that
act autonomously on their behalf, finding information relevant to them, but also
observing their activities, so that the system can tailor its answers to their needs.
2. Information sources can naturally be represented as active agents whose objective
is to ensure their content is widely disseminated to appropriate users.
3. The open nature of a recommender system means the software components need
to interact in flexible ways and that such interactions cannot be hand-crafted at
design time.
These benefits have been recognized by a number of researchers and this has led to the
development of a number of agent-based recommender systems. Relevant examples of
such systems include:
• Fab combined content-based and collaborative filtering techniques to recommend
items [Balabanovic and Shoham, 1997]. It is a hybrid system that seeks to incor-
porate the advantages of both methods. The Fab agents are used to search and
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index Web documents, and for profiling group interests. They enable the system
to automatically identify emergent communities of interest in the user population,
which enables enhanced group awareness and communications.
• MEMOIR uses trails, open hypermedia link services and a set of software agents
to assist users in accessing and navigating vast amounts of information in Internet
environments [DeRoure et al., 2001]. Additionally, it exploits trail data to support
users in finding colleagues with similar interests, since users with similar interests
follow similar paths and therefore they leave comparable trails. MEMOIR differs
from previous systems in that it aims to find users rather than documents.
• Linking in Context provides a service that automatically recommends relevant Web
document links to the user’s current context, such that the user does not need to
consult any external search facilities [El-Beltagy et al., 2001]. In more detail, the
system coordinates different types of agents to extract document context, and
generates and categorizes links into clusters according to different users’ interests.
When new types of users’ interests become available, new link clusters are added
into the system.
2.3 Improving the Quality of Recommendations
Although both agent and non-agent based recommender systems have a number of ad-
vantages in comparison to pure filtering systems, most of them still suffer from problems
related to quality of recommendations. These include:
• The quality of the recommendations with respect to the user’s preferences needs
to be improved [Sarwar et al., 2000]. Users need recommendations they can trust
to help them find what they like. If the recommendations provided by the recom-
mender system are poor, then the system will not be used.
• It is difficult to match the various recommendation methods’ inq to the upq. This
is because the inq is based on a recommendation method’s internal valuation of
a recommendation, while the upq is based on the user’s valuation of it. And, as
discussed in section 1.2, these two valuations can be very different.
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• There is not a universal criterion to evaluate which methods are better than the
others. Therefore, there is not a universally best recommendation method that
can always suggest the best recommendations in all circumstances. Moreover, it is
difficult to compare and evaluate the different methods that are available [Breese
et al., 1998]. This is due to the fact that different recommendation methods are
based on different notions. For example, some are based on the correlation between
the item contents (such as term frequency inverse document frequency [Salton and
McGill, 1983] and weighting [El-Beltagy et al., 2001]), while others are based on
the correlation between users’ interests (such as votes [Goldberg et al., 1992] and
trails [DeRoure et al., 2001]).
A number of recommenders have tried to address these research challenges. Specifically,
Yu et al. [2001] introduced an information theoretic approach to measure the relevance
of a user for predicting the preference for the given target concept. The learning ap-
proach [Sheth and Maes, 1993, Baclace, 1991, Billsus and Pazzani, 1998] to personalized
information filtering using relevance feedback and genetic algorithms also helps in the
context of improving the quality of recommendations. Finally, Sheth [Sheth and Maes,
1993] has demonstrated a system with a collection of information filtering interface
agents which has learning capabilities of specializing users’ interests and exploring new
potential domains to predict the users’ preferences so as to provide good recommen-
dations. Now all these approaches make it possible to provide good recommendations
from the viewpoint of one specific recommendation method itself. However, they are
still weak in improving the quality from the user’s point of view. Additionally, they
still lack a regime that can seek the best recommendations across a number of different
methods in a single system. Therefore, these approaches are still some distance away
from meeting the objective of suggesting the best recommendations in all possible cir-
cumstances. In contrast, we believe that the best way of dealing with this problem is
to allow multiple recommendation methods to co-exist and to provide an overarching
system that coordinates their outputs such that only the best recommendations (from
whatever source or method) are presented to the user. To make this a reality, however,
a number of key challenges need to be overcome:
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1. Given multiple recommendation methods, it is comparatively easy to provide the
user with a multitude of recommendations. However, the challenge is to filter
them to the user in a decreasing order of upq, given that there is no comparability
among different methods’ inqs. Moreover, another difficulty is that the notion of
quality is not absolute, but rather it is user-defined and varies over time, typically
according to the user’s interests and activities.
2. Many methods for suggesting relevant information already exist and more will
be developed in the future. Some may be specialized to specific media such as
audio or video [Hill et al., 1995]; others may be particularly suited to process
information in text documents [Maltz, 1993]; while yet others are more efficient in
specific application domains [DeRoure et al., 2001]. From an architectural point
of view, this means the challenge is to design a modular system that has the
ability to accommodate multiple recommending methods, and to integrate them
in a seamless and dynamic fashion as they appear on line.
As outlined in section 1.2, the means we have chosen to manage the multiple recom-
menders in a marketplace. To this end, section 2.4 explains the basic concepts of auctions
in more detail.
2.4 Auction Theory
Auctions are an efficient and effective market mechanism. They are important in our
research because they are an efficient means of allocating scarce resource. Moreover, the
underlying economic theories are well-studied [Klemperer, 1999, Vickrey, 1961, Milgrom
and Weber, 1982, McAfee and McMillan, 1987, Milgrom, 1989] and are suitable for
modeling various market participants in experiments. In this context, we are not going to
provide a detailed survey on auction theory (see [Klemperer, 1999] for such information).
Instead, we report on the issues related to agent-mediated on-line auctions that are
relevant to our context.
In designing an auction mechanism, two key issues are essential: the protocol and the
agents’ strategy [Jennings et al., 2001], each of which will be dealt with in turn.
Chapter 2 Literature Review 23
Formally, a protocol is a set of norms that constrain the proposals that the auction
participants are able to make [Jennings et al., 2001]. To date, thousands of different
auction protocols have been devised [Wellman et al., 2001]. However, four standard
auctions are widely used and analyzed: the ascending auction (also called the English
auction), the descending auction (also called the Dutch auction), the first-price sealed-
bid auction (sometimes called the Yankee auction), and the second-price sealed-bid
auction (also called the Vickrey auction).
In the ascending auctions, the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains,
and that bidder wins the object at the final price. This auction can be run by having
the seller announce prices, by having the bidders call out prices themselves, or by having
bids submitted electronically with the best current bid posted. The descending auction
works in exactly the opposite way: the auctioneer starts at a very high price, and then
lowers it continuously. The first bidder that calls out to accept the current price wins
the good at that price.
In the first-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder independently submits a single bid,
without seeing others’ bids, and the good is sold to the bidder who makes the highest
bid. The winner pays his bid. In the second-price sealed-bid auction, everything is the
same as in the first-price sealed bid auction except that the good is sold to the bidder
who makes the highest bid, but at a price of the second-highest bidder’s bid.
In all of these cases, if there is more than one item to be sold, the items can all be sold
at the same price (called price uniformity) or they may be sold at different prices (called
price differentiation). In this work, we consider auctions with price differentiation since
these allow a seller to obtain the maximum possible profit [Varian, 2003] p434-436 (refer
to section 3.2 for more details).
Given a specific auction protocol, a bidder’s strategy is the decision making model that
they use in order to decide what actions to take [Jennings et al., 2001]. For example, a
bidder’s best strategy, irrespective of others’, in an English auction is to bid actively until
the price reaches the value of the good to him [Milgrom and Weber, 1982]. As another
example, a bidder’s best strategy in a second-price sealed-bid auction is to submit a bid
equal to the value of the good to him [Milgrom and Weber, 1982]. Generally speaking,
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however, for most auction protocols the strategy is not so simple and significant work
needs to be invested in order to design it.
To date, however, comparatively little work has been done on using auction-based tech-
niques to implement recommender systems. The reason for this is that recommender
systems have typically not incorporated multiple recommendation methods. Thus there
is no need for a coordination mechanism. There are, however, two systems that have
exploited this approach and these are discussed in section 2.5.
2.5 Market-Based Recommender Systems
Bohte et al. [2001] developed a system that used a competitive market-based allocation
of consumer attention space from the user’s perspective. In the marketplace, supplier
agents compete with each other to attract the user’s attention. The system uses an
(n + 1) auction, in which all winners pay the (n + 1)th price (i.e. there is no price
differentiation) and n is the number of items for competition. This work investigates
the user’s behaviour in making choices when faced multiple items. Three user models are
demonstrated: 1. independent visits with several purchases, 2. independent visits with
one expected purchase, and 3. search-till-found behaviour. According to [Bohte et al.,
2001], model 1 shows very efficient allocation of recommendations, whereas in models
2 and 3 efficient allocation is difficult to obtain. This is because the recommendation
provider’s expected payoff is dependent on the allocation of the other recommendations.
In this work, we believe the user’s behaviour models when making decisions in the face
of a list of recommendations are worth following (see section 4.1.3). However, this work
has a number of limitations when it comes to being used in a recommender system
context:
• This work is not concerned with the upq. Therefore, the recommenders cannot
readily learn the user’s actual interests.
• The auction protocol requires all recommender agents to pay identically for differ-
ent selected items and comparatively little information is conveyed by the system
(primarily a signal of selection). With only identical information of different se-
lections, the system cannot differentiate between the various selected items and so
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neither can the recommender agents. Thus, the recommender agents cannot learn
to improve the quality of their recommendations according to a user’s interest.
• This work is not targeted specifically at recommendations, but rather at the al-
location of consumer’s attention space. In other words, this work concerns the
user’s behaviour when facing a list of recommendations rather than producing
high quality recommendations.
The second piece of work in this vein was our initial attempt at coordinating multiple
recommendation methods in a single system as detailed in [Moreau et al., 2002]. In
this work, an extensible modular recommender system suggesting relevant Web docu-
ments to the user’s context is developed. The system is capable of integrating multiple
recommendation methods. Moreover, a marketplace is developed in the system to co-
ordinate various methods in making recommendations. The system also exhibited the
efficient capability of incorporating multiple recommendation methods in a single system
in a seamless manner. However, without modelling the user, the marketplace fails to
meet the objective of making high quality recommendations with respect to the user’s
interests:
• Without investigating the user’s valuation of the recommendations (the upq), the
recommendations provided by various methods based on their individual valuation
of the items (the inq) are blindly made to the user (because the methods do not
know whether the user likes the recommendations). Moreover, without defining
the upq, the system fails to incentivise recommending agents about the user’s
interests. And the system has difficulty in knowing which recommendations are
better given a user’s context. Therefore, it is difficult to present the user with a
list of recommendations in decreasing order of the user perceived quality.
• The marketplace is not economically efficient because of the way it limited the
rewards. More specifically, there is only one recommendation rewarded in each
auction. The rewarded item is always the first bid which is predicted to be the
best. However, a real user may not select the first bid item. Moreover, he may
select multiple recommendations in one auction in the real circumstances. Thus,
the system should reward all user-selected items and more than one agent could
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learn the user’s interests in each auction. Therefore, one reward regime limited
the system learning capability of the user’s interests. Moreover, the amount of
each reward is based on the other agents’ bids. In this way, the reward and the
bidding price are based upon each other. Thus, the reward is in no way related
to the user’s valuation of a recommendation and therefore cannot incentivise the
agents about the user’s interests. In an efficient market, the reward and the price
should indicate the value and cost of a good so as to incentivise the agents how
the user values an item and how much to bid on it.
• The system cannot stop bad recommendations. This is because the reward regime
is not based on the upq of the recommendations. Thus, bad recommendations can
also bid to a suitable level to be shortlisted and rewarded continuously. However,
we expect a good marketplace to have the capability to encourage good recom-
mendations and discourage bad ones.
Against this background, none of the standard auction protocols are suitable to regulate
our marketplace. This is because:
• Usually, there is only one bidder who wins in the standard auction protocols.
However, there may be more than one bidder (the recommender agents) who wins
in our auction.
• In the standard auction protocols, there is no notion of reward. However, in our
auction, the system will reward the winners for making good recommendations.
Therefore, we need to develop a bespoke auction protocol, including a reward mechanism,
to regulate the agents in our marketplace. With such an auction protocol, we also need
to design a bespoke strategy for the agents. And these will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 3.
2.6 Reinforcement Learning
In terms of suggesting good recommendations, an agent in our system needs to classify
its recommendations into different inq categories and correlate these categories to the
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user’s preferences. This is because, by frequently suggesting items from those categories
that best satisfy the users, a self-interested agent is able to maximize its revenue. To
do this, an agent needs to make trials over these categories and see which make profits
(by receiving rewards) and which lose credits (by paying for the bid, while not receiving
rewards). Now this kind of “trial-and-error” learning behaviour is exactly what happens
in Reinforcement Learning [Mitchell, 1997].
Generally speaking, in reinforcement learning, an agent is assumed to be situated in a
multi-state environment where the agent’s actions determine both its immediate reward
and the next state of the environment. Moreover, this state transition affects the agent’s
future actions and, consequently, its future expected rewards. Thus, the expected future
reward needs to be factored into the agent’s current decision making. Therefore, in this
kind of problem, an agent needs to learn which actions are desirable based on rewards
that can be obtained arbitrarily far in the future. In this context, Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs) are a typical model of this kind of reinforcement learning [Mitchell,
1997]. An MDP consists of a set of states (s), a set of actions (a), a state transition
function (δ(st, at) = st+1) and a reward function with respect to the transitions (r =
(st, at)). The MDPmodel makes the complicated decision making processes intuitive and
simplified by estimating the overall payoff (current reward plus the discounted delayed
rewards in future) of all the possible state transitions (all combinations of the state-
action pair (si, aj)). After this estimation profile converges, an agent’s optimal action
selection strategy is choosing the action with the maximal overall payoff at any given
state. However, in the context of our market-based recommender’s learning, taking one
action is independent of taking another (because future rewards are only based on future
recommendations’ upqs and have no relationship to the current recommendation) (see
details in section 5.2.1). In other words, the learning strategy we need does not have the
concept of states and state transition. It considers the actions and their corresponding
rewards only.
The most relevant work to our context in terms of reinforcement learning is the k-armed
gambling problem [Berry and Fristedt, 1985]. In the k-armed gambling problem, an
agent faces k gambling machines, each of which has a payoff probability of zero or one.
The agent needs to learn the average payoffs that can be obtained from each gambling
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machine (or from each inq segment in our case) as quickly as possible, while still maxi-
mizing its revenue. In this context, the solution to the k-armed gambling problem also
suits our problem. Specifically, Berry and Fristedt developed a recursive algorithm to
find the optimal strategy to gain the maximal payoffs in the case that the agent is per-
mitted a fixed number of pulls [Berry and Fristedt, 1985]. However, in our context, the
recommender agents do not have a limit on the number of interactions they can have
with the marketplace. Thus, we aim to develop an unbiased optimal strategy by allowing
the agents to gain sufficient experience. Gittins also tackles the k-armed gambling prob-
lem [Gittins, 1989]. His “allocation index” method indexes all the actions that an agent
experienced with a combined value of the expected payoff of each action and the value of
the information that can be obtained by choosing it. The agent then chooses the action
with the largest index value and this is shown to guarantee the optimal balance between
exploration and exploitation. However, this technique only applies if the expected future
rewards are discounted, which is inappropriate in our context because future rewards are
equally important as the current ones in our system (thus we do not discount rewards).
Thrun also develops an exploration strategy for the k-armed gambling problem [Thrun,
1992]. Specifically, his strategy always chooses the action with the highest payoff. How-
ever, this strategy may produce a biased estimation from the true expectation, since the
actions with negative signals received in the beginning may have insufficient experience
to produce biased expectations (as we discuss in section 5.2.3). In contrast, we aim to
build a strategy that can produce an unbiased expectation. Kaelbling’s interval-based
technique can be seen as an extension of Thrun’s greedy strategy [Kaelbling, 1993]. Her
approach computes the upper bound of the confidence interval on the success probabil-
ities of all actions and chooses the one with the highest upper bound. However, this
approach relies on an a priori analysis of the payoff distribution of each action. This
approach also has the shortcoming that insufficient experience in the beginning of learn-
ing may produce biased confidence intervals and this, in turn, also induces a bias from
optimum.
In sum, none of the above learning strategies is suitable for the recommender agents in
our marketplace. Therefore, a specific strategy needs to be developed for our context,
and this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2 Literature Review 29
2.7 Summary
We believe that with the growing number of recommendation methods and in the face
of evolving users’ interests, there is a need to develop a mechanism capable of accommo-
dating multiple recommendation methods (both existing and forthcoming) and let them
work together to provide high quality recommendations. In this context, agent-mediated
online auctions appear to be a promising method for coordinating such system. Thus,
the key challenge of this research is to develop the market mechanisms that have the
capability to incentivise various recommending agents to bid according to the user’s
valuation of their recommendations such that only a small number of the most valuable
items will be directed to the user. Additionally, a good learning strategy for recom-
menders to learn users’ interests so that they can make good recommendations while
still maximize their revenue is another research challenge.
Chapter 3
Auction Mechanism Design for
the Recommender System
This chapter discusses the design of the auction for our recommender system. In this
endeavor, there are two major issues that need to be addressed: the protocol and the
strategies (as detailed in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).
This chapter contributes to the thesis with the auction mechanism being designed. The
mechanism we developed for our system is theoretically proved to be able to give incen-
tives of users’ interests to recommender agents by rewarding the user-selected recom-
mendations. A reward mechanism is also developed to incentivise recommender agents
about the users’ interests. The mechanism follows the principle of good recommen-
dations making positive revenue by receiving rewards, whereas bad recommendations
make a loss by paying to be shortlisted but not receiving any rewards. Additionally, the
reward mechanism we developed is Pareto optimal and maximizes social welfare. With
the auction protocol and reward mechanism in place, a set of rational bidding strategies
are also developed for agents to make their recommendations. Finally, we theoretically
proved that the marketplace is able to dynamically reach the equilibria. And at the
equilibria, we show the recommender agents are able to reason about the relationship
between the bidding prices and the rewards so as to maximize their revenue.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the auction protocol (section 3.2) and reward
mechanism design (section 3.3), the agents’ bidding strategies (section 3.4), as well as
a theoretical analysis on how the marketplace works to relate the agents’ bids to their
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corresponding rewards (section 3.5). First, however, some central evaluation criteria for
mechanism design are presented.
3.1 Evaluation Metrics
Designing market mechanisms is an engineering design task, in which the rules should
be developed in order to meet particular objectives, either for certain participants or
for society as a whole [Roth, 2002]. In seeking to design the market mechanism for
our recommender system, therefore, our first step is to identify the properties that we
would like our auction to exhibit. This then gives us the requirements against which we
can evaluate our design. In particular we would like to design a market that has the
following standard properties [Sandholm, 1999, Varian, 2003, Dash et al., 2003]:
Ê Pareto Efficiency: A solution x is Pareto efficient if there is no other solution x′
such that at least one agent is better off in x′ than in x and no agent is worse off
in x′ than in x. Pareto efficiency provides us with a way of comparing alternative
mechanisms and good mechanisms should be designed to maximize allocation ef-
ficiency [Roth, 2002, Sandholm, 1999, Varian, 2003]. This is important from the
point of view of the individual agents because if a non-Pareto efficient mechanism
is chosen then the design could be improved upon (for at least one agent) without
making any of the other agents worse off.
Ë Social Welfare Maximization: In our context, social welfare is a numeric measure
of the sum of all agents’ utilities. In contrast to Pareto efficiency, social welfare
provides a way to rank different social preferences over the various solutions and
to indicate which is best for the group of agents as a whole [Kagel and Roth, 1995].
This is a supplement to the Pareto efficient criterion. From the viewpoint of indi-
vidual agents, there may exist many Pareto efficient solutions to the given problem
that cannot be distinguished between. In such cases, social welfare maximization
provides a way of differentiating between them by determining which is the best
from the social point of view [Sandholm, 1999, Varian, 2003].
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Ì Individual Rationality: Participation in an auction is individually rational for an
agent if its payoff in the auction is no less than what it would get by not participat-
ing. A mechanism is individually rational if participation is individually rational
for all agents [Sandholm, 1999]. Individually rational protocols are essential in
our context because all agents (representing the various recommendation meth-
ods) need a clear incentive to participate in the market so that the best possible
recommendations can be picked by the market. Indeed, if the protocol is not indi-
vidually rational for some agents, they would simply not participate in the auction
and their recommendations would be lost.
Í Convergence: If the prices for the goods being allocated converge after a number
of rounds of auctions, the market is said to be convergent. This is important from
the viewpoint of the bidding agents since it enables them to learn to bid rationally
at a certain level for a given type of good (characterized by upq level in this case)
in order to maximize their revenue [Roth, 2002]. Without convergence, an agent
will never know how much to bid with respect to a given recommendation and
therefore the marketplace behaviour will be chaotic.
Î Effective Shortlist in Decreasing Order of UPQ: This is the common aim of all
recommender systems [Herlocker et al., 2004]. The marketplace should be capable
of shortlisting the recommendations in decreasing order of the upq after a number
of auction iterations. This is important from the point of view of the users since
they only want a small number of the best recommendations.
Ï Clear Incentives: A good mechanism design should give agents incentives to act in
particular way, such that the system’s global goal is attained despite the individual
goal of the self-interested agents [Dash et al., 2003, Sandholm, 1999]. In our
context, the protocol should be able to incentivise the recommender agents about
the user’s interests so that they can bid differently for different inq levels. This is
important because a recommender agent needs to relate its bids to the inq of the
recommendations through the feedback from the marketplace which reflects the
user’s preferences.
Ð Fairness: A good market mechanism should be fair to all participants [Roth,
2002, Dash et al., 2003]. In our context, a protocol is fair if it gives all constituent
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recommenders equal opportunity of suggesting their recommendations to users (ir-
respective of the agent or method that generates them). This is important because
we want the system to shortlist the best recommendations in an unbiased manner
meaning that the system does not degenerate to a single constituent recommender.
Ñ Stability: A protocol is stable if it provides all agents with an incentive to behave
in a particular way over time. The marketplace should be designed to be stable
because if a self-interested agent is better off behaving in some other manner than
desired, it will do so [Sandholm, 1999]. Thus, an unstable protocol allows agents
to behave with intentions that make the system deviate from its best potential
outcome [Roth, 2002]. Therefore, stability is important because without it the
system behaviour is unpredictable.
With these metrics in place, sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 detail the auction protocol we
designed, the reward mechanism we established and the bidding strategies of the indi-
vidual agents. Section 3.5 then analyzes how the market performs with such market
mechanisms and the bidding strategies in place. Section 3.6 evaluates the auction mech-
anism against the first three metrics when analyzing the market equilibrium, whereas
the evaluations against the last five metrics will be discussed in Chapter 4. We have
organized the evaluation in such a way because the first three points are set from a pure
economic point of view and, therefore, the marketplace can be evaluated against them
at design time. The remaining five items relate to the quality of the system’s output
and can only be evaluated by experiments.
3.2 The Auction Protocol
This section defines the auction protocol for managing the multiple recommender agents
(as per Figure 1.2 on page 7). To ensure recommendations are provided in a timely and
computationally efficient manner, we choose a generalized first-price sealed-bid auction
in which all agents whose recommendations are shortlisted pay an amount equal to
their valuation of the advertisement (meaning we have price differentiation). We choose
a sealed bid auction (in which agents will typically make a single bid) to minimize
the time for running the auction and the amount of communication generated. We
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choose a first price auction with price differentiation because the relative ordering of the
recommendations affects the likelihood of them being selected by the user. In particular,
in the market, each information provider agent is keen to get their recommendations
advertised to the user. Each agent has a valuation of the advertisement (which will
be different between the different agents) and is willing to pay up to this amount to
display its recommendations. When an agent gets its recommendations short-listed,
and therefore advertised to the user’s browser, it has consumed the advertisement service
provided by the recommender system. In return, it needs to pay an amount of credit to
the system.
In more detail, the market operates in the following manner. Each time when an auc-
tion is activated, the user requests recommendations of Web documents. In each such
activation, the auctioneer agent calls for a number of bids, say M (M > 0) equal to the
number of recommendations it is seeking. Then, each constituent recommender agent
submits M bids to the auctioneer agent (each bid contains a recommendation and a
price). After a fixed time, the auctioneer agent ranks all the bids it received by their
bidding price, and directs the M bids with the highest prices to the user’s browser (as
recommendations in the sidebar — see Figure 1.1). Those bidding agents whose recom-
mendations are shortlisted pay the auctioneer agent according to how much they bid.
Those bidding agents whose recommendations are not shortlisted do not pay anything.
The user may then take up a number of these shortlisted recommendations in which
case the agent that supplied them is rewarded.
The protocol for each auction round is formally defined in Figure 3.1. It should be
noted that: (i) function GenerateBid (Abi, recj , pricej) relates to the bidding strategy
and will be discussed in section 3.4; (ii) function UserSelectsRecs(SU) concerns the
user’s behaviour of making choices among the shortlisted recommendations and will be
discussed in section 4.1.3; and (iii) function ComputeReward(bh) concerns the reward
mechanism and will be discussed in section 3.3.
3.3 The Reward Mechanism
With the auction protocol in place, we now turn to the reward mechanism. According
to our protocol, the user may select multiple recommendations from the shortlist. For
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The Variables:
• S: the number of recommender agents (S > 1);
• Ab1, Ab2, ..., AbS : S bidding agents;
• AB : complete set of bidding agents, i.e., Ab1, Ab2, ..., AbS ;
• Tb: duration of the auction;
• M : number of recommendations that the auctioneer agent requests;
• bij = 〈Abi, recj , pricej〉: bid provided by Abi, containing the jth recommendation with
bidding price pricej (i ∈ [1..S], j ∈ [1..M ]);
• BALL: a set of bids which represents all bids submitted to the auctioneer agent;
• BM : a set of bids which represents the shortlisted bids that will be recommended to the user;
• BR: a set of bids which represents those selected by the user (and will be rewarded by the
auctioneer agent);
• SU : a set of recommendations displayed in the user’s sidebar (i.e. BM ignoring the prices);
• SUR: a set of recommendations that are selected by the user (i.e. BR ignoring the prices);
• N : number of user-selected recommendations;
• bl, bh: two bids for temporary use (l, h ∈ [1..M ]);
• Rh: reward to hth user-selected recommendation.
The Algorithm:
BALL = φ;
BM = φ;
BR = φ; // system initialization
CallForBids(AB ,M, Tb); // system calls for bids
repeat during the duration of auction Tb
{
bij = GenerateBid(Abi, urlj , pricej);
BALL = BALL ∪ {bij};
}
for l = 1 to M do // shortlist M highest bids
{
bl = FindBidWithLthTopPrice(B
ALL, l);
BM = BM ∪ {bl};
}
SU = { 〈Abi, urlj〉 | 〈Abi, urlj , pricej〉 ∈ BM}; // the set of shortlisted urls
SUR = UserSelectsURLs(SU); // user makes selection (SUR ⊆ SU)
BR = { 〈Abi, urlj , pricej〉 | 〈Abi, urlj〉 ∈ SUR and 〈Abi, urlj , pricej〉 ∈ BM};
N = |BR|; // the number of user selected items
for h = 1 to N do
{ // reward the user selected items
bh = FindHthBid(B
R, h);
Rh = ComputeReward(bh);
}
Figure 3.1: The Auction Protocol
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each such user-selected recommendation, the suggesting agent is given a reward. A
given agent may have multiple recommendations selected in a given auction in which
case it receives multiple rewards. In defining the ComputeReward function, our aim is
to ensure that it is both Pareto efficient and social welfare maximizing (as per section
3.1). To this end, this section addresses the following issues: (i) How is one reward
mechanism judged to be better than another? (ii) Does there exist a reward mechanism
that is the best amongst all possible mechanisms? First, however, a complete set of
reward mechanisms is introduced.
3.3.1 The Complete Set of Reward Mechanisms
Let us assume we have N (defined in section 3.2) user-selected recommendations to be
rewarded and the auctioneer has an amount of payoff, RT , to be distributed to the
relevant agents. The problem is then how to best split RT into parts and distribute
them to each of the rewarded recommender agents such that we cannot find any other
more optimal allocation solutions.
To this end, we define the complete set of reward mechanisms as follows: Suppose the
hth (h ∈ [1..N ]) user-selected recommendation receives an amount of payoff Rh. Then,
all possible reward mechanisms are such that the sum of each payoff is less than or
equal to RT . That is,
∑N
h=1Rh ≤ RT . Therefore, we have a complete set of reward
mechanisms, <ˆ, such that:
<ˆ = { (R1, R2, · · · , RN ) |
∑N
h=1Rh ≤ RT }
Now each element of <ˆ is a possible allocation of RT and <ˆ can be split into two
complementary subsets: <ˆ1 that does not completely allocate all of RT (called a With
Surplus Mechanism (WSM)) and <ˆ2 that does allocate all of RT (called a No Surplus
Mechanism (NSM)):
<ˆ1 = { (R1, R2, · · · , RN ) |
∑N
h=1Rh < R
T } (WSM)
<ˆ2 = { (R1, R2, · · · , RN ) |
∑N
h=1Rh = R
T } (NSM)
From these two subsets, we want to identify those that are both Pareto efficient and
social welfare maximizing.
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Figure 3.2: Pareto Optimization
3.3.2 Pareto Optimal Reward Mechanisms
If there is only one recommendation to be rewarded, it is trivially true that awarding all
of RT to this recommendation is the Pareto optimal solution. However, when there is
more than one recommendation to be rewarded, the allocation is more complicated. To
simplify the presentation, we discuss the case where two recommendations are rewarded
(i.e., N = 2). This is chosen since it can easily be depicted and it gives us a direct
impression of allocation. The general case with multiple recommendations rewarded
(N ≥ 2) can be analyzed in the same way.
To this end, Figure 3.2 depicts the case where there are two recommendations to be
rewarded (R1 and R2). The axes represent the payoff allocated to each recommendation.
We define the budget payoff curve as the line joining (0, RT ) and (RT , 0) and it represents
the payoffs whose sum is RT . The triangle formed by the budget payoff curve and the
axes, including the edges, contains all possible allocations of RT . The outcome of each
possible reward mechanism corresponds to a point within this area1. Those points
on the budget payoff curve represent the elements of NSM since each of these points
allocates the total amount of RT . For example, for point M2, R1 = r12, R2 = r22 and
R1 + R2 = r12 + r22 = RT . Generally speaking, therefore, any mechanism in the set
1One point in this area may represent multiple reward mechanisms since different mechanisms may
result in the same outcome. In this case, our concern is how much the reward to one recommendation
is related to the reward of another. Hence, we are concerned only with the outcome and ignore what
specific reward mechanism the outcome comes from.
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NSM maximizes the total payoff and it is impossible to distinguish between any of these
points. A mechanism that produces a reward in the triangle, but not on the budget
payoff curve, is by definition in the WSM set. For example, for point M1, R1 = r12,
R2 = r21 and R1 +R2 = r12 + r21 < RT .
In terms of Pareto efficiency, for any point representing a WSM outcome, at least one
Pareto optimal point can be found representing a related NSM. For example, in Fig-
ure 3.2, point M1 (in WSM) can straightforwardly be transformed into M2 (in NSM)
by giving R2 the extra amount of reward (r22 − r21). However, those points on the
budget curve cannot be improved upon since giving extra reward to either recommenda-
tion necessarily results in a loss to the other. Therefore, all NSM outcomes are Pareto
efficient.
3.3.3 Social Welfare Maximizing Reward Mechanisms
Pareto efficiency has nothing to say about the distribution of welfare across agents.
Thus, given two mechanisms that produce outcomes that are both Pareto efficient, it is
not possible to say which is better. Thus, we need a further means of differentiation. To
this end, we seek to define a social welfare function that is able to assign a ranking to
all Pareto efficient mechanisms. This ranking specifies the “social preference” [Varian,
2003] p590 of a distribution of overall welfare to different rewarded recommendations
and should ensure that recommendations are rewarded according to how good they are.
However, in our system, there are two different views on the quality of a recommendation:
internal quality and user perceived quality (see section 1.2). The inq is used to compute
the agents’ bid price — the higher the quality, the higher its bid price. The upq
indicates how a recommendation satisfies the user. Since the recommender system’s
objective is to satisfy the user, the marketplace’s objective is to shortlist the most valuable
recommendations in decreasing order of user perceived quality. Therefore, we decide to
reward the user-selected recommendations based on the upq and this quality can be
defined as Qh ∈ [1..100] (h ∈ [1..N ]). To do this, we can segment our set of potential
reward mechanisms that are Pareto efficient (i.e. <ˆ2) into two complementary subsets
— those that allocate reward in a manner proportional to the upq and those that do
not:
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Proportional Reward Mechanism (PRM)
<ˆP = { (R1, R2, · · · , RN ) | Rh = Qh∑N
i=1Qi
×RT , where h ∈ [1..N ]}
Non-Proportional Reward Mechanism (NPM) 2
<ˆN = <ˆ2 − <ˆP
Given these two sets, we can now define our social welfare function in terms of utility.
As noted above, we want the system to prefer a reward mechanism that distributes
the welfare to the user-selected recommendations according to how well they satisfy the
user. Therefore, a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function [Varian, 2003] is introduced.
This function shows preferences of the inputs in a manner proportional to the value of
their powers:
U(R1, R2, · · · , RN ) = R1Q1 ·R2Q2 · · · · ·RNQN (3.1)
In this function, the powers, Q1, Q2, · · · , QN , describe how important each rewarded
agent’s utility is to the overall social welfare. Specifically, a reward mechanism, mi =
(R1,i, R2,i, · · · , RN,i) is better than (or more socially-preferred to) mj = (R1,j , R2,j ,
· · · , RN,j), if U(mi) > U(mj).
Our objective now is to find if there exists a best mechanism within <ˆ2. Thus, we need
to determine if there is a mechanism that has the maximum utility value, given a total
amount of reward RT . That is:
Proposition:
There exists an m′ ∈ <ˆ2, such that ∀m ∈ <ˆ2, if m 6=m′, U(m′) > U(m).
Conditions:
N is a natural number (3.2)
Qi > 0 and is constant (i ∈ [1..N ]) (3.3)
RT > 0 and is constant (3.4)
R1 +R2 + · · ·+RN = RT (3.5)
Ri > 0 3 (i ∈ [1..N ]) (3.6)
2Note that <ˆP contains only one element (given an RT and a set of Qi, whose values are fixed, there
is only one solution for <ˆP ), while <ˆN contains multiple elements.
3We do not consider the case of Ri = 0, i ∈ [1..N ], since this case must result in U = 0 and any
mechanism with a positive utility is better than this solution.
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Proof:
In the case of N = 1, R1 = RT ensures the maximal value of U and this is the solution
that we want. We now turn to the case of N > 1. Based on the given conditions, the
utility function always results in a positive value within the whole input range. There-
fore, a monotonic transformation of the original utility function, V = lnU , simplifies
the problem.
V (R1, R2, · · · , RN ) =
N∑
i=1
Qi lnRi (3.7)
Hence, finding the maximum value of U is equivalent to finding that of V . We will first
determine whether there exists extrema in function V , and then verify how many there
are, and then, whether they are maxima or minima.
Function (3.7) has one constraint (condition (3.5)) on the N input variables. Thus, only
N − 1 variables remain independent. Let us consider that R1 is dependent of the other
N − 1 variables
R1 = RT − (R2 +R3 + · · ·+RN ) (3.8)
Substituting equation (3.8) for R1 in function (3.7), we get:
V = Q1 ln[RT − (R2 + · · ·+RN )] +Q2 lnR2 + · · ·+QN lnRN (3.9)
Therefore, in (3.9), R2 · · ·RN are independent of each other. The necessary condition
for V reaching extrema is:
∂V
∂R2
= −Q1
RT−(R2+R3+···+RN ) +
Q2
R2
= 0
∂V
∂R3
= −Q1
RT−(R2+R3+···+RN ) +
Q3
R3
= 0
...
∂V
∂RN
= −Q1
RT−(R2+R3+···+RN ) +
QN
RN
= 0
(3.10)
Now (3.10) has N − 1 equations and N − 1 variables and is non-simplified. Its unique
series of solutions is Rj = RT
Qj∑N
i=1Qi
, (j ∈ [2 · ·N ]). Substituting this for R2 to RN in
equation (3.8), we get:
Rh = RT
Qh∑N
i=1Qi
, where h ∈ [1 · ·N ]. (3.11)
We record this extremum, (3.11), as MPRM and note that it represents the PRM by its
definition.
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We now need to verify whether pointMPRM is a maximum or a minimum. This depends
on the second derivative of V at this point, d2VMPRM . VMPRM (value of V at point
MPRM ) is sufficiently maximum if d2VMPRM < 0; VMPRM is sufficiently minimum if
d2VMPRM > 0; VMPRM is unclear if d
2VMPRM = 0.
From (3.11), we know that Q1R1 =
Q2
R2
= · · · = QNRN . We assume K =
Q1
R1
. From condition
(3.3) and (3.6), we know K > 0. The first derivative of V is,
dV =
Q1
R1
dR1 +
Q2
R2
dR2 + · · ·+ QN
RN
dRN (3.12)
The second derivative of V is:
d2V = d(dV )
= d(
Q1
R1
)dR1 + d(
Q2
R2
)dR2 + · · ·+ d(QN
RN
)dRN
= −(Q1
R21
dR21 +
Q2
R22
dR22 + · · ·+
QN
R2N
dR2N ). (3.13)
At point MPRM , there is a constraint on dR1, dR2, · · · , dRN . This is, by differentiating
condition (3.5) on both sides,
dR1 + dR2 + · · ·+ dRN = 0. (3.14)
Therefore,
dR1 = −(dR2 + · · ·+ dRN ). (3.15)
The second derivative of V at point MPRM is,
d2VMPRM = −K2[
(dR2 + · · ·+ dRN )2
Q1
+
dR22
Q2
+ · · ·+ dR
2
N
QN
]. (3.16)
Since Qi > 0 (i ∈ [1..N ]), d2VPRM < 0. Therefore, V and U get maximum value at
solution (3.11). Hence, given a specific RT , MPRM is the unique maximum point (i.e.
m′ in the proposition) and <ˆP , represented by MPRM , is the best mechanism in <ˆ2. n
We now illustrate this outcome with an example with two recommendations being re-
warded (Figure 3.3). Here, the axes represent the payoffs allocated to the two recommen-
dations. MPRM and MNPM represent the PRM and an element of the NPM set. The
utility curves defined by U(R1, R2) = R1Q1 · R2Q2 (as per function (3.1)) are depicted
in Figure 3.3 and they give us a direct impression of the comparison of the different
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Figure 3.3: Utility Curve for Reward Mechanisms
mechanisms. In Figure 3.3, the mechanisms represented by points on the same utility
indifference curve are as good as each other since they produce the same utility. How-
ever, given an arbitrary pair of utility indifference curves, mechanisms represented by
points on the curve that is far from the origin (compared to the other curve) are better
(or more preferred) than those on the other. This is because the curves bear higher
utility the further away from the origin they are. Thus, in Figure 3.3, uP > uN > u1.
So, the mechanism represented by MPRM is better than the one represented by MNPM ,
which, in turn, is better than M1. This discussion tells us that, by providing utility
function (3.1) for the reward mechanism, the unique element of <ˆP represents the best
possible mechanism. Therefore, this is the one we should use.
3.3.4 Designing the Practical Reward Mechanism
Having identified <ˆP as the best reward mechanism for our protocol, we now need to
transform it into an applicable form that we can use in practice for our recommender
system. What the analysis in section 3.3.3 essentially tells us is how a reward to one
recommendation should be related to that of another. Thus, for example, if the user
likes recommendation recA twice as much as recommendation recB, the reward to the
former should be twice that of the latter. In addition, it is difficult to determine the
actual value of RT without delving into the specifics of a particular marketplace. To this
end, we adjust the reward mechanism of (3.11) to an equivalent one that does not rely
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on RT and is, therefore, easier to compute. In our revised mechanism, all user-selected
recommendations are ordered in decreasing rank of upq (such thatQ1 > Q2 > · · · > QN )
and each reward is based on the (M + 1)th price PM+1 (the highest not shortlisted bid)
instead of RT :
Rh = δ ·Qh · PM+1 (3.17)
where h ∈ [1..N ], δ is the reward coefficient and δ > 0. This new mechanism also
ensures recommendations are rewarded proportionally to their upqs and is therefore
also ideal from the perspective of maximizing social welfare. This is because as each Rh
(h ∈ [1..N ]) is known, the value of the total payoff ∑Nh=1Rh is also known. Among all
possible allocations for this total payoff, mechanism (3.17) ensures the maximal social
welfare according to section 3.3.3. Given any value of δ, with respect to each specific
auction round, PM+1 is fixed. So, RT is fixed and thus solution (3.17) is equivalent to
(3.11). We base the reward on PM+1 (whose value is not known by the bidding agents)
so that the market cannot be manipulable by the participants [Varian, 2003] p289. If
the reward is based on the prices from the rewarded recommendations, the rewarded
agents might be able to affect the market through their prices since they are aware of
the history of both rewards and bid prices. Our approach also reduces the possibility of
bidding collusions because the reward is based on something that the rewarded agents
are unaware of and cannot control.
However, the reward mechanism (3.17), as it currently stands, does not satisfy the sys-
tem objective of shortlisting the most valuable recommendations in decreasing order of
upq. This is because all individually rational agents will bid the same price (marginally
higher than PM+1) to maximize their revenue. This is because a bidder’s revenue is the
reward obtained minus the bidding price that has been paid (section 3.2) and, hence,
a rational bidder should bid as low as possible to be shortlisted. When all shortlisted
recommendations have the same bidding price, the system cannot differentiate and rank
them by price. Therefore, we need a mechanism that can relate and regulate the bidding
price according to the upq (i.e. higher quality means a higher price).
To achieve this, we involve two other variables: Ph (h ∈ [1..N ]) and P ∗m (m ∈ [1..M ]).
Ph is the bidding price of the hth rewarded recommendation (user-selected recommen-
dation with the hth highest upq). P ∗m is the historical average bidding price of the mth
shortlisted recommendation during the system’s lifetime (note the bidding agents do
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not actually know this value). By this definition, P ∗m indicates the price for the mth
advertisement displayed in the user’s browser sidebar which is decided by the invisible
hand (namely the market) [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001].
With this additional information, we can now fine-tune the reward mechanism towards
the system objective. We expect the fine-tuned mechanism to incentivise the recom-
mender agents to bid their recommendations in a way that is proportional to the upqs
of the items (so as to shortlist the recommendations in decreasing order of the upq).
And, on the other hand, the shortlisted agents can only maximize their revenue by bid-
ding in this manner. To achieve this, instead of (3.17), we adjust the reward to the hth
rewarded recommendation to:
Rh = δ ·Qh · PM+1 − α · |P ∗h − Ph| (3.18)
where α is another system coefficient and α > 1. The specific values of δ and α are
not yet defined and their values will depend upon the specifics of the application (see
Chapter 4 for details).
The reward mechanism in (3.18), compared with (3.17), gives recommender agents the
incentive to adjust their bids to different levels according to their belief about the cor-
responding upq. With (3.18), the market can differentiate shortlisted recommendations
by price so that the marketplace can shortlist good recommendations in decreasing or-
der of upq. Moreover, under certain conditions, mechanism (3.18) will tend to be the
same as (3.17) (to be discussed in section 3.5). Hence, mechanism (3.18) satisfies all the
requirements listed in section 3.1.
3.4 Designing the Agents’ Bidding Strategies
Rational bidders seek to maximize their revenue and they do this by bidding sensibly
for recommendations that they believe are valuable to the user. If they provide poor
recommendations they will either be not-shortlisted (revenue unchanged) or shortlisted
but not rewarded (revenue decreases); if they provide recommendations that are rele-
vant to the user’s interest but either bid too high or too low (with respect to P ∗h —
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section 3.3.4) they will also lose revenue4. The outcome of such bids is that the corre-
sponding recommendation is: not shortlisted, shortlisted but not rewarded, or rewarded.
Depending on what happened to its previous bid for the given recommendation, a ratio-
nal bidder should base the bidding price of its next bid (Pnext) for that recommendation
on (i) the inq, (ii) the last bid price (P last) and (iii) the previous rewards to this rec-
ommendation. Assuming the inq for next recommendation is unchanged, we need only
consider the bidding strategies with respect to price and reward. To this end, we make
one assumption and we will ensure this holds in developing and simulating the practical
bidding strategies discussed in sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.3:
Assumption: With respect to a given internal quality level, there are recommendations
in the next bid that have the same quality level.
With this in place, we now consider the three potential outcomes from bidding.
3.4.1 Bid Not Shortlisted
This leaves the agent’s revenue unchanged since it neither has to pay for its advertising,
nor does it receive a reward. The only way to increase revenue is to get the recommen-
dation shortlisted (since this might bring a reward). Therefore, the agent will increase
its bidding price for the same recommendation:
Pnext = Y · P last (Y > 1)
This is the dominant strategy (something the agent is best off by using no matter what
strategies the other agents use — section 2.4) in this case since being shortlisted and
rewarded is the only way of increasing revenue.
3.4.2 Bid Shortlisted But Not Rewarded
These agents lose revenue since they pay for the advertising but receive no reward. This
means the agent overrated its inq with respect to the upq and so the agent should
4This is because the second term of equation (3.18) will not be zero, which results in a decrease of
revenue. This point will be proved in detail in the end of this subsection.
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decrease its price in subsequent rounds so as to lose less:
Pnext = Z · P last (0 < Z < 1)
This is the dominant strategy in this case since keeping the same price or even raising
it will result in further losses.
3.4.3 Bid Rewarded
These agents have a good correlation between their inq for a recommendation and that
of the upq. Therefore, these agents have a chance of increasing their revenue. The profit
made by the hth rewarded recommendation is:
ξh = δ ·Qh · PM+1 − α · |P ∗h − Ph| − Ph
However, since the agent is unaware of P ∗h , it does not know whether ξh has been maxi-
mized. Hence, it must minimize (α · |P ∗h −Ph|+Ph) so as to maximize ξh. Furthermore,
the agent does not know whether Ph is higher or lower than P ∗h . In either case, however,
the agent will definitely make a loss if Ph is not close to P ∗h (proof below).
Assume the set of recommending agents remains unchanged between successive auctions
and they produce recommendations of the same quality level (we discuss what happens
when this situation does not hold in section 3.5). The upq for the hth rewarded recom-
mendation will remain in the hth place in subsequent auctions. Given this, P ∗h is related
to Qh, such that the agent with the hth rewarded recommendation is able to estimate
the value of P ∗h . Now consider the design of the strategy for the h
th rewarded recommen-
dation. We find that the hth rewarded agent can always be aware of whether its price
is closer to or farther from the hth historical average market price, P ∗h , by adjusting its
bidding prices. In this way, the agent can minimize its loss. The proof is given below.
Assumptions [static marketplace]:
(i) The hth rewarded recommendation remains the hth highest upq in subsequent bids.
(ii) P ∗h remains stable in subsequent bids. (iii) There are sufficient bidders in the market
with not-shortlisted increasing prices and shortlisted but not rewarded decreasing prices
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to ensure PM+1 remains stable. (iv) ∆P > 0, which represents an increment or a
decrement of bidding prices.
Proposition:
When adjusting the bidding price of the hth rewarded recommendation, an agent makes
a profit increment if the price approaches the historical average price of the hth adver-
tisement slot; otherwise, it makes a profit decrement.
Proof:
According to assumptions (i) and (ii), P ∗h is unchanged with respect to the h
th rewarded
recommendation. So the corresponding agent can estimate the value of P ∗h .
When Ph < P ∗h , its profit in the current bid is:
ξhl = δ ·Qh · PM+1 − α|P ∗h − Ph| − Ph
= δ ·Qh · PM+1 − αP ∗h + (α− 1)Ph
Given that PM+1 is stable (assumption (iii)), if the agent raises the price by ∆P in the
next bid, its profit in the next bid will be:
ξhli = δ ·Qh · PM+1 − α|P ∗h − (Ph +∆P )| − (Ph +∆P )
= δ ·Qh · PM+1 − αP ∗h + (α− 1)Ph + (α− 1)∆P
Since α > 1 and ∆P > 0, ξhli − ξhl = (α− 1)∆P > 0.
When Ph < P ∗h , if the agent decreases the price by ∆P in the next bid, its profit will
be:
ξhld = δ ·Qh · PM+1 − α|P ∗h − (Ph −∆P )| − (Ph −∆P )
= δ ·Qh · PM+1 − αP ∗h + (α− 1)Ph − (α− 1)∆P
Therefore, ξhld − ξhl = −(α− 1)∆P < 0.
The case when Ph > P ∗h can be proven in the same way.
Thus, when changing the bid price, an agent makes a profit increment if the price
approaches the average price; otherwise, it makes a profit loss. In case of the bid price
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crossing over the average price, for example the current price is below the average price
and by making an increment the next bid is above the average price, a rational agent
will keep increasing its price to make more profit since it does not know its price has
crossed over the average price. However, from this point, its price is going away from
the average and so the agent will be aware of the loss in profit in the following bids. The
case when the price crosses down over the average price can be proven in the same way.
n
This proof tells us that a rational rewarded bidder will adjust its price to the corre-
sponding average market price to maximize its profit. The proof also indicates that,
whatever its current price is with respect to the historical average, when adjusting the
bid price, if the adjustment results in making less profit, it indicates the action is wrong
and (Ph ± ∆P ) is farther from P ∗h ; if it results in making more profit, it indicates the
action is right and (Ph ±∆P ) is closer to P ∗h . This phenomenon is listed in Table 3.1
(∆ξ represents the possible profit of the next bid compared to that of the current bid).
Table 3.1 also specifies the strategy for the rewarded agents. This strategy (to bid closer
to the corresponding historical average market price) is the dominant strategy for the
rewarded agents since otherwise they will definitely incur a loss of revenue. The actual
value of ∆P will be defined in an application-specific manner.
Table 3.1: Price Adjustment and Results
Current Price Adjustment |P∗h −Ph| ∆ξ
Ph < P
∗
h
+∆P ↘ > 0
−∆P ↗ < 0
Ph > P
∗
h
+∆P ↗ < 0
−∆P ↘ > 0
3.5 Market Equilibrium
According to the strategy for rewarded bidders (section 3.4), such bidders must bid in a
manner that aligns their internal view of quality with that of the user. Thus, over time,
each individual recommender agent improves its correspondence between its bid price
and the user’s preferences for recommendations. Only by achieving this, can an agent
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Figure 3.4: Market Equilibrium and Its Change
(a) The supply curve S is vertical indicating that whatever the deal is, the supply of the hth advertisement
slot is constant. The demand curve D has a slope indicating that more agents are willing to pay a low
price and few agents are willing to pay a high price for the same slot. The cross indicates that at a
certain price level the quantity of demand equals that of supply. This cross point represents the market
equilibrium. (b) At each price level, more recommendations become available and the demand curve
shifts to the right.
maximize its profit. How quickly this convergence occurs depends on the adjustment of
price ∆P .
Under the assumption of a static marketplace (section 3.4.3), the market reaches an
equilibrium. The hth historical average market price reflects the market equilibrium
price: thus, at a certain price, the quantity of demand of the hth advertisement slot
equals the quantity of the supply (see Figure 3.4(a) 5).
In the long run, however, these assumptions will not hold and the equilibrium will tend
to be broken. However, this new market situation will gradually tend towards another
equilibrium and will reach it as long as the changes in the recommender agents are not
too frequent with respect to convergence times (see Figure 3.4(b)). If, for example,
there is more demand in the system, the demand curve will shift right compared to
(a). This means at each price level, there are more bidders willing to pay for the
same advertisement slot (because, for example, more better recommendations are being
produced).
5Strictly speaking, the demand curve should be discrete in this case. And the quantity of supply
is 1 since we differentiate between each of the M slots and there is only one hth slot. To simplify the
discussion, however, we use a continuous demand curve in this context.
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At equilibrium, since the bidding prices are aligned with the upq, the system can produce
a shortlist of recommendations in decreasing order of upq which is precisely the objective
of the recommender system.
3.6 Economical Evaluations of the Marketplace
This section evaluates the market mechanism design with respect to the first three
desiderata of section 3.1.
• Pareto Efficiency: With the reward mechanism defined in (3.18), the historical
average market price, P ∗h , reflects how the majority of bidders value a given adver-
tisement slot and this price becomes the expected equilibrium price. With such a
reward mechanism, each bidder iterates itself to the corresponding expected equi-
librium price. Therefore, the market has a tendency to converge to the equilibrium.
With the market tending to equilibrium, the second term in reward mechanism
(3.18) tends to zero. Therefore, this mechanism tends to be the same as mechanism
(3.17), which is the ideal Pareto efficient mechanism.
• Social Welfare Maximization: With the market tending to equilibrium, reward
mechanism (3.18) tends to be the same as mechanism (3.17). Thus, this reward
mechanism tends to reward all user selected recommendations in a manner that is
proportional to their upq. Therefore, (3.18) maximizes social welfare and is the
most socially-preferred.
• Individual Rationality: According to the analysis in section 3.4, the market mech-
anism produces individually rational dominant strategies for the cases in which
the bids are not shortlisted, shortlisted but not rewarded and rewarded. Thus, all
the agents bid rationally by taking the dominant strategy accordingly.
3.7 Summary
Based on the above discussions, the generalized first-price sealed-bid auction protocol
was adopted and the PRM reward mechanism was found to be appropriate for our
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context. Specifically, this reward mechanism is capable of incentivising the recommender
agents to bid in a manner that aligns their recommendations with those that are likely to
satisfy the user. And, in turn, based on the reward received and the price paid, the agents
can build up their bidding strategies in terms of individual rationality and stability so
as to maximise their revenue. As the marketplace dynamically chases the equilibrium,
the frequently shortlisted recommendations adjust their prices to some suitable levels
to maximise the revenue and thus the higher the upq a recommendation gains the
higher the price is. Therefore, the frequently shortlisted recommendations tend to bid
in the decreasing order of the upq when the market tends to equilibrium. In this
way, the marketplace works as a black box in controlling a recommender system that
has a large number of raw input items and a small number of desirable output items.
Moreover, the marketplace has been shown to be capable of correlating the upqs with
the recommenders’ inqs of the recommendations.
This chapter contributes to the thesis in the following manner: an auction protocol, re-
ward mechanism and a set of bidding strategies are developed to assist the market-based
recommendations in this chapter. The reward mechanism is proved to be Pareto optimal
and social welfare maximizing. It is able to give clear incentives of user preferences to
recommender agents, relate the recommenders’ bids to the upqs of their recommenda-
tions and shortlist recommendations in decreasing order of their upqs. Compared to
other work in the literature of information filtering and recommender systems (content-
based, collaborative, demographic and hybrid filtering techniques), our approach is the
first attempt to automate the coordination of multiple different techniques.
With the auction mechanism design in place, a number of experiments are needed to
evaluate the operational characteristics of the marketplace so that its practicality as a
controller for a recommender system can be ascertained. This is the subject of Chapter 4.
Chapter 4
Simulating and Evaluating the
Marketplace
This chapter reports on the simulation experiments to evaluate the market mechanisms
designed for our recommender system in Chapter 3 with respect to the last five criteria
described in section 3.1.
This chapter contributes to the thesis in the following manner. The simulations demon-
strate that (i) the theoretical design of the market mechanism in Chapter 3 is viable to
coordinate recommendations; (ii) the marketplace does indeed work as a black box that
gives clear incentives of users’ interests to the recommender agents; (iii) the marketplace
is able to correlate the upqs of recommendations to the recommender agents’ inqs; (iv)
the recommender agents are able to maximize their revenue by bidding with the feed-
back from the marketplace that reflects a user’s interests; and (v) the marketplace is
stable in that it can avoid aggressive bidders dominating the marketplace and it is fair
to all agents that bid their recommendations.
In more detail, the experimental settings are discussed in section 4.1. The evaluations
of the marketplace are then presented in section 4.2. Section 4.3 evaluates the market
properties and the correlation between the upq and the inq in more general cases when
multiple features of recommendations are considered. Section 4.4 evaluates the system’s
ability to seek out the recommendation with the highest upq value from all bids and
recommend it to the user.
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4.1 Experimental Settings
As per Figure 1.2, our system is composed of three kinds of agents: the auctioneer agent,
the recommender agents and the user agent, which will be dealt with in sections 4.1.1,
4.1.2 and 4.1.3 respectively. Before we discuss these agents, however, an important
system variable, the number of bids called for, M (defined in section 3.2), needs to be
decided. Here we use the value of ten (because our previous study showed this is the
number of items that can be managed efficiently in the browser’s sidebar [Moreau et al.,
2002]).
4.1.1 Configuring the Auctioneer Agent
The auctioneer agent determines the reward paid to the agents who make recommen-
dations selected by the user. Given that the rewarded mechanism is defined in for-
mula (3.18), two system variables control the auctioneer agent: δ and α (defined in
section 3.3.4). From the reward mechanism, we can see that δ affects the volume of
the credit paid to a particular user-selected recommendation. The bigger δ is, the more
the recommendation is paid. We can also see that α affects the sensitivity of the in-
centives the marketplace delivers to the recommender agents to make them aware of
the equilibrium (because the recommender agents need large alterations to chase the
equilibrium price if α is big). In our experiment, we set δ = 1.5 and α = 1.5 (based on
our experience that these values enable the recommender agents to both increase their
revenue by making good recommendations over the long term and chase the equilibrium
quickly [Wei et al., 2003a]).
4.1.2 Configuring the Recommender Agents
In this subsection, we discuss how a recommender agent generates a bid and how it
relates the bidding price to its inq for a recommendation. Before delving into this
discussion, however, the number of recommender agents contained in our system needs
to be defined. We assign this system variable (see S defined in Figure 3.1) a value of
nine (to ensure there is a sufficient number of input recommendations and sufficient
competition in the marketplace). This value is chosen for experimental expediency and,
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in practice, it would depend on how many actual recommender agents participate in the
marketplace.
Each agent has a set of recommendations available to suggest (typically ordered accord-
ing to their inqs). Each such agent needs to compute the relation between its local
perception of relevance and the user’s preference. Having done this, it can then bid an
appropriate price to maximize its revenue. Thus, the agent will relate its bidding price
to its knowledge about the upq (reflected by the rewards it has received) with respect
to different inq levels. We term this relationship between the bidding price and the inq
an agent’s strategy profile. This profile is on a per agent basis. It records an agent’s
bidding price for different inq levels and indicates how an agent should relate its bid to
its inq.
Simulating Recommendation Methods. To assess the broad feasibility of our
market-based approach, we want our representation of the inqs to be capable of corre-
sponding to as many recommendation techniques as possible. Moreover, we do not want
our results to be skewed by any innate bias in the recommendation methods themselves.
Therefore, we take an abstract view on the recommender methods and view them simply
as being able to learn a user’s interests based on their internal belief about certain rec-
ommendation properties (features or attributes) that the user’s context focuses on. We
believe this is a reasonable abstraction because a recommendation method’s ability to
adaptively match certain recommendation properties to the user’s actual preferences has
been shown to be crucial to making high quality recommendations [Claypool et al., 1999]
(see Chapter 6 for three real recommendation methods developed for user evaluations).
Given these observations, we define the inq of a specific recommendation method to be
the sum of the weighted evaluation scores made of different techniques on different prop-
erties of a recommendation (see equation (4.1)). This is consistent with the observation
that effective recommendation methods need to combine filtering techniques based on
different recommendation properties to achieve peak performance [Burke, 2002]. To this
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end, we simulate the recommendation methods’ inqs on a linear basis1. More formally,
q(Rec) = k1 · Φ1(Rec) + k2 · Φ2(Rec) + · · ·+ kI · ΦI(Rec) (I > 0) (4.1)
where q(Rec) represents the inq of item Rec based on a specific method. This method
evaluates an item from I perspectives (i.e. properties, features or attributes). The value
of I is on a per method basis because different methods evaluate different numbers
of properties of an item. Here, each Φi(Rec) (i ∈ [1..I]) represents the evaluation
function based on a specific property of Rec (Φi(Rec) ∈ [0, 1.0])2. Such properties
can be either objective (such as the TFIDF [Salton, 1989] of a document), subjective
(such as customers’ opinions of the tastes of the foods in a restaurant) or a mixture
of the two (such as users’ opinions of the textual and graphical descriptions of the
products of a store). Note that different evaluation functions might evaluate the same
property of a recommendation but from different perspectives. For example, Φi and Φj
are two functions that evaluate the same property (x) of a recommendation. However,
Φi = sin(x) whereas Φj = cos(x). Variable ki (ki > 0) specifies the weight of Φi(Rec)
and k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kI = 1.0 in order to ensure 0 6 q 6 1.0.
For example, consider the case where the user’s browsing context is local restaurants. In
this situation, an individual recommendation method might base its inq on the TFIDF
of an online restaurant menu with a value between 0 to 1.0, other people’s opinions of the
food on the restaurant’s website with an integer voting value of 1 .. 5 (normalization will
be used), whether the user has ever consumed the service of the current restaurant with
a binary value of 0 or 1, or any other possible properties of the item. In our case, each
of these corresponds to a specific Φi(Rec) and if a particular method uses a combination
of these base terms then appropriate values for the respective ki’s would be set.
The next step is to determine how to simulate Φ. Based on our previous studies in this
area, by randomly collecting 400 different Web pages on the subject of “world news”, we
1This linear combination is used by several hybrid recommender systems in combining results from
different recommendation methods (see section 2.1.4). Through combining different weighted properties
or features, it is believed that a recommendation method can improve its precision in predicting the
user’s preference and improve its quality of recommendations [Pazzani, 1999, Yu et al., 2003].
2When evaluating different recommendation methods, we perform a normalization on the results to
fix them into a range of [0, 1.0]. This is because different recommendation methods have different quality
(or rating) ranges [Pennock et al., 2000]. This can be achieved in practice by adaptively matching a
method’s min and max inq value onto 0 and 1.0 respectively. This makes the values from different
methods meaningful in our market based recommender system in terms of inq and upq.
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find that the keyword similarity [Moreau et al., 2002] of the 400 documents compared
to CNN’s frontpage (http://www.cnn.com) follows a Gaussian normal distribution (see
the contour of the distribution in Figure 4.1(a)). Hence, we decide to use some Gaussian
normal distributions to model the valuations of properties (Φ) of recommendations in
predicting user’s preferences on a probabilistic basis [Popescul et al., 2001, Sharma and
Poole, 2001]. Specifically, in our experiments, we simulate different document properties
of one method by different random variables that follow different normal distributions.
The probability density function of the normal distribution is defined as3:
N(µ, σ2) : f(q) =
1√
2pi σ
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2 , q ∈ [0, 1.0] (4.2)
where µ and σ are the mean value and the standard deviation of the random samples
(see Figure 4.1(b)). The mean of the distribution represents the average value of the
inqs of all samples generated by the corresponding method. The middle range (between
one unit of standard deviation on both sides of the mean) of the distribution contains
the majority of the samples (about 68 percent of its total).
One of the key objectives of the recommender agents is to build up their strategy profiles
so that they can relate their bidding price to their inqs based on their knowledge about
the reward (which, in turn, reflects the upq of the recommendations). In order to
learn such characteristics for all inq levels, each agent divides its strategy profile into
20 continuous segments. In each auction, a recommender agent needs to compute the
inqs of ten recommendations and make ten corresponding bids. In the early auction
rounds, all the agents’ strategy profiles are empty. With an empty strategy profile, an
agent will bid proportionally (because it can only expect a high inq recommendation
to receive a high upq and, consequently, more reward than a low inq recommendation)
to the inq of ten (value of M defined in section 3.2) recommendations based on an
initial seeding price. We set different initial seeding price values (randomly generated
from the range [128, 256]4) for different recommender agents (because different agents
value their recommendations differently with their empty strategy profiles). After each
auction, all strategy profile segments record and update information about: the last bid
3We fix the sample into the range [0, 1.0] (rather than (-∞, +∞)) since we have manipulated the
inq into this range (see equation (4.1)).
4The exact values of the boundary of the range are not important. What matters is whether such
a randomly given range can make the market converge and exhibit the other properties specified in
section 3.1.
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Figure 4.1: Simulating Evaluation Technique
status (not shortlisted, shortlisted but not rewarded, or rewarded), the last bid price,
the last rewarded price and the last rewarded profit. Based on such information about
each segment, and using the appropriate bidding strategy, an agent can compute its
bids in subsequent auctions if there are recommendations that belong to this segment.
After a number of iterations, those segments that cover the majority of samples will have
sufficient information to reach the equilibrium price and form a stable strategy profile.
4.1.3 Configuring the User Agent
Again in seeking to evaluate the principle of a market-based approach to recommenda-
tion, we want to work in a well controlled environment. Thus we simulate the users of
our recommender system (as others have done when seeking to validate the principle
of a new method [Billsus and Pazzani, 2000, Bohte et al., 2004, Gonzalez et al., 2004]).
Specifically, when a user is faced with a set of shortlisted recommendations, he will visit
some of the recommendations and will then have a valuation of each visited item. Thus,
a user assigns a number, Qi (Qi ∈ [0..100], i ∈ [1..M ]), to each visited item according
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Table 4.1: User’s Decision of Different Models
Shortlisted Recommendations Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
User Perceived Quality 70 50 75 30 60 82 90 85 65 55
Decision of Independent Selection 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Decision of Search-Till-Satisfied 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Both models have the same AT of 60. Search-till-satisfied model has a ST of 80. “1” means the
recommendation is selected to be rewarded, while “0” means not selected.
to his valuation of the recommendation. This number Qi is the upq value. To simulate
the choices of a user in selecting recommendations, we deploy a user model inside the
user agent. Building on the user simulation of Bohte et al. (see section 2.5), we adopt
the following models:
• Independent Selection: The selection of one recommendation is independent of the
others. Once the upq of a recommendation is greater than or equal to a particular
acceptance threshold (AT ), the recommendation is accepted and rewarded. Those rec-
ommendations with upq less than AT will not be selected and therefore receive no
reward.
• Search-Till-Satisfied Behaviour: The selection of one recommendation is dependent on
other recommendations that are ranked above it in the list. In this case, the user stops
searching once he discovers a recommendation that has a upq greater than or equal to
a particular satisfaction threshold (ST ).
By means of an illustration, Table 4.1 is an example of a user’s decision under the two
different models. All recommendations with upq above the AT (60) are selected to be
rewarded in the case of independent selection. However, Q7, Q8 and Q9 are not selected
to be rewarded by the search-till-satisfied behaviour though their upqs are above the
AT . Indeed, the user stops searching since a document with a quality of 82 (Q6) has
been found above the ST (80).
We simulate the user by a user agent which knows its valuation for each recommendation
and assigns the upq based on this valuation correspondingly. Thus, when a real user
considers I ′ (I ′ > 0) evaluation perspectives of a recommendation (Rec), the upq of Rec
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is defined as:
Q(Rec) = k′1 · Φ′1(Rec) + k′2 · Φ′2(Rec) + · · ·+ k′I′ · Φ′I′(Rec) (4.3)
where Φ′i(Rec) (whose definition is equivalent to that of Φi(Rec) in equation (4.1),
Φ′i(Rec) ∈ [0, 1.0], i ∈ [1..I ′]) is the evaluation function based on a specific property of
Rec. k′i (k
′
i > 0, i ∈ [1..I ′]) is the weight of Φ′i(Rec) contributing to Q(Rec). We set
k′1 + k′2 + · · ·+ k′I′ = 100 to ensure 0 6 Q 6 100.
4.1.4 Correlating the UPQ to the INQ
From the formal specifications of the upq and the inq of a given item, as given in
equations (4.1) and (4.3), it can be seen whether the evaluation functions of the document
that the user considers overlap with those that a recommendation method considers.
Here, we define the set of evaluation functions {Φ′1,Φ′2, · · · ,Φ′I′} that the user evaluates
as ϕQ. Likewise, we define the set of functions {Φ1,Φ2, · · · ,ΦI} that a recommendation
method evaluates as ϕq. We define ϕ = ϕQ ∩ ϕq as the recommendation method’s
effective factors in terms of the upq. We define ϕ = ϕQ − ϕq as the recommendation
method’s ineffective factors. The variable ϕ is important, because if ϕ 6= φ (φ stands for
“empty set”) the method will have some correlation with the upq since their evaluations
of the recommendation items share some of the same evaluation functions. Otherwise,
if ϕ = φ, a recommendation method cannot correlate its inq to the upq since they
evaluate the items from totally different perspectives. These issues will be discussed in
detail in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
By abstracting all recommendation methods as independent learners that predict user’s
preferences, all predictions can be seen as composed of effective data and noisy data on a
probabilistic basis [Popescul et al., 2001, Sharma and Poole, 2001]. This, in turn, simpli-
fies modeling the market-based constituent recommenders on a high abstraction level.
Specifically, by defining a recommendation method’s effective and ineffective factors,
given a recommendation item Rec, its upq can be represented in terms of a method’s
inq as follows:
Q(Rec) = Γ(ϕ(Rec)) + Γ(ϕ(Rec)) (4.4)
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where Γ and Γ are two mapping functions that align the coefficients of the elements of ϕ
and ϕ with the weightings (k′i) of the evaluation functions (Φ
′
i) of Q (see equation (4.3)).
For example, assume a user evaluates an item Rec from perspectives of Φa, Φb and
Φc and the importance of these functions are k′a, k′b and k
′
c respectively (k
′
a + k
′
b +
k′c = 100 and k′a, k′b, k
′
c > 0), the upq will be Q = k
′
aΦa + k
′
bΦb + k
′
cΦc. Assuming a
recommendation method evaluates the item from perspectives of Φa, Φb and Φd and their
relative importance is ka, kb and kd respectively (ka, kb, kd > 0 and ka + kb + kd = 1.0),
its inq is q = kaΦa + kbΦb + kdΦd. Thus, the inq’s effective factors are ϕ = {Φa, Φb}
and its ineffective factor is ϕ = {Φc}. Therefore, Γ(Φa,Φb) = (k
′
a
ka
k′b
kb
) ×
kaΦa
kbΦb
 and
Γ(Φc) = (k′c) × (Φc). We find that when a recommendation method’s effective factors
form a major weighting of both its inq and the upq (e.g., in the above example, Φa and
Φb contribute ka+kbka+kb+kd of the weighting of the inq and
k′a+k′b
k′a+k′b+k′c
weighting of the upq),
this method can easily correlate its inq to the upq (see section 4.3 for more details),
and can continuously produce good recommendations and make profits. Otherwise, if a
method has only ineffective factors, the method cannot correlate its inq to the upq and
therefore makes poor recommendations most of the time and will go bankrupt. These
properties will be discussed in more detail in section 4.3.
4.2 Evaluation of the Marketplace
Having outlined the setup of the three kinds of agents specified in section 4.1, this section
will focus on evaluating the system properties. In our case, the market is the key to
coordinating the various recommendation methods. If it does not work effectively, the
system will not be able to make good recommendations. Among the five properties we
want our market to exhibit, convergence is the most important because it forms the basis
of the other four. Therefore, we will start with experiments on market convergence.
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4.2.1 Market Convergence
We endow our system with 100 documents ready to be recommended to the user5.
Every time the user visits a specific recommendation, the upq of this recommendation
is assigned by the user and this value is independent of the various methods’ inqs. To
simplify the experiments on evaluating the properties (Φi) of a recommendation item,
we assume each recommendation method evaluates items from only one perspective (but
two different methods may use different perspectives). The more general case with more
than one Φi involved in each method is dealt with in section 4.3. We further assume the
user considers two different properties of the recommendations (Φ0 and Φ1). Thus, the
effective and ineffective factors of the recommendation methods can be easily controlled6.
Assuming the weighting of the two properties are k0 and k1, respectively, the upq can
be represented formally as:
Q(Rec) = k0 · Φ0(Rec) + k1 · Φ1(Rec) (4.5)
To generalize the experiments, nine constituent recommender agents are placed in our
marketplace and each of them is based on one of three different properties (Φ1,Φ2,Φ3)
of recommendations (note here Φ1 is the same as in equation (4.5)), meaning that some
of the recommendation methods contain the effective factors in terms of the upq and
some of them do not. We will use three Gaussian normal distribution functions (see
equation (4.2)) to simulate the valuations of the three properties. Each property re-
lates to one of the three distributions: N(0.35, 0.12), N(0.5, 0.12) and N(0.65, 0.12) (see
Figure 4.2). We set the standard deviation to a value of 0.1, meaning the three differ-
ent properties share only a small intersection (so as to easily differentiate the different
methods). Thus, those methods’ inqs based on Φ1 can be presented formally as:
qi(Rec) = Φ1(Rec) (i ∈ [1..3]) (4.6)
5The working scenario and the configurations of the upq and the inq in this section will be used for
all experiments in section 4.2.
6We can exemplify this case in a scenario where the user is browsing the local restaurants on the Web.
We assume the user evaluates the recommended restaurant websites from two perspectives: whether the
restaurant sells some specific foods (Φ0) and other customers’ opinions of the foods in the restaurant (Φ1).
If a recommendation method also computes Φ1, then Φ1 is its effective factor and Φ0 is its ineffective
factor in terms of the upq (mutatis mutandis if the method computes Φ0). If a recommendation method
evaluates the recommendations by Φx (which is different from Φ1 and Φ0), then it has no effective
factors.
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Figure 4.2: Distributions of Three Properties of a set of Recommendations
In this case, the upq (equation (4.5)) can be represented in terms of the inq which
contains the effective factors:
Q(Rec) = k1 · qi(Rec) + k0 · Φ0(Rec) (i ∈ [1..3]) (4.7)
Having further configured the experimental settings, we are going to examine the system
property from the perspective of market convergence. In section 3.5, we showed that the
marketplace can reach an equilibrium such that the shortlist prices converge at different
levels with respect to different upq levels. To evaluate this, we arranged 300 auctions
with 10 shortlisted recommendations using the independent selection user model (AT =
66) and (k1 = 75, k0 = 25)7 for equations (4.5) and (4.7) to see if the marketplace does
indeed have such a convergence property. We organized three groups of experiments,
each of which contains a different number of agents having the effective factors, to
see whether the market converges in various cases. The configurations are shown in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Configurations of the Three Groups of Experiments
Experiments Configurations
Experiment 1
qi(Rec) = Φ1(Rec) (i ∈ [1..3]) and qj(Rec) = Φ2(Rec) (j ∈ [4..6])
and qk(Rec) = Φ3(Rec) (k ∈ [7..9])
Experiment 2 qi(Rec) = Φ1(Rec) (i ∈ [1..9])
Experiment 3
q1(Rec) = Φ1(Rec) and qj(Rec) = Φ2(Rec) (j ∈ [2..5])
and qk(Rec) = Φ3(Rec) (k ∈ [6..9])
7k1 and k0 can be set to any other combinations in these experiments. 75 and 25 are chosen to exhibit
the higher importance of Φ1 than Φ0.
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In the first experiment, each of the three properties is shared by three agents; thus
only the first three agents contain the effective factor, whereas the other six do not8.
From Figure 4.3(a), we can see that the shortlisted prices converge (for example, the
4th and 10th bid oscillate around 150 and 130 respectively, which indicate P ∗4 and P ∗10
respectively) after about 100 auctions. We find that, with the search-till-satisfied user
model (with ST = 60 and AT = 45), the market also converges (for which we do not
provide a figure), but only after a longer time (more auction rounds) compared to the
independent selection. This takes longer because fewer agents are rewarded in this case
and they need more bids to chase the equilibrium price.
In the second experiment, all nine agents evaluate recommendations by property Φ1. In
this case, the market converges very quickly (after about 30 auctions, see Figure 4.3(b)),
because all agents’ inqs are actually the effective factors in terms of the upq. Thus they
have a good correlation with the user’s valuation of the recommendations. Therefore,
more recommendations at each quality level can be related to the upq and the agents
receive more signals of the user’s interests. This, in turn, means agents get sufficient
chances to alter their price effectively to chase the equilibrium price with respect to each
upq level. This results in a market that converges quickly.
In the third experiment, only the first agent evaluates Φ1 and the other eight agents
evaluate Φ2 or Φ3. The market still converges but very slowly (after about 600 auctions,
see Figure 4.3(c)) with the first bid price oscillating around 125. This slow speed can
be accounted for by the fact that only one agent can relate its good recommendations’
bidding price to its inq with respect to each upq level and there are insufficient good
recommendations. Therefore, the agent needs a longer time to get a sufficient number
of high quality recommendations to be rewarded and to chase the equilibrium price. In
this experiment with very few agents taking the effective factor in terms of upq, it is
interesting to see that the 10th bid price decreases till it reaches zero (see Figure 4.3(c))9.
8In this case, the first three agents can relate their bidding price to their inqs, since their inqs have a
relationship with the upq (contributing 75% of its total weighting, see equation (4.7)). Also the rewards
they received reflect the upq with respect to a specific recommendation. The remaining six agents
cannot relate their bids to their inqs because their inqs have no relationship with the upq and their
rewards. This subject will be discussed further in section 4.2.3.
9Actually only the first and second bid prices converge in this experiment. The second bid is not
plotted in Figure 4.3(c) because it is close to the first bid and we want to clearly display the convergence.
The other eight bids, the 3rd ∼ 10th, do not converge to a positive level and decrease continuously till
reaching zero (for the same reason only the 10th bid is plotted).
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Figure 4.3: Convergence of Shortlist Prices
The explanation is that most of the recommendations, from the eight agents with only
ineffective factors as their inqs, cannot relate their bidding price to their inqs. Thus,
these agents cannot reason about the relationship between the rewards and the inqs
of the rewarded recommendations (since the rewards are based on the upq, not on the
inq). Therefore, the equilibrium price for such bids (if it exists) has no relationship with
the inq. Such a recommender agent cannot chase the equilibrium price based on the
inq. Such shortlisted (both rewarded and not-rewarded) recommendations will make
loss most of the time. Hence, most of the recommendations will bid as low as possible
to reduce their loss (this phenomenon continues till the bid price reaches zero meaning
paying nothing). The exception to this is the small number of bids from the only agent
with the effective factors. Overall, this experiment demonstrates that the marketplace
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Figure 4.4: The upq of Shortlisted Recommendations (Experiment 1)
deters bad recommendations and only good recommendations can pass through.
When all the experiments are taken together, we find that the shortlisted prices always
converge after a number of iterations as long as there is at least one agent that has
effective factors. The speed of the convergence depends on the setting of the parameters
α, AT , ST , Y and Z. Since these variables are not our main concern here, we only
overview their effects. Broadly speaking, AT and ST affect the number of recommen-
dations being rewarded (because more agents are rewarded if their values are small).
By being rewarded more times, an agent receives more information and therefore can
chase the equilibrium faster. The variables Y and Z also affect the speed with which
the agent can chase the equilibrium. Specifically, with high values of these variables, an
agent alters its price quickly to reach the equilibrium price.
4.2.2 Efficient Shortlists
The most important feature of our system is its capability to shortlist the best rec-
ommendations in decreasing order of upq when the market converges. To this end,
Figure 4.4(a) shows the upq of the shortlisted recommendations during the 100th auc-
tion (which is after convergence) in the first experiment introduced in section 4.2.1.
Here, we can see that the quality of the ten shortlisted recommendations has an overall
tendency to decrease in most cases (although there are some exceptions). Figure 4.4(b)
shows the average upq of fifteen continuous auctions after convergence (from the 101st
to the 115th auction). By averaging over these auctions, we can see that the upq de-
creases monotonically. Thus, Figure 4.4 tells us that our market mechanism is indeed
capable of shortlisting the best recommendations in decreasing order of upq. Through
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various experiments stated in section 4.2.1, we find that our market can always do so
and our results hold more broadly than just for this specific experiment.
4.2.3 Clear Incentives
The next step is to see if the recommender agents can relate their bids to the inqs of
their recommendations (meaning an agent can generate a steady strategy profile). In this
case, each recommender agent builds up its strategy profile from its knowledge about the
bids with respect to its 20 inq segments. Specifically, Figure 4.5(a) shows the bidding
prices for different segments of the first recommender agent with the effective factors Φ1
as its inq. From Figure 4.5(a), we can see that this agent’s bidding prices for different
inq segments oscillate around certain levels after the market reaches the equilibrium
(after about 100 auctions). Figure 4.5(b) shows the agent’s strategy profile (equilibrium
bidding price versus the inq segments) and that higher inq does indeed relate to higher
bidding price. Indeed, this agent evaluates its inq on the effective factors, in particular,
on those that have a high weighting in the upq (see equations (4.5) and (4.7)). Thus,
the agent can relate its bidding price to its inq in such a way that the higher the
inq, the higher the corresponding upq, and the higher the bidding price. In this way,
the agent maximizes its revenue. Figure 4.5(c) shows the bidding prices for different
segments of the seventh agent with the ineffective factor Φ3 as its inq and Figure 4.5(d)
depicts this agent’s strategy profile (which shows there is no relationship between the
bidding price and the inq). From figures 4.5(c) and (d), we can see that this agent’s
bidding prices do not reach equilibrium (because the agent has only ineffective factors
as its inq). Therefore, it cannot relate its bids to its inq, because it cannot reason
about the relationship between the occasional rewards and the inqs of the rewarded
recommendations. Since high inq does not indicate high upq in this case, the upq
with respect to a specific inq segment can vary dramatically. Therefore, based on the
upq, the rewards with respect to a specific inq level do not converge (meaning that the
agent can learn nothing from the marketplace). Hence, based on the rewards (see the
relationship between the reward and the bidding price in equation (3.18)), the bidding
prices with respect to this inq level do not converge. Thus, the agent cannot build up a
practical strategy profile after the market converges. Agents with ineffective factor Φ2
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Figure 4.5: Bidding Profile and Strategy Profile of Bidders with Effective and Inef-
fective Factors
(Experiment 1)
exhibit the same properties as those agents with Φ3 and we do not comment further on
them.
In addition to the bidding strategy profile, we also examined the revenue and the number
of times these agents won in the auctions. From Figure 4.6(a), we can see that the first
three agents, with the effective factors, win more times than the remaining six agents
(that have ineffective factors). Figure 4.6(b) shows that the first three agents can make
profits whereas the other six make a loss over time. Indeed, the agents with ineffective
factors always bid high enough to be shortlisted (see section 4.2.4 for more information
about equal opportunities of being shortlisted), but they are not able to learn anything
from the few occasional rewards that they receive. Thus, these agents pay more when
shortlisted than they earn when rewarded10.
When taken together, figures 4.5 and 4.6 indicate that the agents with effective factors in
terms of upq are capable of “learning” from the marketplace to alter their bids to certain
10The rational bidding strategy for those agents who cannot learn anything from the market is to bid
as low as possible to lose less money, see Figure 4.3(c) and its explanation.
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Figure 4.6: Number of Winning and Bidders’ Balance of Bidders with Effective and
Ineffective Factors
(Experiment 1)
levels in order to chase the equilibrium price. This, in turn, results in a maximization of
their revenue (see Chapter 5 for more details about learning). In contrast, agents with
ineffective factors are not capable of learning from the market. From our observation
of the various simulations, with good correlations to the upq, a recommender agent’s
strategy profile changes quickly before the market converges and then becomes relatively
stable after convergence.
4.2.4 Fairness
We expect the market to be fair to all recommender agents irrespective of the recom-
mendation method they use. To see this, we use the first experiment configuration
introduced in section 4.2.1. From Figure 4.7, it can be seen that the curves that rep-
resent the number of recommendations being shortlisted (including both rewarded and
not rewarded) for each agent are closer to each other compared to the number of recom-
mendations being rewarded as shown in Figure 4.6(a). This means that all agents have
equal opportunities of suggesting their recommendations. Thus, the market is fair to all
agents whatever methods they use.
However, different methods do not necessarily have an equal opportunity of being re-
warded as shown in Figure 4.6(a). This, in turn, highlights the fact that a fair market
does not mean that all agents are equally likely to receive reward. Rather, the opportu-
nity of being rewarded depends on the upq of the recommendations.
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Figure 4.7: Opportunity of Being Shortlisted (Experiment 1)
4.2.5 Stability
To evaluate the stability of the market with respect to bidding strategies, we now consider
what happens if some of the agents no longer follow the dominant strategies of section 3.4.
Here we assume the agents adopt a greedy strategy meaning they bid as much as possible
on every round to outbid others. To this end, we use the setting of the second experiment
introduced in section 4.2.1 with all nine agents taking the effective factors as their inqs.
However, we select one recommender agent (say the first one) as the greedy bidder and
the other agents still take the dominant strategy. Here, all recommender agents are
endowed with an initial credit of 65535. The greedy bidder always bids much higher
than the others to get its recommendations shortlisted with the hope of making profit.
However, this greedy bidder does not receive any more rewards from its recommendations
when compared with the rewarded recommendations provided by the other non-greedy
bidders. Indeed, the reward is not based on the bid price, but rather on the upq
(for exactly this reason). With the same amount of reward with respect to the same
level of upq, however, the greedy bidder pays much more for each of its shortlisted
recommendations. Therefore, the greedy bidder goes bankrupt over time (see “Bidder
1” in Figure 4.8(a)), while the other non-greedy bidders keep increasing their balance
steadily. In comparison, when no greedy bidders participate, all recommender agents
keep increasing their balance as shown in Figure 4.8(b).
Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 70
(a)
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Bi
dd
er
s’ 
Ba
la
nc
e
Auctions
Bidders’ Balance in a Market with One Greedy Bidder
Bidder 1
Bidder 2
Bidder 3
(b)
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
110000
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Bi
dd
er
s’ 
Ba
la
nc
e
Auctions
Bidders’ Balance in a Market with No Greedy Bidders
Bidder 1
Bidder 2
Bidder 3
Figure 4.8: Balance of Bidders with Effective and Ineffective Factors
4.3 Dealing with Multiple Recommendation Properties
Having evaluated the system properties with respect to the metrics stated in section 3.1,
this section considers the case where more than one recommendation property (Φ in-
troduced in section 4.1.2) is evaluated by both the user and the recommender agents.
This is important because many real recommendation methods evaluate more than one
property (or feature) of recommendations [Burke, 2002, Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994]
and it is important that our market-based recommender system performs well in such
cases.
However, first, we need to establish the configurations of the three kinds of agents in our
marketplace. Since the auctioneer agent simply acts as the organizer of the marketplace,
rewarding the user-selected recommendations based on the upq, this agent remains the
same as in section 4.1.1. We still use the independent selection user model with AT = 66.
Since it is not practical to gather up every possible case that contains an arbitrary
number of properties (Φ) in one formula (for either upq or inq) and to exemplify the
correlations between these two qualities in a simple set of experiments, we begin the
analysis with two properties involved for each quality function (both the user and the
recommender agents). The more general cases in which each quality function evaluates
more than two properties can be analyzed in the same way. To this end, the configuration
of the user agent also remains unchanged, Q(Rec) = 75Φ1(Rec) + 25Φ0(Rec). The
recommender agents are each configured to evaluate two properties: some agents share
both properties, some share only one property, and some share no property with the
user’s valuation of the recommendations. In this section, we consider eight recommender
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agents and their inqs are configured as follows:
q1(Rec) = q5(Rec) = 0.75Φ1(Rec) + 0.25Φ0(Rec)
q2(Rec) = q6(Rec) = 0.75Φ1(Rec) + 0.25Φ3(Rec)
q3(Rec) = q7(Rec) = 0.75Φ3(Rec) + 0.25Φ0(Rec)
q4(Rec) = q8(Rec) = 0.75Φ2(Rec) + 0.25Φ3(Rec)
(4.8)
Φ0, Φ1, Φ2 and Φ3 are configured as per section 4.2.1. With these settings, we can see
that q1 and q5 fully contain the effective factors and they match the user’s valuation
of recommendations accurately. Likewise, q2, q6, q3 and q7 partially match the user’s
valuation, whereas q4 and q8 have no match. More formally, using a transformation of
the upq, Q(Rec) = (75Φ1(Rec) + 25Φ0(Rec))/100, to subtract each item in equation
array (4.8), we can expect the four methods to exhibit the following correlations to the
upq (where“” stands for “has no relationship to”):
q1(Rec) = q5(Rec) = 0.01 ·Q(Rec)
q2(Rec) = q6(Rec) = 0.01 ·Q(Rec) + 0.25 · (Φ3(Rec)− Φ0(Rec) )
q3(Rec) = q7(Rec) = 0.01 ·Q(Rec) + 0.75 · (Φ3(Rec)− Φ1(Rec) )
q4(Rec) = q8(Rec)  Q(Rec)
(4.8′)
Having configured the three kinds of agents, we are going to evaluate the market prop-
erties and validate that the correlations in equation array (4.8′) do effect the agents’
bidding and learning behaviour. Again, the evaluation begins with the most important
system property — market convergence. Figure 4.9 again demonstrates that the market
converges (after about 80 auctions) with at least one agent capable of relating its inq
to the upq (the first and the fifth agents in this experiment).
Using similar simulations to the ones of section 4.2, we find that the market exhibits the
same properties: namely efficient shortlists, clear incentives for agents to bid, stability
and fairness. Thus, we do not further discuss these issues in this section. Instead, we
will focus on how the different recommendation methods correlate their inqs to the upq.
This problem can be decomposed into two subproblems:
(i) Can the agents relate their bids to their internal quality?
(ii) To what extent does each individual agent relate its inq to the upq?
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Figure 4.10: Strategy Profiles of Bidders with Effective and Ineffective Factors
To this end, the strategy profiles for four agents (q1, q2, q3 and q4) at the point when
the market reaches equilibrium are plotted in Figure 4.10. From Figure 4.10(a), we can
see that the first agent bids its recommendations from inq segments that are above the
level of 0.65 at a level that is much higher than 160, which is actually the equilibrium
price of the tenth bid (see Figure 4.9 after 80 auctions). Since the equilibrium price of
the tenth bid represents the lowest price to be shortlisted, we refer to it as the market
access price. For the first agent, both evaluation properties (Φ1 and Φ0) are the effective
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factors and their weightings both match those in the upq. Thus, its inq fully matches
the upq. Being capable of relating its inq to the upq, this agent can establish from
which specific inq segments its recommendations can be rewarded. From Figure 4.10(a),
we can also see that bids from inq segments that are below the level of 0.65 are lower
than the market access price. Indeed, the first agent learns from the marketplace that
these recommendations will not be rewarded and so it decreases their price so as not
to shortlist these items and avoid paying for them when they are unlikely to produce a
return.
From Figure 4.10(b), we can see that the second agent bids its recommendations from
very high inq segments (higher than the level of 0.80) at a level that is higher than the
market access price. The second agent has one of its two evaluating properties (Φ1) as
the effective factor and this contributes significantly to both the inq and the upq (both
with a weighting of 0.75). In this case, only a very high value of Φ1 can give a high
value of q2 since Φ1’s weighting is much bigger than Φ3’s. Thus, very high inqs indicate
high values of upq, and, therefore, such recommendations have good correlations to the
user’s preferences. Therefore, the agent only bids on very high inq recommendations
that are highly likely to be shortlisted. It does this to make profit without incurring a
high risk of losing credits (i.e. shortlisted but not rewarded).
From Figure 4.10(c), we can see that the third agent has few segments with bids higher
than the market access price (compared to the first and second agents). The explanation
is that, even though one of its two evaluating properties (Φ0) is the effective factor, it
contributes too little to its inq (coefficient value 0.25). Therefore, its inq cannot easily
be related to the upq. With fewer concrete signals from the rewards received, it is
difficult for the agent to relate its bids to its inqs. Thus the agent is not confident
enough to bid for certain items at a very high price (since it has a high risk of losing
credits without earning).
Figure 4.10(d) demonstrates that the fourth agent, having no effective factors, does not
dare to bid high enough for any items from any segments to be shortlisted. It behaves in
this way because it does not want to incur the risk of being shortlisted without receiving
any reward. This uncertainty comes from the fact that the agent cannot effectively relate
its inq to the upq. Thus it does not know what items from which segments match the
user’s preference.
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Figure 4.11: Balance of Bidders with Effective and Ineffective Factors
When taken together, these experiments show that the agents’ confidence to relate their
bids to the inq decreases from the first agent to the fourth. Theoretically, this point
can be shown in their inq functions with respect to the upq (see equation (4.8′)). Thus,
the noise between the four agents’ inqs and the upqs is, respectively, 0, 0.25(Φ4(Rec)−
Φ0(Rec)), 0.75(Φ5(Rec)−Φ1(Rec)) and full noise. Therefore, the agents’ ability to relate
their inqs to the upq is in decreasing order. On the other hand, since the agents’ bids
are based on rewards and rewards are based on the upq, the bids can be related to the
upq. Thus, the agents’ ability to relate their inqs to their bids is in decreasing order.
This, in turn, effects their balance. Specifically, Figure 4.11 demonstrates that the more
strongly an agent can relate its inqs to its bids, the more profit it will make.
4.4 Validating the System’s Ability to Seek Out the Best
Recommendation
Having evaluated the market with respect to the metrics listed in section 3.1 and the
correlation between the inq and the upq of the recommendations, this section evaluates
the system’s ability to seek out the best item from all the source recommendations. This
is clearly an important feature from the user’s viewpoint, since if the system cannot
recommend the best items, the user will not use it.
To evaluate this aspect of the system, we use the first experiment discussed in sec-
tion 4.2.1 and trace the bidding price of the recommendation with the highest upq
value selected by the first agent (see Figure 4.12, in which the cross points represent
the bidding price of this particular recommendation). From this, we can see that this
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recommendation’s bidding price keeps increasing till it converges to the first bid price
of the shortlisted items. This means that as long as the first agent chooses the highest
upq recommendation to bid in an auction round (after the market converges), this item
is always displayed in the first slot of the sidebar of the user’s browser. Therefore, in
case of either user model (independent selection or search-till-satisfaction), this recom-
mendation will be selected by the user, since the first shortlisted recommendation has
the highest upq. This result shows that the system is capable of seeking out the best
recommendation and presenting it to the user.
4.5 Summary
Based on these simulations, the auction mechanism designed in Chapter 3 is shown to be
effective. Specifically, we organized a set of consecutive auctions with nine recommender
agents to offer their recommendations. We simulate the user with two kinds of user mod-
els: independent selection of recommendations and search till satisfied. We find that our
market can always converge after a number of auctions with either user model. After
convergence, the marketplace is able to give incentives of users’ preferences to the rec-
ommender agents and to shortlist the best recommendations in decreasing order of their
upqs. Additionally, the marketplace gives either effective or ineffective recommender
agents equal opportunity to bid their recommendations and is stable meaning that it is
able to stop greedy bidders aggressively bidding their recommendations. By simulation,
our marketplace is shown to be capable of successfully correlating the two perspectives of
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recommendation quality (internal and user perceived) and is able to identify the highest
upq item to be shortlisted at the top position of the recommendation sidebar.
This chapter has proved that the auction mechanism design developed in Chapter 3 is
feasible to coordinate multiple different recommendation methods in one single system
and is able to relate their good recommendations to the user’s interests. However, how
a recommender agent learns the user’s interests is left to be addressed and this is the
subject of Chapter 5.
Chapter 5
Learning Users’ Interests
Having shown the effectiveness of our market mechanism as a means of coordinating
different recommendation methods, an open problem from the point of view of the
individual recommender agents remains: given a set of recommendations with different
inq levels, in what order should an agent try to advertise them so that it can learn
the user’s interests as quickly as possible, while still maximizing its revenue? Thus, for
example, the agent could bid the items that have never been advertised to the user,
which would allow it to learn the user’s interests quickly but could also result in it
losing money. Conversely, the agent could always bid those items that have been highly
rewarded, so ensuring a good return, but it would take a very long time to learn the
extent of the user’s interests. To this end, this chapter reports a quality classification
mechanism and a reinforcement learning strategy we built for the recommender agents
to learn the user’s interests.
This chapter contributes to the thesis in the way that a marketplace with learning
recommender agents converges quicker and seeks out the best recommendations quicker
and more frequently than that with non-learning agents. Moreover, with a learning
capability, a recommender agent is able to make a larger amount of profit, while still
making good recommendations.
Specifically, section 5.1 outlines the metrics over which we can evaluate our learning
strategy, section 5.2 details the learning algorithm and the exploration strategy, and
section 5.3 evaluates the learning strategy against the metrics defined in section 5.1.
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5.1 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the learning strategy we use the following evaluation metrics (the first two
are concerned with an individual learner’s performance and the second two with the
performance of the collective of learners):
Ê Convergence to Optimality: Many learning algorithms come with a provable guar-
antee of asymptotic convergence to optimal behaviour [Mitchell, 1997]. This cri-
terion is included here to evaluate the quality of learning itself; it is important
because if an algorithm does not converge, the agent will have no incentive to
follow its behaviour.
Ë Individual Rationality: See the third metric defined in section 3.1.
Ì Quick Market Convergence: See the definition of “market convergence” in the
fourth metric in section 3.1. In the analysis of our recommender system in Chap-
ter 4, we proved that convergence is necessary to ensure only the best items are
displayed and that they are shortlisted in decreasing order of upq. Therefore, a
market that converges quickly means that it starts satisfying the user quickly. This
is clearly important since a user will stop using a recommender if it takes too long
to produce good suggestions.
Í Best Recommendation’s Identification: A good recommender system should be
able to identify the best recommendation (the one with the highest upq) quickly
and suggest it frequently [Konstan et al., 1997, Bohte et al., 2004]. This is im-
portant because, otherwise, if the best recommendations cannot be identified and
displayed, the user will stop using the system.
The first metric is new compared to those metrics listed in section 3.1. This metric
is needed specifically to evaluate the learning performance which is why it has not
been considered until now. The second and the third metrics are chosen from the
same perspective of those listed in section 3.1. The second metric is used to evaluate
the individual agents’ bidding behavior and the third is used to evaluate the overall
performance of the marketplace as the coordinator of multiple recommenders. The
fourth metric is also new because with this we can compare the system performance in
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terms of high quality recommendations between one with learning capability and one
without.
With these metrics in place, we are going to design our learning strategy.
5.2 The Learning Strategy
This section details a recommender agent’s learning algorithm (section 5.2.2), explo-
ration strategy (section 5.2.3) and the overall strategy (section 5.2.4). Before we go into
the details of the strategy, however, section 5.2.1 briefly discusses an agent’s learning
problem in our marketplace.
5.2.1 The Quality Classification Problem
From the point of the view of an individual constituent recommender agent in our system,
its aim in advertising recommendations is to maximize its revenue through satisfying
the user. Thus, an agent needs to learn which recommendations the user prefers and
align its bidding behaviour with the interests of the user. To do this, agents classify
their recommendations into a predetermined number (G) of categories (or segments,
e.g., G = 20 in section 4.1.2 on page 56) based on their inqs (e.g. in the simplest case,
where G = 2, an agent could classify “bad” recommendations as those with an inq of
less than 0.5 and those with an inq between 0.5 and 1.0 as “good”) and then they relate
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these inqs to the upqs (see Figure 5.1). Intuitively, the more the user is satisfied with
a recommendation, the more reward the corresponding agent receives. Thus, an agent
that has sufficient experience of the user’s feedback can learn the user’s interests by
correlating its recommendations (and their corresponding inq segments) to the rewards
(that reflect their upqs) they receive [Wei et al., 2003a]. This, in turn, enables a self-
interested agent to consciously make recommendations from those inq segments that
correspond to high upqs so that it can best satisfy the user and, thus, gain maximal
revenue. To effectively compute the agents’ revenue, we define an agent’s immediate
reward (made from a recommendation displayed to the user in one auction round) as
the reward it received minus the price it has paid for the advertisement1. With this, what
an agent needs to do is to learn how much immediate reward, on average, it can expect
for items in each category (i.e. each inq segment). We term this average immediate
reward for each inq segment an agent’s expected revenue. Thus, a self-interested agent
can maximize its revenue by frequently bidding recommendations from the segments
with high expected revenue. Therefore, an agent’s recommending task can be seen as
a quality classification problem and it needs to align the user’s preferences with its inq
segments (reflected by expected revenue) and, meanwhile, make maximal revenue [Wei
et al., 2004b,a, To appeara].
However, when an agent starts bidding in the marketplace, it has no information about
how much revenue it can expect for each segment. Therefore, the agent needs to interact
in the marketplace by taking actions over its G segments to learn this information (as per
Figure 5.1). In this way, an agent can produce a profile of such information from which it
can form an optimal strategy to maximize its overall revenue. In this context, the agent’s
learning behaviour is on a “trial-and-error” basis. The agent bids its recommendations
and receives the corresponding feedback in a manner that good recommendations gain
rewards, whereas bad ones attract a loss. This kind of trial-and-error learning behaviour
is exactly what happens in Reinforcement Learning [Mitchell, 1997]. Thus, to be more
concrete, an agent needs an algorithm to learn the expected revenue over each segment.
In addition, it also needs an exploration strategy to make trials on its G segments such
1Agents pay nothing for items they put forward that are not displayed to the user (this occurs when
other agents are willing to pay more to advertise their recommendations). By definition, an immediate
reward may either be positive or negative. If a displayed recommendation is not selected by the user or
if it has paid too much to display an item, the corresponding agent’s immediate reward is negative since
it has paid for the display and received less reward.
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that it strikes a balance between learning as quickly as possible, while still maximizing
revenue.
5.2.2 The Q-Learning Algorithm
In chapters 3 and 4, we have proved (theoretically and empirically) that our marketplace
enables an agent to relate the rewards it received to its G inq segments. Building on this
basis, the contribution of this chapter is in how to effectively learn the expected revenue
that is likely to accrue over its G segments. Such a strategy is desirable because high
expected revenue on a specific segment implies that more rewards can be expected if it
repeats bidding on that segment in future. Therefore, this subsection aims to address
the problem of producing the expected revenue profile over an agent’s G segments, while
still trading profitably in the marketplace.
In detail, an agent needs to execute a set of actions (bidding on its G segments,
a1, a2, · · · , aG), to learn the expected revenue of each segment (R(ai), i ∈ [1..G]). Specif-
ically, an action ai that results in its recommendation being displayed to the user must
pay some amount of credit. Then, it may or may not receive an amount of reward (de-
pending on whether its recommendation satisfies the user). We record the tth immediate
reward that ai has received as ri,t (t = 1, 2, · · · ). From a statistical perspective, the ex-
pected revenue can be obtained from the mean value of the series of discrete immediate
reward values:
E[R(ai)] = lim
t→∞(
1
t
∑
t
ri,t) . (5.1)
In this context, the Q-learning technique provides a well established way of estimating
the optimality [Mitchell, 1997]. In particular, we use a standard Q-learning algorithm
to estimate R(ai) by learning the mean value of the immediate rewards:
Qˆi := (1− 1
t
) · Qˆi + 1
t
· ri,t , (5.2)
where Qˆi is the current estimation of R(ai), and 1t is the learning rate that controls
how much weight is given to the immediate reward (as opposed to the old estimation).
As 1t decreases, Qˆi builds up an average of all experiences, and the odd new unusual
experience, ri,t, does not significantly affect the established Qˆi. As t approaches infinity,
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the learning rate tends to zero which means that learning is no longer taking place. This,
in turn, makes Qˆi converge to a unique set of values that define the expected revenue of
each segment.
Proposition:
As t −→∞, Qˆi converges to E[R(ai)].
Proof:
We use Qi,0 to represent the initial value of Qˆi, and Qˆi,t to represent the local estimation
to R(ai) when ai has been experienced t times. Qˆi’s updates go:
Qˆi,1 = 0 · Qˆi,0 + 1 · ri,1 = ri,1
Qˆi,2 = 12 · ri,1 + 12 · ri,2 = 12(ri,1 + ri,2)
Qˆi,3 = 23 · 12(ri,1 + ri,2) + 13 · ri,3 = 13(ri,1 + ri,2 + ri,3)
...
Qˆi,t = 1t (ri,1 + ri,2 + · · ·+ ri,t) = 1t
∑t
j=1 ri,j
As t→∞, limt→∞(1t
∑t
j=1 ri,j) statistically defines E[R(ai)]. n
This proof exemplifies how newly experienced immediate rewards, combined with the
learning rate, produce convergence. With the Q-learning algorithm in place, an agent
needs an exploration strategy to execute actions to build up its Qˆ profile.
5.2.3 The Exploration Strategy
We assume all agents are self-interested and want to gain maximal revenue as they
bid. However, before Qˆi converges, it is difficult for an agent to know how much can
be expected through each action and, therefore, which action it should choose. It is
faced with the classic dilemma of choosing actions that have a well-known reward or
choosing new ones that have uncertain rewards (which may be higher or lower than the
well-known actions). To this end, the agent needs an exploration strategy over its G
segments to build up its Qˆi in an effective way so that it can know how much return
can be expected from each segment.
In general, there is a fairly well developed formal theory for exploration strategies for
problems similar to that faced by our agents [Kaelbling et al., 1996]. However, the
standard methods require very specific conditions (detailed in section 2.6) that do not
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hold in our context2. Specifically, the number of times that an agent can interact with
the marketplace is not limited. Thus, the agent can gather as much information as it
wants in order to form its expected revenue profile. Knowing how much can be expected
through each action, an agent can use a probabilistic approach to select actions based on
the law of effect [Thorndike, 1898]: choices that have led to good outcomes in the past are
more likely to be repeated in the future. To this end, a Boltzmann exploration strategy
fits our context well; it ensures the agent exploits higher Qˆ value actions with higher
probability, whereas it explores lower Qˆ value actions with lower probability [Kaelbling
et al., 1996]. The probability of taking action ai is formally defined as:
Pai =
eQˆi/T∑G
j=1 e
Qˆj/T
(T > 0), (5.3)
where T is a system variable that controls the priority of action selection. In practice,
as the agent’s experience increases and all Qˆis tend to converge, the agent’s knowledge
approaches optimality. Thus, T can be decreased such that the agent chooses fewer
actions with small Qˆi values (meaning trying not to lose credits) and chooses more
actions with large Qˆi values (meaning trying to gain credits).
In practice, however, we have observed that the learning algorithm of equation (5.2)
accompanied with the exploration strategy of equation (5.3) has a problem of producing
bias from the optimal and very little work has been done to address this. This problem
occurs when an agent obtains a very small negative Qˆi value for a particular action in
its first few trials3. If this happens, a bias from the true expected revenue of this action
may occur (since the action may in general produce positive R(ai)) and the agent will
seldom choose it. This kind of bias is a particular problem in our system. This is because
a user may not always visit all displayed items in the sidebar and, thus, some good
recommendations may be skipped and, therefore, be deemed bad ones. To avoid such
bias, T needs to be assigned a very large value in the beginning of learning to limit the
exploration priority given to those actions with very large Qˆ values. However, controlling
2In fact, it is hard to find the absolutely best strategy for most complex problems. In reinforcement
learning practice, therefore, approaches tend to be developed for specific contexts. They solve the
problems in question in a reasonable and computationally tractable manner, although they are often
not the absolutely optimal choice [Kaelbling et al., 1996].
3A negative immediate reward means punishment and an erroneous action. A reward of zero means
that the action has received no feedback. Thus, actions with negative, zero and positive feedback are
differentiated and exploration priority should be given to the latter two.
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T in terms of producing the unbiased optimal strategy is hard to achieve, since different
actions’ Qˆs converge with different speeds and their convergence is difficult to detect.
Even with other exploration strategies, such biases still exist since no exploration can
avoid such unlucky trials at the beginning of learning. To this end, we developed an
algorithm that takes positive initial Qˆi values into account to overcome this problem.
We detail this in the next section.
5.2.4 The Overall Strategy
To overcome the impact of bias in the beginning of learning, we use positive initial Qˆ
values (i.e. Qˆi,0) and make them affect the learning. Thus, instead of algorithm (5.2),
we use the following learning algorithm:
Qˆi := (1− 1
t0 + t
) · Qˆi + 1
t0 + t
· ri,t . (5.4)
The difference between (5.2) and (5.4) is that the former does not take Qˆi,0 into account,
whereas the latter does. Specifically, algorithm (5.4) assumes that each action has been
experienced t0 (t0 is positive and finite) times and each time with a feedback of Qˆi,0
(Qˆi,0 À 0) before the agent starts learning. This, in turn, removes the problem discussed
in section 5.2.3. Indeed, if an action causes a negative immediate reward in the beginning,
it does not force its Qˆi to become negative. In this way, all actions will still be allocated
a relatively equal opportunity of being explored as an agent begins learning. As the
agent continues to interact with the marketplace, its Qˆis update gradually to different
levels and these levels still make its exploration follow the law of effect. Thus, the agent’s
exploitation tends to optimality with its Qˆ values tending to converge. Additionally, by
initializing Qˆ with positive values, the exploration does not need a sophisticated control
on T , since a relatively small positive value is sufficient and is easier to control. Moreover,
the change from (5.2) to (5.4) does not affect the convergence (as proved below)4.
Proposition:
Given Qˆi’s definition by algorithm (5.4), its convergence to E[R(ai)] is independent of
its initial value Qˆi,0 and initial time t0 .
4However the time it takes to converge is extended slightly depending on the values of Qˆ0 and t0 (the
larger their values are, the longer it takes to converge).
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The Main Strategy:
for i = 1 to G do {
Qˆi,0 = Qinit; // Initialize Qˆi and Qinit À 0
ti = 0; // Initialize ti
}
do {
for i = 1 to G do
Pai = ExploreProbability( i, Qˆ1, Qˆ2,· · · , QˆG ); // Equation (5.3)
ak = ActionSelection( Pa1 , Pa2 , · · · , PaG ) F; // k ∈ [1..G]
tk = tk + 1; // ak has been experienced tk times
rk,tk = ImmediateReward( ak ); // compute immediate reward
Qˆk = UpdateQ( Qˆk, tk, rk,tk ); // Equation (5.4)} while (true)
F Method ActionSelection:
ActionSelection( Pa1 , Pa2 , · · · , PaG ){
double boundary[0..G]; // probability boundary for G segments
for i = 0 to G do
boundary[i] = 0;
for i = 1 to G do // compute the G actions’ probability boundary
for j = 1 to i do
boundary[i] = boundary[i] + Paj ;
double Rand = UniformRandom0to1() ♠; // generate a probability
for k = 1 to G do
if ( boundary[k − 1] 6 Rand < boundary[k] )
return ak; // select a random action based on its probability
}
♠ UniformRandom0to1() returns a random value that follows a uniform distribution within the range [0, 1.0).
Figure 5.2: The Learning Strategy for an Individual Agent
Proof:
Qˆi’s updates go:
Qˆi,1= t0t0+1 · Qˆi,0 + 1t0+1 · ri,1
Qˆi,2= (1− 1t0+2)( t0t0+1 · Qˆi,0 + 1t0+1 · ri,1) + 1t0+2 · ri,2
= t0t0+2 · Qˆi,0 + 1t0+2 · (ri,1 + ri,2)
Qˆi,3= (1− 1t0+3)( t0t0+2 · Qˆi,0 + 1t0+2 · (ri,1 + ri,2)) + 1t0+3 · ri,3
= t0t0+3 · Qˆi,0 + 1t0+3 · (ri,1 + ri,2 + ri,3)
...
Qˆi,t= t0t0+t · Qˆi,0 + tt0+t · 1t ·
∑t
j=1 ri,j
Since t0 is finite, limt→∞ t0t0+t −→ 0 and limt→∞ tt0+t −→ 1.
Thus, limt→∞ Qˆi,t −→ limt→∞(1t
∑t
j=1 ri,j) = E[R(ai)]. n
This proof shows that algorithm (5.4) also produces unbiased learning. Thus, we will
use (5.4) and (5.3) for our agents and the overall strategy is detailed in Fig. 5.2.
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5.3 Evaluation
This section reports on the experiments to evaluate the learning strategy we have devel-
oped. Section 5.3.1 outlines the experimental settings, whereas section 5.3.2 evaluates
the learning strategy against the metrics defined in section 5.1.
5.3.1 Experimental Settings
We assume that there are four good recommendation methods (able to correlate their
inqs to the upq) and four poor ones (unable to do so). Given a specific recommendation
(Rec), the correlations of its upq to a good method’s inq (INQg) and to a poor one’s
(INQp) are described in equations (5.5) and (5.6) respectively (again “” means “has
no relation to”):
UPQ(Rec) = INQg(Rec)± 0.1 · random() (5.5)
UPQ(Rec)  INQp(Rec) (5.6)
where random() returns a random value that follows a uniform distribution within the
range [0, 1.0). This random value can be seen as the noise between the inq and the upq.
All upq and inq values are fixed within [0, 1.0). In each auction round, the marketplace
calls for ten bids. Again we use an independent-selection user model to decide which
recommendations displayed to the user will be rewarded (see section 4.1.3). In this
model, selecting one item is independent of selecting another and all recommendations
with a upq higher than a particular threshold will be rewarded. Here, we set this
threshold to 0.75. To correlate their inqs to the upqs, all agents divide their inq
range into G = 20 equal segments. We assume that all agents share the same set of
recommendations and each agent has at least ten items in each segment. Before starting
to bid, Qinit is set to 250, T = 200 and t0 = 1 for all agents. All agents are initially
endowed with same amount of credit (65536). At the beginning, each agent will bid the
same (128) for items from any segment, since it does not know which segments are more
valuable than others.
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5.3.2 Simulating and Evaluating the Strategy
Having outlined the configuration of the agents, this section details the evaluations.
The results shown in this section are for a single simulation run. However, to ensure
these results are typical for our system, we repeated the experiments for two hundred
simulation trials. Thus, the results we will show and discuss are representative of the
outcomes. Specifically, over the two hundred simulations, we found that: in 78.1% of
the trials the good recommendation methods’ Qˆs converge; all good recommendation
methods with converged Qˆ profiles make a significantly greater amount of credit (38.3%
on average); a marketplace with learning agents takes 59.4% less time to converge than
one without; and the number of best recommendations that a learning market is able to
identify is, on average, 2.73 times that of a market without learning capability.
Among all the properties that we want the learning strategy to exhibit, Qˆ convergence
is the most important. Indeed, in its absence, an agent loses its basis to reason (see
section 5.1). Thus, we will start with experiments on the convergence of Qˆ values.
5.3.2.1 Convergence to Optimality
To evaluate an agent’s Qˆ value convergence, we arranged 300 consecutive auctions.
Among the eight agents, the first four employ the good recommendation method and
the last four employ the poor one. We find that, with a good method, an agent’s Qˆ
values always converge such that high inq segments’ Qˆs (corresponding to high upq
because of equation (5.5)) converge to high values and low inq segments’ Qˆs converge to
low values (see Fig. 5.3(a)). Specifically, the Qˆ values of those inq segments correspond-
ing to the upqs above the user’s satisfaction threshold (0.75) converge proportionally to
their corresponding upqs. The higher the corresponding upq, the higher the Qˆi’s con-
vergence value, because the recommendations from a segment corresponding to higher
upqs receive more immediate reward than those corresponding to lower upqs. The Qˆ
values of those segments that correspond to the upqs below 0.75 converge to negative
values, since they do not receive rewards if their recommendations are displayed. More-
over, the convergence is independent of the specific form of equation (5.5). Specifically,
once there is a unique upq level corresponding to each inq level (even high inq corre-
sponding to low upq), the Qˆ value of an inq segment corresponding to a high upq will
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Figure 5.3: Q-Learning Convergence
always converge to a high level (since it induces high immediate rewards). However,
with a poor method, an agent’s Qˆ values cannot converge such that high inq segments’
Qˆs converge to high values (see Fig. 5.3(b)). This is because a specific inq corresponds
to very different upqs (and very different immediate rewards) at different times because
of equation (5.6).
To exemplify that our learning algorithm (5.4) overcomes the bias problem that may
occur in (5.2), we organized another set of experiments with all agents taking zero initial
Qˆi values and all other settings remained unchanged (see Fig. 5.3(c)). From Fig. 5.3(c),
we can see that Qˆ12 is updated only once and with a large negative value of -82 (this
gives the corresponding action virtually no chance of being selected in future). Qˆ16
also produces a bias in the beginning. In even worse cases, Qˆ16 can never update itself
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Figure 5.4: Recommenders’ Balance
like Qˆ12 (however, it should actually have a positive expected revenue). However, with
positive initial Qˆi values, such biases do not occur (see Fig. 5.3(a)).
5.3.2.2 Individual Rationality
The agents with good methods are able to know what recommendations better satisfy
the user. Therefore, they can achieve more immediate rewards. Thus, good recommen-
dations are raised more frequently by a learning agent than by a non-learning one. This,
in turn, means learning agents can maximize their revenue by selecting good recommen-
dations. In particular, Fig. 5.4 shows that good recommendation methods with learning
capability (the first four agents in Fig. 5.4(a)) make, on average, significantly greater
amounts (about 43%) of credit than those without (the first four agents in Fig. 5.4(b)).
With a poor method, the agents cannot relate their bids to the user’s interest and there-
fore bid randomly. Thus, they cannot consistently achieve positive immediate rewards
and their revenue is low (the last four agents in Fig. 5.4 (a) and (b)).
5.3.2.3 Quick Market Convergence
We have shown that market convergence enables the agents to know what prices to bid
for recommendations relating to certain upqs so as to gain maximal revenue in Chapter 4.
Thus, quick market convergence lets agents reach this state quickly. To evaluate this, we
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Figure 5.5: Market Convergence
organized two sets of experiments (using the same settings as the experiments assessing
the convergence). The first one contains all learning agents and the other contains none.
We find that a marketplace with learning agents always converges quicker than the one
without. From Fig. 5.5, we can see that a marketplace with learning agents (Fig. 5.5(a))
converges after about 40 auctions, whereas one without (Fig. 5.5(b)) converges after
about 120 auctions. Indeed, as the learning agents’ Qˆ profiles converge, more high
quality recommendations are consistently suggested (since their high Qˆ values induce
high probability for the agent to bid these items because of equation (5.3)) and low
quality ones are deterred. This, in turn, accelerates effective price iterations to chase
the market equilibrium. It takes approximately one third of the time for a market with
learning agents to chase the equilibrium compared to one without.
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5.3.2.4 Best Recommendation’s Identification
To evaluate the learning strategy’s ability to identify the best recommendation (from
the viewpoint of the user, i.e. the top upq item) quickly and bid it consistently, we
use the same set of experiments that were used to assess market convergence. We then
trace the top upq item highlighted by a randomly selected learning agent with a good
recommendation method and a corresponding one from a non-learning agent in Fig. 5.5
(a) and (b) respectively. We do this by plotting this top upq items’ bidding prices
with circle points in the figures. To clearly display the points of the trace and not to
damage the quality of lines (representing the three displayed bids), we do not display
the points when this item is raised by other agents. From Fig. 5.5(a), we can see that
this item’s bidding price keeps increasing till it converges to the first bid price of the
displayed items. This means that as long as the randomly selected agent chooses this
particular item to bid in an auction (after the market converges), it is always displayed
in the top position displayed to the user. However, in contrast, this phenomenon in
a market without learning agents proceeds slowly (see Fig. 5.5(b)). This means that
a learning market can satisfy the user quicker than a non-learning one. Additionally,
a learning market raises the best recommendation more frequently (39 times by the
selected learning agent, see Fig. 5.5(a)) than a market without learning capability (13
times by the corresponding non-learning agent, see Fig. 5.5(b)).
5.4 Summary
This chapter presents the learning problem that a recommender agent faces in our mar-
ketplace. Specifically, the agent needs to classify its recommendations into different inq
categories and to quickly identify and frequently suggest those categories that highly
interest a user so as to maximize its revenue, while still satisfying the user. By sim-
ulating and evaluating our Q-learning strategy, we show that the strategy can always
come to the optimal solution, is able to quickly identify the effective inq categories and
frequently suggest items from these categories, and enables the agents to make more
revenue than those without a learning capability.
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In sum, this chapter has developed a reinforcement learning algorithm and a Boltzmann
exploration strategy for the recommender agents to learn the users’ interests. This chap-
ter has also proved the effectiveness of recommender agents using the learning strategy
in our marketplace. With this learning capability, our marketplace converges quicker
and suggests the best items more quickly and frequently than without it.
Chapter 6
User Evaluations of the
Recommender System
With the marketplace designed, simulated and formally analyzed, we now need to eval-
uate the feasibility and the efficiency with real users of our market-based approach to
recommender systems. To do this, we implemented a market-based recommender system
that incorporates three typically-used recommendation methods (content-based, collab-
orative and demographic). We then arranged for a number of people (thirty-one in this
case) to use our system so that we could record various aspects of their interactions
and the system’s outputs. These records were then analyzed in order to provide a user
evaluation of the efficiency of our system.
With the user evaluations of our system, we have shown that (i) multiple constituent rec-
ommenders contribute to the recommendations that are placed in front of users through
the marketplace, (ii) the marketplace converges with respect to most of the users, (iii)
the market-based recommender’s top recommendation is the best item of those suggested
by whatever constituent recommenders for most of the users most of the time, and (iv)
the marketplace is able to seek out the best recommendations for a given user most of
the time and place these among the top positions in the recommendation sidebar most
of the time. By undertaking these user trials, this chapter contributes to the thesis by
showing that the market-based approach is capable in practice (as well as in theory)
of coordinating multiple recommendation methods and effectively identifying the best
recommendations quickly and frequently.
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Specifically, section 6.1 defines the metrics that are used to evaluate our system. Sec-
tion 6.2 outlines a user’s task in terms of using the recommender system. Section 6.3
details the system configurations in terms of the three recommendation methods. Con-
sequently, section 6.4 discusses the evaluation results and section 6.5 summarizes our
findings from this aspect of the work.
6.1 Evaluation Metrics
In seeking to evaluate our system with real users, the first step is to identify the properties
that we would like our market-based recommender system to exhibit. This then gives
us the requirements against which we perform our evaluation. In particular, we are
interested in the following metrics (the first, second and fourth metrics are the most
important system properties selected from those discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.4; the
third metric is defined according to the essential purpose of the market-based approach
to recommender systems discussed in section 1.1):
Ê Balanced Output Contribution
There are three constituent recommenders incorporated in our marketplace (each
of which exploits a different recommendation method, see section 6.3 for details).
Here we term the recommendations suggested by one constituent recommender
and eventually displayed (shortlisted) to users as that recommender’s output con-
tributions. For a given user, it might be the case that one recommender makes the
significant majority of output contributions and the others make very few output
contributions. In this case, we say that the recommender that contributes the
majority of outputs dominates the marketplace. Such domination with respect to
a specific user is not necessarily a bad thing (because it means the dominating
recommender has learnt this user’s interests more efficiently and therefore con-
tributes more good recommendations than the remaining recommenders). How-
ever, it would be a problem if the same method dominates the user population
across all their various interests. Indeed, if the users’ interests literally follow
a uniform distribution among a number of potential interesting browsing topics
(meaning that different users have different interests and no one interesting topic
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dominates the majority population of the users), if one constituent recommender
dominates the marketplace for most users most of the time, the marketplace es-
sentially degenerates to the single dominant method. To capture the fact that
multiple methods actively work simultaneously, generally speaking, we expect the
different constituent recommenders to make balanced (broadly similar) output
contributions with respect to a number of users with various interests. This met-
ric is important because, on the one hand, compared to the equal opportunity
of bidding that the marketplace gives to different constituent recommenders (dis-
cussed in simulations in section 4.2.4), this metric further evaluates the fairness
of the marketplace in terms of output contribution in a real environment (with
real users and real recommendations) and this cannot be done in the design and
simulation stages. On the other hand, the balanced output contribution metric
eventually verifies the fact that the marketplace works as a means of coordinating
multiple different recommendation methods and ensures the marketplace does not
degenerate to a single method.
Ë Market Convergence
As highlighted in sections 4.2 and 4.4, market convergence is a key desirable char-
acteristic of our system. Such convergence is important because it ensures that
the system makes an effective shortlist of recommendations, gives the appropriate
incentives to the constituent recommenders, gives equal opportunity of bidding to
different constituent recommenders, makes the marketplace stable, and seeks out
the best recommendations frequently. Now section 4.2.1 showed that convergence
happened with our simulated users, but here we want to ensure that it does also
happen with real ones.
In more detail, to demonstrate the market convergence for each user, we evaluate
whether the bidding prices for all upq levels1 have an overall tendency to con-
verge to their corresponding equilibrium prices (meaning that the bidding prices
for items with a upq value of 1 tend to converge to the equilibrium price for upq
of 1, prices for items with a upq value of 2 tend to converge to the equilibrium
price for upq of 2, and so on). In our previous simulations (section 4.2), we evalu-
ated the convergence by validating whether the bidding prices for each shortlisted
1The upq of a recommendation is identical to the user’s rating throughout this chapter. This is
because by definition a real user’s rating for an item reflects the user’s perceived quality of that item.
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advertisement slot converged to a small oscillation around a constant level after
a number of auction rounds. Thus this approach directly observes the economic
market equilibrium price (the point where the demand meets the supply) for each
advertisement slot. However, in practice, we need quick market convergence so as
to quickly suggest high quality recommendations to a real user without spending
a vast amount of time (i.e. hundreds of auction rounds as per section 4.2) be-
fore good recommendations come out. Therefore, instead of evaluating how prices
deviate from corresponding equilibria of different advertisement slots, we seek to
evaluate the tendency towards market convergence by evaluating how the bidding
prices for each upq level deviate from their corresponding equilibria prices. In-
deed, we have already demonstrated that the convergence of prices for different
upqs is consistent with the convergence of prices for different advertisement slots
in section 3.5. This is because as the bidding prices for different advertisement
slots converge, prices of recommendations of a specific upq also converge (other-
wise, with recommendations of at least one specific upq level not converging, prices
with respect to advertisement slots do not converge). More formally, with respect
to a specific upq level Q¯, in a specific auction round a¯, there are NQ¯ recommenda-
tions (from whatever constituent recommenders) with bidding prices P1, P2, · · · ,
PNQ¯ being rated at Q¯ level by a user and the corresponding equilibrium price is P¯
(see section 6.3.1 for the definition of equilibrium price for one specific upq level).
The deviation from equilibrium for Q¯ in auction round a¯ is then calculated as:
DQ¯,a¯ =
1
NQ¯
NQ¯∑
i=1
|Pi − P¯ |. (6.1)
With this definition, the ideal market convergence would be that DQ¯,a¯ converges
to zero with a¯ increasing for all different Q¯s. However, rewards to high upq
recommendations give more confident incentives to recommenders than those to
low upq ones. Thus, it takes more time to converge for low upq levels than high
ones. In some cases, recommenders fail to learn users’ interests with respect to
very low upq recommendations and the market cannot converge on these upq
levels. Therefore, in practice, we expect DQ¯,a¯ to converge for most Q¯s, especially
the high ones.
Ì Effective Peak Performance
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As discussed in section 1.1, we ideally want the market-based recommender to
always perform as well as the best of the constituent recommenders (whatever that
is for the given user in the given context). Thus, we view our market-based system
as a meta-recommender whose recommendations are those shortlisted items that
are displayed to the users. Specifically, we expect to see that the first displayed
recommendation (in the first slot of the recommendation sidebar, see Figure 1.1)
suggested by our market-based recommender at any auction round is as good, from
the user’s viewpoint, as the best of the first bid items suggested by all constituent
recommenders. This is important because a good recommender system is one
that makes the best recommendations. To do this, we define a metric, called
peak performance. A constituent recommender’s peak performance at a given
auction round is defined as the upq of its first bid item, whereas the market-
based recommender’s is defined as the upq of its first displayed item. Note that
in the case of a constituent recommender that has no items shortlisted at an
auction round, its local peak performance is zero. Therefore, we expect the market-
based recommender’s peak performance to be as high as that of the best of the
constituent recommenders’ for most auction rounds for most users. To do this,
we define the effective peak performance point as an auction round in which the
market-based recommender’s peak performance is as high as that of the best of the
constituent recommenders’. With this, we statistically evaluate how many times
the marketplace performs as well as the best of all constituent recommenders for
all users over all auction rounds.
Í Best Recommendation Identification
The previous evaluation metric evaluates the qualities of recommendations from
the perspective of comparison between the market-based recommender and its
constituent recommenders. However, whether a recommender is able to satisfy
a user is eventually decided by the user. Thus, we also need to evaluate the
qualities of recommendations from the users’ point of view. This is the most
important property of any kind of recommender systems. Indeed, whether a user
likes a recommender system eventually depends on its ability to identify the best
recommendations to him. Here, we define the best recommendations as the items of
the highest two upq levels (i.e. “4” and “5”, see section 6.2 for the configuration of
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the rating value range of recommendations). As discussed in section 4.4, we want
our system to be able to identify and frequently suggest the best recommendations
to users. To evaluate this, we define two measurements: qualified recommending
round and satisfied recommending round. Specifically, with respect to a particular
user, a qualified recommending round means an auction round with at least one
best recommendation displayed in any advertisement slot of the recommendation
sidebar, whereas a satisfied recommending round means an auction round with
at least one best recommendation displayed in any of the first two advertisement
slots. Thus, a satisfied recommending round must be a qualified recommending
round, but a qualified recommending round may not be a satisfied recommending
round. With these two measurements, we evaluate how the numbers of qualified
and satisfied recommending rounds, with respect to a given user, are compared to
the total number of recommending rounds.
With these metrics in place, we now outline the user trial process.
6.2 User Trials
In this section, we outline the process of the trial from the perspective of a user of our
system. In using our system, a user is required to choose a specific browsing topic,
browse a set of recommended web documents on that chosen topic, and then rate each
document according to how it satisfies him. The user’s task can be segmented into two
stages: building an interest profile and then browsing and rating the recommendations.
The flowchart in Figure 6.1 depicts these two stages and the remainder of this subsection
elaborates on the details involved.
Our evaluation involves thirty-one effective user trials from the School of Electronics
and Computer Science at the University of Southampton. The user population covers
PhD students, post-doctoral researchers and academic staff and they are all researchers
in the Intelligence Agents Multimedia Group (IAM Group). In particular, most of
them are researchers in the areas of “agents”, “artificial intelligence”, “machine learn-
ing”, “knowledge technologies”, “automated negotiation”, “auctions”, “game theory”
and “hypermedia”.
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Figure 6.1: A User’s Task
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Figure 6.2: Selecting Browsing Topic and Telling Research Interests
To start using our recommender system, each user needs to build up a user profile of
his interests, based on which, our system suggests its recommendations. There are four
steps in the user profiling stage (as per the upper part of Figure 6.1). In the first step,
a user needs to select a browsing topic. Here a browsing topic is an interesting topic
that a user chooses as his browsing context throughout his browsing and rating task
(i.e. the whole trial). Figure 6.2 shows a screenshot of an example of choosing browsing
topics when a user faces our system. As shown in the upper corner of the sidebar of
Figure 6.2, a dropdown box comprises three predetermined topics for a user to choose.
They are: Agents, Automated Negotiation and Machine Learning. The three topics are
chosen according to the most popular research topics within the IAM Group based on
an email survey of the thirty-one people.
In order to recommend good documents, the system needs to learn the users’ interests.
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Thus, each constituent recommender needs to build a user profile as the basis to com-
pute its recommendations2. Since it is a difficult and complex process to precisely and
automatically profile a user’s interests [Middleton et al., 2004] and because it is not the
main focus of this work, we decided to profile users’ interests in a straightforward way as
follows. From step 2 to step 4 in Figure 6.1, three kinds of user interest profiles are built
(one for each of the three recommendation methods). In the remaining phase of the trial
described as the “recommending and browsing stage” in Figure 6.1, a user is required
to rate a set of keywords that may be relevant to his research interests in the field of
computer science. These words are3: agents, biorobotics, artificial intelligence, machine
learning, knowledge technologies, automated negotiation, auctions, markets, game the-
ory, e-commerce, semantics, software engineering, information processing, distributed
computing, grid, web services, networks, security, trust, mobility, ontologies and hyper-
media. The user is required to rate all these topics according to how important they
are to his research interests (see the dropdown boxes in the lower part of the sidebar in
Figure 6.2 for part of the twenty-two topics). A rating number is limited to the range
between “0” and “10”: “0” indicates totally irrelevant, “1” indicates weakly relevant and
“10” indicates perfectly relevant. Based on the ratings of these topics, two user profiles
for collaborative and demographic recommendation methods are built respectively (see
sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 for more details about these two methods). To produce profile
for the content-based method, the system randomly recommends six web documents on
the user’s chosen browsing topic and displays their corresponding urls in the browser
sidebar (see Figure 6.3). We term these recommended urls in the profiling stage the
2With respect to a specific user, because different constituent recommenders compute their recom-
mendations independently and use their user profiles in their own ways, we need to build each recom-
mendation method a separate user profile.
3This list was produced by performing an email survey on the most popular research topics within the
IAM Group of the University of Southampton. Specifically, we ask people to provide a list of topics that
represent their main research interests. We received thirty-four responses. Among all these responses,
twenty-two topics appear in at least three responses, whereas the remaining ones rarely appear. Thus,
the twenty-two topics are used in our experiment to profile a user’s interests. These interest topics
are related to the three predetermined browsing topics in the following manner. Only three topics are
insufficient to define good correlations between users. To accurately compute different users’ correlations,
more interest topics define more accuracy. Thus, we use a larger number of topics to specify a user’s
interests. Therefore, these topics can be seen as an extension of the three predetermined browsing
topics. Actually the three browsing topics can be extended to the same set of interest topics. However,
in so doing, we need to prepare a huge number of source recommendation web documents. But it is
not our concern in this research to recommend as many interest topics and prepare as many source
recommendations as possible. Thus, we select only a few of most popular ones as the browsing topics
to do our experiment.
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Figure 6.3: Rating Predetermined urls
predetermined urls4. The user is then required to browse all these predetermined urls
and give each a rating according to his personal opinion (how a user rates recommen-
dations is detailed in the end of this section). With these ratings to recommendations,
the content-based recommender collects a couple of the most interesting documents and
analyzes their contents to produce its user profile. To capture the user’s actual interests,
three positive-rated urls are needed. If less than three positive-rated urls collected in
the third and fourth step, steps three and four are repeated until three have been col-
lected. Based on these most interested Web documents, a user profile for content-based
recommendation method is produced (see section 6.3.2 for more details about how the
content-based method helps recommendations).
After the profiling stage, a user starts his main browsing and rating stage (the last three
steps in Figure 6.1). In this stage, the user is each time suggested five Web documents
4The predetermined urls are randomly selected from a separate recommendation pool, whereas the
three constituent recommenders have their own recommendation pools. These four recommendation
pools do not share any public items.
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(step 5 in Figure 6.1). The user is required to browse and give each a rating according
to how relevant it is to his research interests (step 6 in Figure 6.1).
For example, a user has a list of five interest topics (Agents, 6), (machine learning,
4), (auctions, 7), (markets, 9) and (information processing, 10) (numbers
represent their relevance) and seventeen other topics with zero relevance. The user
chooses “agents” as his browsing topic and is recommended two Web documents in this
broad area. Specifically, one document is on a topic of “using market-based mechanism
to coordinate information agents”, whereas the other is on “mobile agent’s security over
the Internet”. Thus, the user should rate the former higher than the latter. This is
because, besides agents, the former is related to markets and information processing
which are also the user’s interests, whereas the latter relates to mobility and security
which are not. For another example with respect to the same user, a third Web document
is suggested on a topic of “agents and machine learning”. In this case, the user should
prefer the first recommendation to this one because machine learning is less relevant
than markets and information processing.
Therefore, a rating to a recommendation Web document is a user’s personal opinion
about how well it relates to his research interests. A rating number is limited to
“0” to “5” (see the dropdown box below each predetermined url in Figure 6.3), in
which, “0” means totally irrelevant, “1” means weakly relevant and “5” means perfectly
relevant. We use five positive levels to specify recommendation quality because this
number has previously proved to be sufficient and effective in differentiating users’ pref-
erences [Resnick et al., 1994, Shardanand and Maes, 1995, Pazzani, 1999]5. Actually,
these rating numbers represent the upqs of the recommendations by definition. A user’s
rating number of each recommendation is an absolute value throughout his trial. Thus,
if a recommendation is rated by the user in an earlier time, he is required not to change
its rating value. Therefore, a user’s evaluation criterion of the qualities of recommenda-
tions should be consistent throughout his task. With these ratings to recommendations,
the system rewards the relevant constituent recommenders to assist their learning about
the user’s interests (step 7 in Figure 6.1). We term the subroutine of recommending,
5We use more levels to define the importance of interest topics because more levels define more
accuracy of users’ correlations. To avoid too much computation, ten levels are used.
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Figure 6.4: Configurations of the Market-Based Recommender System
browsing/rating and rewarding a recommending round (step 5 to 7 of Figure 6.1). Each
user is required to do fifteen rounds to complete his trial.
Knowing what the users are required to do, we then outline how the system suggests
recommendations in terms of three component recommendation methods.
6.3 System Configuration
This section describes the configuration of our market-based recommender system (Fig-
ure 6.4 depicts its architecture). This section is organized into four main parts: config-
uration of the marketplace (section 6.3.1), and the details of the three different compo-
nent recommendation methods (section 6.3.2 to 6.3.4). We choose a number of different
recommendation methods since one of the goals of our system is to be able to incor-
porate and coordinate various recommendation methods and seek out the best items
from whichever source is most appropriate (see section 1.1). Specifically, we use three
different methods that compute the inqs of their recommendations based on different
similarity measures:
• one based on similarity between the current document and those the user has
previously indicated as being of interest (i.e. a typical content-based method);
• one based on the correlations between the user’s interests and those of other users’
(i.e. a typical collaborative method);
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• one based on the similarity between the available documents and the user’s profile
as represented by their keyword topics of interest (i.e. a variation of the typical
demographic method6).
Therefore, our three component recommendation methods are based on three different
similarity measures: document-to-document, user-to-user, and document-to-user. Be-
fore we detail the configurations of these component methods, however, we briefly outline
the settings of the marketplace that coordinates these methods.
6.3.1 Marketplace Configuration
This section outlines the configurations of all system variables with respect to the mar-
ketplace defined in Chapters 3 and 5. We discuss them in the same order as they
appeared in the two chapters.
The following four variables are defined in section 3.2. They are briefly described and
configured as below.
• S represents the number of constituent recommenders that are incorporated in our
marketplace. Thus, S = 3 because we have three constituent recommenders.
• Tb represents the duration of marketplace calling for bids. We set Tb = 5 seconds
because, in practice, we find that five seconds allows sufficient time for the three
constituent recommenders to compute their recommendations in most cases.
• M represents the number of recommendations that the marketplace calls for in
each auction round. We set M = 5 because five recommendations do not over-
burden the users and five is a practical number in terms of the trials.
6A typical demographic method analyzes the characteristics of people (such as age, gender and
occupation) and groups people with similar characteristics. Then, it analyzes the attributes of recom-
mendations (such as textual descriptions or contents of books, colour of material of clothes and price
of products), and, finally, matches people with certain characteristics to recommendations with suitable
attributes. We do not analyze people’s characteristics by age, gender and the like, but by their research
interests since what we recommend are only Web documents that are relevant to a particular set of
interesting topics. Thus, we group people by characteristics of their interesting topics and match people
to documents with relevant topics. We do not consider this method a content-based one though it also
analyzes the textual contents of documents. Rather, we consider it a demographic method. This is
because content-based method compute similarities between documents, whereas this method computes
similarity between the characteristics of people and the attributes of recommendations. For example,
a group of people share the interest topic of “machine learning”, thus, all of them would probably be
interested in documents related to reinforcement learning.
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• N represents the number recommendations that are rated by a user in one rec-
ommending round. We set N = 5 because we require each user to rate all five
recommendations in each recommending round. Thus, having rated all displayed
recommendations, the marketplace gives as much information about the user: in-
terests to the recommenders as possible.
The following variables are defined in Equation 3.18 in section 3.3.4. They are configured
as below.
• Qh represents the upq of a shortlisted recommendation. We setQh ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
because, in section 6.2, we have argued that five positive levels are sufficient to
specify the qualities of relevant recommendations and, additionally, a level of zero
indicates irrelevant ones.
• δ controls the amount of reward to good recommendations and α controls the
signal of deviation from equilibria that are delivered to the recommenders. We
keep δ = 1.5 and α = 1.5 as per section 4.1.1 because they have been proved
to be effective and we want our user evaluation to also be effective based on our
empirical studies in Chapter 4.
• P¯h represents the market equilibrium price for recommendations with upq level
of h (as we stated in section 6.1Ë, we do not use P ∗h defined in section 3.2 to
evaluate market convergence). However, to kick-start the process, so that we do
not need lots of recommending rounds to get good recommendations, we set some
constant values rather than let the marketplace find them all out for itself. Based
on our empirical study in section 4.2, we set these constant values to P¯1 = 110,
P¯2 = 120, P¯3 = 130, P¯4 = 140 and P¯5 = 150 to differentiate recommendations with
different upqs. The system gives clearer incentives to recommenders by fixing these
equilibrium prices to constant levels rather than by using the historical average
bidding prices for different upq levels. This is because the historical averaging
prices change from one auction round to another and this makes the rewards to the
same upq recommendations in different auction rounds differently. Consequently,
this makes it difficult for a recommender to learn the user’s preferences (reflected by
rewards) to its recommendations. Moreover, since the constituent recommenders
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do not know these fixed equilibrium price values, a marketplace with a set of fixed
equilibrium prices does not affect their bidding strategies.
• PM+1 represents the highest bidding price that is not shortlisted in one auction
round. It is the basic unit reward and it controls the amount of actual reward to
an agent together with δ. Like setting P¯h with constant values, we set PM+1 = 100
in order to give quick and clear incentives to recommenders (because constant unit
reward makes it easier for recommenders to learn the bidding price deviations from
the equilibria).
The last system variable we need to discuss was defined in section 5.2 for agents to learn
users’ interests.
• G represents the number of inq segments of a constituent recommender. In prac-
tice, based on our computation of the inqs of the recommendations of our three
constituent recommenders (detailed in sections 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4), we find that
six segments are sufficient to effectively differentiate recommendations in terms of
inq. Thus, we set G = 6 for our three constituent recommenders.
6.3.2 The Content-Based Method’s Configuration
A content-based method suggests recommendations based on the contents of a user’s
previously top rated documents. Therefore, before it can start recommending, this
method needs to learn something about documents that the user thinks are valuable.
In our case this is the purpose of the system collecting at least three positively rated
predetermined urls in the user-profiling stage (see Figure 6.1). To this end, the top
rated document of the three is chosen as the initial basis for this method since this is
the one the user currently likes best. Thus this method recommends web documents
based on their similarity to the top rated predetermined url. In the recommending and
browsing stage (see Figure 6.1), if subsequent Web pages with even higher ratings are
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uncovered, then these become the basis for recommending based on content. If there is
more than one page with the same highest rating value, all of them are used7.
To be more precise, let P1, P2, · · · , PNc be the Nc (Nc 6 3) previously rated different
Web pages with the same top rating value Rv. Then let PP be a potential Web document
to be recommended. Now, the internal quality of this potential Web page is computed
by the similarity between the Nc top rated pages and itself:
INQcon(PP ) =
1
Nc
∑
i
Similarity(PP , Pi) ∗Rv (6.2)
In Equation 6.2, the subscript of the function is used to differentiate it from the other two
methods introduced in sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4. The similarity measure will be formally
discussed in the end of this subsection. Thus, the content-based method compares
the source recommendation web pages to previously top rated pages and recommends
those with high similarity values. To compute the similarity value, we extract fifteen
keywords with the highest term frequency (TF) from each document8. Actually, the
more keywords extracted the more accurate they are able to stand for a document.
However, extracting a large number of keywords induces much computation and affects
the efficiency of recommending. In practice, therefore, we find that fifteen frequently
occurring keywords are able to cover the meaning that a document delivers in most
cases. Thus, a source web page is represented as a fifteen-dimensional term vector
(for reasons of computational simplicity we do not use more keywords). The similarity
measure of two web pages is then computed using the standard technique of considering
the cosine between two vectors with a result value between 0 and 1.0, where 0 indicates
not strongly related and 1.0 indicates very strongly related [Salton, 1989]. These fifteen
most frequently occurring words are then stored in a Content-Based Recommendation
Table (see Table 6.1 for part of the actual table we use). Likewise, the predetermined
urls are prepared with the fifteen most frequently occurring terms and their TFs in a
7We seek to use a common one for each of the three typical kinds of recommendation method (i.e.
content-based, collaborative and demographic) described in Chapter 2. However, we do not aim to refine
each method to a perfect one because we are not aiming to build perfect information filtering methods
and this is not our main concern in this work.
8To extract the most frequently occurring keywords from a web document, a lookup table is used
to filter out unimportant words that do not make sense in our context and need to be ignored (such
as “a”, “the”, “in”, “that” and “and”). This look up table is constructed according to Middleton’s
work [Middleton, 2003]. Meanwhile, a stop-list technique also taken from Middleton’s work is used to
match different words with the same meaning. For example, “negotiation”, “negotiations”, “negotiating”
and “negotiated” are tokenized into “negotiat” and are all deemed the same word.
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Table 6.1: The Content-Based Recommendation Table
Table 6.2: The Predetermined URL Table
Predetermined URL Table in the similar style (see Table 6.2 for part of the actual table
we use). As stated in section 6.2, the contents of the Predetermined URL Table do not
overlap those in the Content-base Recommendation Table, nor do they with the source
recommendation tables presented in the subsequent two recommendation methods (see
sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4).
From the Content-Based Recommendation Table, we can see that each potential Web
document is represented by a record of that table. Each record contains a vector of
fifteen dimensions decided by the fifteen keywords and each dimension has a value of the
keyword’s TF. With respect to a specific record, ki represents the ith most frequently
occuring keyword in a document and wi represents the times it occurs (i.e. the TF).
With this representation, we are going to formally discuss the similarity measure of
two Web documents. Assuming Px and Py are two different documents and they each
have fifteen keywords that are the same (k1, k2, · · · , k15). Thus, the two documents can
be represented by two vectors in the same fifteen-dimensional Euclidean space: x =
(w1, w2, · · · , w15) and y = (w′1, w′2, · · · , w′15) where wi and w′i are their keyword ki’s TFs
respectively. The inq of Px is defined as the cosine of the two term vectors of Px and
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Py [Salton, 1989]:
Similarity(Px, Py) = cos(x,y)
=
x× y
|x| · |y|
=
∑15
i=1(wi · w′i)√∑15
i=1(wi)2 ·
√∑15
i=1(w
′
i)2
,
(6.3)
where x× y is the inner product of x and y, and |x| = (x× x) 12 is the Euclidean norm
of x. However, in many cases, two vectors share only a few keywords (less than fifteen
or even none). In these cases, the inner product of the two vectors cannot be computed
directly, since they are not in the same Euclidean space. Therefore, both vectors will
be converted into the same space such that their cosine similarity is computable. For
example, a different Web page Py′ contains fifteen most frequently appeared keywords
(k1, k2, k′3, · · · , k′15), where ki 6= k′i, i ∈ [3..15] compared to that of Px. Py′ can be
represented by its TF vector as y′ = (w?1, w?2, · · · , w?15) (no weighting value is zero).
Thus, Py′ shares only the first two keywords with Px. In this case, the similarity between
Px and Py′ is simplified as:
Similarity(Px, Py′) = cos(x,y′)
=
w1 · w?1 + w2 · w?2√∑15
i=1(wi)2 ·
√∑15
i=1(w
?
i )2
.
(6.4)
6.3.3 The Collaborative Method’s Configuration
We use a standard collaborative method based upon Pazzani’s model (see section 2.1.4).
This method computes recommendations based on other users’ ratings to the current
item. Assuming Ns users (ui, i ∈ [1..Ns]) have similar interests with the active user (u)
and their ratings for a potential recommendation web page (Pp) are Ri, i ∈ [1..Ns], the
prediction of the inq of Pp is defined as
INQcol(Pp) =
∑Ns
i=1(γu,ui ×Ri)∑Ns
i=1 γu,ui
, (6.5)
where γu,ui represents the Pearson-γ collaborative correlation [Shardanand and Maes,
1995] between the active user and the ith user with similar interests.
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However, before discussing how to compute Pearson-γ correlation between two users,
we need a way of representing users’ interests. With the users’ interests profile based
on ratings for twenty-two interest topics (see section 6.2), a user can be represented as
a 22-dimensional vector of these topics. For example (the sequence of these 22 fields is
in the same order among all users), a vector of (8, 0, 10, 0, · · · ) represents a user whose
interests are related to those topics with positive field values (such as agents, artificial
intelligence, · · · in this case) and not related to any topics with a field value of “0”.
Thus, the positive field values represent the extent to which their corresponding topics
are relevant. With this in place, we can illustrate the correlation between two different
users as follows. Given two users represented as two user vectors u = (u1, u2, · · · , u22)
and v = (v1, v2, · · · , v22), their Pearson-γ correlation is defined as
γu,v =
∑22
i=1(ui − u¯) · (vi − v¯)√∑22
i=1(ui − u¯)2 ·
∑22
i=1(vi − v¯)2
, (6.6)
where u¯ = 122
∑22
i=1 ui and v¯ =
1
22
∑22
i=1 vi. The user vectors are stored in the User Profile
Table (see Table 6.3 for an example of the actual table we use). The recommendation
Web pages are stored in the Collaborative Recommendation Table. This table has
the same structure as that of the Content-Based Recommendation Table which we do
not show in a separate table here. In the Collaborative Recommendation Table, the
fifteen most frequently occurring keywords and their TFs are used to solve the cold
start problem that bedevils this approach (see the subsequent paragraph). The users’
ratings for each recommendation Web document are stored in the Rating Table (see
Table 6.4 for part of the actual table we use).
Table 6.3: The User Profile Table
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Table 6.4: The Rating Table
Column “userID” in this table corresponds to column “ID” in the User Profile Table, whereas Column
“recID” corresponds to column “RecID” in the Collaborative Recommendation Table. For example, the
first record in this table represents the fact that user “22” gives a rating “3” to a Web document that
stored in the Collaborative Recommendation Table with a RecID of “104”.
To make the collaborative recommendation method work effectively in our system, we
need to overcome the cold start problem. As discussed in section 2.1, when the first few
users start to use the system, the system is unlikely to have any other users with similar
interests. Thus, it will have no users’ ratings for any of the source recommendation
web pages from which to predict their inqs for the active user. To solve this prob-
lem, a “collaboration via contents” technique is used to predict the inq of the source
recommendations (see section 2.1.4). Thus, for each potential web page selected for rec-
ommendation, a rating value within the range of [0..5] is assigned by the filtering agent
through computing the number of keywords shared between the document and the user’s
interests (see the demographic method in Section 6.3.4 for more details). Thus, when
there are an insufficient number of similar users, it is still possible to predict their inqs
using this method.
6.3.4 The Demographic Method’s Configuration
The third kind of recommendation method we use is introduced based on document-user
correlation. This method directly measures how a recommended Web page’s content is
related to a user’s interests [Moreau et al., 2002]. Specifically, this method computes
the number of keywords in a user’s interest profile (see Table 6.3) that overlap with
a document’s fifteen most frequently occuring keywords (as per section 6.3.2). In this
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case, all recommended Web documents are stored in the Demographic Recommendation
Table (this table is not shown separately because it is structured in the same way as the
Content-Based Recommendation Table). Then assuming that a user’s interest profile
contains a set of keywords Ku = {k1, k2, · · · , k22} and that a potential recommendation
Web document (Pp) is represented by its set of keywords Kp = {k1, k2, · · · , k15}, we can
compute the set intersection asK = Ku∩Kp. Given this, the inq of this recommendation
with respect to this user is defined as:
INQdem(Pp) =

|K|, if |K| 6 4;
5, if |K| > 4,
(6.7)
where |K| represents the number of elements contained in set K. Equation 6.7 indicates
that the more keywords a potential Web document shares with a user’s interest profile,
the higher its inq is. However, based on our experiments, there are few documents that
share more than six keywords with a user’s interest profile and, thus, we make all such
documents’ inqs equal to 5 in this case.
6.4 Evaluation and Discussion
Having configured the marketplace and the three constituent recommenders, we then
implemented a system that helps users to find web documents relevant to their research
interests. Based on our thirty-one successful user trials, the rest of this section reports
on the evaluations we performed with respect to the metrics outlined in section 6.1.
6.4.1 Balanced Output Contributions
To evaluate the different constituent recommenders’ eventual contributions to the users,
we record each constituent recommender’s output contribution to each user trial (as
per section 6.1Ê). We then compute the percentage of each constituent recommender’s
output contribution to each user over the complete trial. This information is recorded
in Table 6.5 along with the standard deviation of three methods’ contributions with
respect to each individual user. Given n statistical samples (x1, x2, · · · , xn), their
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standard deviation is defined by:
σx =
√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
n− 1 ,
where x¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi. We are interested in the standard deviation in this context
because it literally indicates the differences among the three methods’ contributions
(the bigger it is, the more likely a method is to dominate in the marketplace). In this
case, we choose the second deviation (15.28 with respect to user “2”) as the criterion
to differentiate whether or not domination occurs. This is because, with respect to a
specific user, if the deviation is bigger than or equal to this value, there must be one
constituent recommender that contributes 2.5 times (see the second item in Table 6.5)
more output contributions than (or as many as) another. This, we feel, is a quantified
view of dominance.
In Table 6.5, the first column shows the (anonymized) identity of the users. The sec-
ond, third and fourth columns show, in percentage terms, the different constituent rec-
ommender’s output contributions to each user. The last column shows the standard
deviation of the three recommenders’ contributions. From this, we can see that there
are twenty-four user trials where no one method dominates, three trials dominated by
the content-based recommender, and two trials dominated by the collaborative and the
demographic recommenders respectively (visually depicted in Figure 6.5). This means
that in most cases (77.42%) all three constituent recommenders make significant output
contributions. From this, we conclude that the auction and reward mechanisms we have
designed do not encourage domination in the marketplace.
The above analysis is based on individual users. However, we can also evaluate the over-
all contributions of the different recommenders to all users. This is important because
it gives us an insight into the difference among the overall contributions of different rec-
ommenders. When we add up each individual recommender’s output contributions to
all users, they contribute 35.1% (content-based), 30.8% (collaborative) and 34.1% (de-
mographic) of the recommendations displayed to the users respectively (see Figure 6.6).
This indicates that, broadly speaking, each of the three constituent recommenders con-
tribute about the same number of output contributions to the users. Again, this result
shows that the marketplace is not biased towards any specific method.
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Table 6.5: Different constituent recommenders’ Output Contributions
User
ID
Content-Based
Recommender’s
Output
Contribution
Collaborative
Recommender’s
Output
Contribution
Demographic
Recommender’s
Output
Contribution
Standard
Deviation of
Three
Contributions
1 72 F 20 8 34.02
2 50 F 20 30 15.28
3 37.14 14.29 48.57 F 17.46
4 28 53.33 F 18.67 17.93
5 32 26.67 41.33 7.42
6 25.34 29.33 45.33 10.58
7 36 26.67 37.33 5.81
8 20 33.33 46.67 13.34
9 32 48 20 14.05
10 41.33 30.67 28 7.05
11 40.69 28.28 31.03 6.52
12 32 25.33 42.67 8.75
13 23.81 35.24 40.95 8.73
14 33.33 29.34 37.33 4.0
15 45.33 30.67 24 10.91
16 28 28 44 9.24
17 44 28 28 9.24
18 33.33 29.34 37.33 4.0
19 40 29.33 30.67 5.81
20 20 62.67 F 17.33 25.44
21 32 33.33 34.67 1.34
22 22.67 30.67 46.66 12.22
23 22.67 40 37.33 9.33
24 40 22.67 37.33 9.33
25 54.67 F 17.33 28 19.23
26 41.33 32 26.67 7.42
27 22.67 38.67 38.67 9.24
28 29.33 38.67 32 4.81
29 42.67 21.33 36 10.91
30 37.33 8 54.67 F 23.59
31 29.33 44 26.67 9.33
A contribution with a F indicates its domination in the corresponding user trial.
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Figure 6.5: Domination in the Marketplace
Figure 6.6: Different Constituent Recommenders’ Overall Output Contributions
6.4.2 Market Convergence
In this subsection, we are going to validate market convergence by evaluating the bidding
price deviations from the equilibria defined in section 6.1 (Equation 6.1). To this end, we
collected the results of the thirty-one user trials and plotted all price deviation points over
auction rounds for each upq level with respect to each user. For example, Figure 6.7(a)
depicts the price deviation points over fifteen auctions for the upq level of “1” with
respect to user “22”. In this figure, the x-axis represents the fifteen consecutive auctions
and the y-axis represents the value of the price deviation from equilibrium. As can be
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seen, there are nine auctions with recommendations rated at level “1” by this user and
their price deviations from the corresponding equilibrium P¯1 (110) are comparatively
small. Then, when we overlay a linear trend line over these deviation points: we get a
line of y = 1.99x+3.22 (all such coefficients for each upq level with respect to each user
are summarized in Table 6.6). From the figure, we can see that the linear trend line with
a large positive coefficient tends to increase as the auction rounds increase. For another
example, Figure 6.7(b) depicts the price deviation points for the upq level of “4” for the
same user. As can be seen, its linear trend line with a big negative coefficient tends to
decrease as the auction rounds increase. For yet another example, Figure 6.7(c) depicts
the price deviation points for the upq level of “3” for user “3”. In this case, the linear
trend line has a small negative coefficient (-0.58) which means that it is hard to judge
the tendency to increase or decrease for this upq level for this user.
Based on the thirty-one user-trials, we find that all trend lines with a big positive
deviation coefficient (larger than 0.58) tend to increase as the auction rounds increase,
all those with a big negative deviation coefficient (smaller than -0.58) tend to decrease,
and all those with a very small deviation coefficient’s absolute value (between -0.58 and
0.58) do not have a clear tendency to increase or decrease. Based on this, we define that
any trend line that has a positive deviation coefficient larger than 0.58 diverges; that has
a negative coefficient smaller than -0.58 converges, and that has a coefficient’s absolute
value smaller than 0.58 is unclear of convergence or divergence. With this definition
in place, Table 6.7 details the convergence for each upq level for each user (based on
Table 6.6).
Based on this individual data, we are now in a position to evaluate how the system
performs in terms of convergence for the user trial population. From Table 6.7, it can
be seen that the price deviations of the top effective rating levels9 for most of the users
tend to converge and the price deviations of the lowest effective rating levels for most
of the users tend to diverge. Specifically, if we exclude the rating levels where there
are an insufficient number of deviation points, there are twenty-eight users that have
their top rating level’s deviation points converge and three users where it is unclear
(see Figure 6.8). This shows that in almost all cases the recommender agents can learn
9For example, in Table 6.7, upq of 4 is considered the top rating of user “3” since there are insufficient
data in his rating level of 5. Likewise, upq of 2 is the lowest effective rating level for this user since there
are insufficient data with upq of 1.
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(a) Divergent Example (Deviations from Equilibrium of upq level “1” for User “22”)
(b) Convergent Example (Deviations from Equilibrium of upq level “4” for User “22”)
(c) Unclear Example (Deviations from Equilibrium of upq level “3” for User “3”)
Figure 6.7: Examples of Linear Trend Line of Deviations from Equilibria
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Table 6.6: Table of Deviations from Equilibria
User
ID
Deviation
Coefficient
of UPQ=1
Deviation
Coefficient
of UPQ=2
Deviation
Coefficient
of UPQ=3
Deviation
Coefficient
of UPQ=4
Deviation
Coefficient
of UPQ=5
1 i * 2.2431 1.4725 1.16 -0.0758
2 1.1846 i -0.482 1.0163 -0.1799
3 i -0.7188 -0.5793 -0.8951 i
4 1.3584 0.6709 -1.0621 -1.1711 -1.2193
5 i 1.8647 0.0251 -1.4178 i
6 2.4336 1.429 -0.3855 -1.8994 i
7 1.9331 1.8553 0.0322 -2.6029 -2.162
8 -0.8877 i i i i
9 2.3799 2.0587 0.1701 -1.3394 -2.0863
10 1.9146 1.4524 -0.2918 i i
11 -0.8575 0.0711 i i -1.1789
12 2.0133 1.4123 0.4087 -1.9071 -2.2316
13 1.5394 1.2418 -0.9607 -1.0426 i
14 2.4343 1.2828 0.6611 -1.1131 -2.1542
15 1.466 0.6606 -1.6457 -1.0571 -1.8371
16 1.0512 -0.0168 -0.8276 i i
17 1.6033 -1.6873 -1.6588 -3.4476 i
18 2.1997 1.1581 0.359 -1.6291 -2.1904
19 2.0186 1.814 0.5971 -1.2874 i
20 1.9116 1.9783 -0.8311 -1.2845 i
21 2.8543 1.6986 -0.9827 -1.5299 -2.5208
22 1.9912 1.296 -0.2344 -1.8763 -1.8136
23 i 1.5569 i i -2.1535
24 1.4248 1.0002 -0.9642 -0.8143 -1.2109
25 1.3664 1.0361 -1.0033 -1.5027 -1.6487
26 i 2.321 -0.3399 -1.695 -2.3186
27 2.2501 1.8482 0.3385 -2.4102 -2.0388
28 i 1.4562 -0.5451 -1.9798 -1.5968
29 i 1.7507 0.1352 -1.5527 -2.9792
30 2.2777 1.3224 -0.0797 -1.5096 -1.9212
31 1.5925 0.9022 -0.6588 -2.1787 -2.1907
* “i” indicates that there are insufficient deviation points (less than four) to judge converge/diverge.
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Table 6.7: Table of Convergence
User
ID
Convergence
of UPQ=1
Convergence
of UPQ=2
Convergence
of UPQ=3
Convergence
of UPQ=4
Convergence
of UPQ=5
1 i d d d u
2 d i u d u
3 i c u c i
4 d d c c c
5 i d u c i
6 d d u c i
7 d d u c c
8 c i i i i
9 d d u c c
10 d d u i i
11 c u i i c
12 d d u c c
13 d d c c i
14 d d d c c
15 d d c c c
16 d u c i i
17 d c c c i
18 d d u c c
19 d d d c i
20 d d c c i
21 d d c c c
22 d d u c c
23 i d i i c
24 d d c c c
25 d d c c c
26 i d u c c
27 d d u c c
28 i d u c c
29 i d u c c
30 d d u c c
31 d d c c c
“i” indicates that there are insufficient deviation points to judge converge/diverge, “c” represents conver-
gence, “d” represents divergence and “u” indicates it is unclear whether there is convergence/divergence.
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Figure 6.8: Convergence of Highest upq (excluding unclear levels) Price Deviations
Figure 6.9: Convergence of Lowest upq (excluding unclear levels) Price Deviations
users’ interests quickly when there are recommendations that are highly rated by users.
In such cases, the agents receive large rewards and are able to be confident about their
recommendations. When evaluating the lowest rating level, again excluding those cases
where there are insufficient deviation points, we find that there are twenty-eight users
that have their lowest rating level’s deviation points diverge and three users where it is
unclear (see Figure 6.9). This pattern is observed because the recommender agents learn
users’ interests slowly when the recommendations are lowly rated by users (since they
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are more uncertain about such recommendations because they receive a small amount of
reward). This divergence is symptomatic of the fact that at these low rating levels the
recommender agents are still iterating their bids to chase the corresponding equilibrium
(according to the bidding strategy introduced in Table 3.1). However, the deviation
cannot diverge to very large values in this case. This is because, on the one hand,
recommendations with very high bid prices compared to the corresponding equilibria
will receive no rewards and the corresponding greedy bidders will go bankrupt (see
section 4.2.5). While, on the other hand, recommendations with very low bid prices
compared to the corresponding equilibria cannot be shortlisted and they will try to
increase their bid prices in later auctions (see section 3.4). This dual effect makes
the price deviations of low upq levels uncertain in a small number of recommending
rounds: they might converge after some further auctions or they might not (if the
recommender agents cannot learn the users’ interests with respect to the moderately
interesting recommendations).
In sum then, these experiments show the marketplace tends to converge quickly over
the recommendations with high user ratings because of the clear incentives associated
with the users’ interests. However, the marketplace is uncertain about convergence over
the recommendations with low user ratings because of weak or unclear incentives. This
does not mean that our marketplace does not work in this case. However, to effectively
correlate the constituent recommenders’ bids to the qualities of the recommendations
with low user ratings is subject to a few other issues, such as:
• long learning time. A long learning period enables the constituent recommenders
to have more information to learn users’ interests so as to be certain about the
moderately interesting items;
• good learning effectiveness. A good learning capability enables the constituent rec-
ommenders to achieve learning convergence quickly and this affects their bidding;
and
• long training process. All kinds of recommender system need a training process to
learn users’ interests [Middleton et al., 2004]. However, our system is somewhat
weak in such process and the constituent recommenders are uncertain about the
moderately interesting items.
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However, these issues are beyond the scope of this work (see the discussions in Chapter 7
where some thoughts on addressing these issues are given).
6.4.3 Effective Peak Performance
To evaluate whether our market-based recommender’s peak performance is indeed above
that of all the constituent recommenders’, we recorded their peak performance points
for all users over all auction rounds. For example, Figure 6.10 shows the marketplace’s
effective peak performance points versus those of the three constituent recommenders
with respect to user “5”. From Figure 6.10, we can see that the market-based recom-
mender’s effective peak performance points are at the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,
seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth and fifteenth auction rounds. From
this, it is apparent that the marketplace’s peak performance is, in most cases, above or
equal to the best of the three constituent recommenders’.
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Figure 6.10: Different Recommenders’ Peak Performances
Now we need to determine whether this happens for most of the users. To do this, we
added up all the effective peak performance points for all thirty-one user trials. Among
all the auctions for all users, 66.4% of them have their market-based recommender’s peak
performance as high as the best of the three constituent recommenders’ (see Figure 6.11).
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Figure 6.11: Marketplace’s Overall Effective Peak Performance
6.4.4 Best Recommendations Identification
After evaluating the above three market related properties of our system, we now seek
to determine whether our system is indeed suggesting those documents that the user
values most. To do this, we randomly selected a few users to evaluate this property10.
With respect to a given user, a number (Num) of recommendations are made available
for recommendation. Here, Num is bigger than 75 (5 recommendations per auction
multiplied by 15 auctions, for a typical user’s task) so that the system can make its
recommendations from a big pool of items from all quality levels. With respect to
a specific user, Num recommendations can be divided into two sets: one with items
suggested by the system to the user and the other with items omitted by the system
during the user’s task (i.e. not presented in any auction round in the trial for that
user). Then, to identify the best items for this user, we require him to perform a trial
(as we have outline previously) and, additionally, to rate all the omitted items. This
means, we can manually identify the best recommendations for the user (defined in the
fourth metric in section 6.1). From this, we are able to validate how many of the best
recommendations our system is able to identify.
In more detail, Figure 6.12 shows a typical example of these experiments. Here, the
horizontal axis represents the different rating levels and the vertical axis represents
10This is a time-consuming task since it involves examining a huge number of Web documents from
the source recommendation pool and rating each of them. Therefore, we performed this with a subset
of our user trial population. Specifically, we did it for one randomly selected user.
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Figure 6.12: Available Recommendations vs Actual Recommended Items
the number of recommendations. The white bars represent the numbers of available
recommendations (made available to recommend before the user performs the task) at
each of the different rating levels. The light gray bars represent the numbers of items
actually suggested by our system from the first to the fifth recommending round of the
user’s task. The dark gray bars represent the numbers of items actually suggested from
the sixth to the tenth recommending round. The black bars represent those suggested
from the eleventh to the fifteenth round. The white bars in Figure 6.12 show that
there are 18 recommendations (fifteen items with rating “4” and three with “5”) that
this user considers best. From Figure 6.12, we can see that the numbers of the best
recommendations have an overall tendency to increase over the recommending rounds.
This indicates that our marketplace is able to effectively learn the user’s interests and
identify the best recommendations more frequently over time. From the numbers of
recommendations made at rating levels “0” and “1”, we can see that our marketplace is
able to deliberately deter such bad and weakly positive recommendations because the
numbers of such recommendations have an overall tendency to decrease over time.
During the user’s trial from the first to the fifth recommending round, we find that there
are four qualified recommending rounds and one of them is a satisfied recommending
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Figure 6.13: Best Recommendations Identification for a Given User
round (see the definitions in the fourth metric in section 6.1); from the sixth to the tenth
round, there are three qualified rounds and two of them are satisfied; from the eleventh
to the fifteenth round, there are five qualified rounds and four of them are satisfied.
These results are displayed in Figure 6.13. This means that 80% of the first five rounds,
66.7% of the second five rounds and 100% of the last five rounds are qualified, whereas
20% of the first five rounds, 40% of the second five rounds and 80% of the last five rounds
are satisfied. Therefore, both the qualified and the satisfied recommending rounds have
the overall tendency of increasing. When taken together, these results show that our
marketplace is indeed able to identify the best recommendations and display them in
the top positions of the recommendation sidebar quickly and frequently.
6.5 Summary
This chapter presents the user evaluation of our market-based recommender system.
Specifically, we validated and verified the feasibility and efficiency of our market-based
approach to recommender systems through thirty-one user trials. Based on our exper-
iments with these real users, we conclude that our market-based recommender system
has the following properties:
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• Our marketplace is able to coordinate multiple recommenders and guarantee they
have equal opportunities to display their recommendations to users. Compared
to the fairness defined in section 3.1 and evaluated in section 4.2.4, the identi-
cal output contribution again reinforces the fairness property of the marketplace.
With the simulations in section 4.2.4, it is hard to assert fairness with respect to
different users’ interests and browsing contexts. However, the evaluations on iden-
tical output contribution demonstrate that our marketplace is able to act fairly to
different constituent recommenders across a user population of different interests
and browsing contexts in a real environment.
• The market converges quickly with respect to highly rated recommendations since
there are clear incentives associated with these items. The evaluations on mar-
ket convergence directly evaluate the bidding price deviations from corresponding
equilibria of different upq levels. This is based on the fact that we have demon-
strated, in section 4.2.1, that as prices for different advertisement slots converge,
prices for recommendations of different upq levels also converge. In this chap-
ter, we successfully demonstrated the convergence of recommendations with high
upqs, while we observe a lack of convergence of low upq recommendations.
Additionally, the price convergence for different upq levels also indicates the mar-
ketplace’s ability to correlate the recommendations’ upqs to the constituent rec-
ommenders’ inqs. This is because after the high upqs prices convergence, the
individual recommenders have built up their internal correlations between the
prices and the corresponding upqs, as well as to their inqs (this relationship has
been demonstrated in section 4.2.3). Thus, the correlations between these upqs
and their corresponding inqs have been built up.
• After convergence, the market-based recommender’s peak performance is above or
equal to the best of all three constituent recommenders’ most of the time. This
means that our marketplace is able to work as a coordinator of multiple different
recommenders and always output the best items from whatever of these constituent
recommenders. This is the original objective of our market-based approach to
recommendations as stated in section 1.1.
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• Our market-based recommender is able to identify the best items most of the time
and, in general, these are displayed in the top positions of the recommendation
side bar. This is again precisely the objective of our market-based approach that
is stated in section 1.1.
To conclude, this chapter contributes to the thesis in the following ways: (i) this chapter
built up a real market-based recommender system and evaluated our market mechanism
design from chapters 3, 4 and 5 with real users; (ii) the evaluation results show that our
marketplace works as an effective coordinator of multiple recommendation methods and
gives fairness to all constituent recommenders without any one dominating the market-
place across the user population; (iii) the evaluation results show that the marketplace
always converges with respect to the recommendations that highly interest the users.
Additionally, this indicates the marketplace is able to correlate such recommendations’
upqs and inqs; and (iv) the marketplace works effectively and is able to quickly and
frequently seek out the best items from all constituent recommenders and display them
at the top positions of the recommendation side bar to the users in most cases. In sum-
mary, the user evaluations of the real market-based recommender demonstrates that our
market-based approach is an effective means of coordinating multiple different recom-
mendation methods in one single system and that it is an effective way of dealing with
the problem of information overload.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Information overload on the Web is an ever-growing problem and recommender systems
have been widely advocated as a tool that can help in this context. Given this, there are
many recommendation methods being developed to assist recommendations. However,
there is no one that is able to effectively make recommendations for all users with various
interests. Thus, we believe that the way to go in this area is to develop an overarching
system that incorporates multiple recommendation methods and that lets only the best
items from whatever methods pass through to the user.
Following this philosophy, in this work, a market-based approach is used to coordinate
multiple recommendation methods. Here a market-based recommender is a system that
uses an economic marketplace to let multiple recommenders compete with each other
to offer their recommendations. By so doing, the marketplace automates the coordina-
tion of this competition and the process of selecting the best items from the viewpoint
of users. Such a system is designed to be used in conjunction with traditional rec-
ommendation methods (such as content-based, collaborative, demographic and hybrid
filtering techniques). In particular, the market-based recommender system is effectively
a meta-recommender that selects only the best items from whatever sources to display
to users.
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7.1 Conclusions
The central hypotheses of this thesis is that a market-based approach is a good means
of coordinating multiple recommendation methods and letting only the best items pass
through to the user. In order to prove this hypotheses, three sub-hypotheses are estab-
lished and evaluated.
The first sub-hypotheses is that all the constituent recommenders incorporated in the
marketplace work in a broadly similar manner and that in gross terms they contribute
a similar number of recommendations across various user interests. This property en-
sures there is sufficient competition between the various recommendation methods and
that the market-based recommender does not degenerate to a single constituent recom-
mendation method. To this end, simulation results in section 4.2.4 show that different
methods do indeed contribute a similar number of recommendations to users without
considering users’ interests and browsing contexts. This is the first attempt to prove
the first sub-hypotheses. Building on this, section 6.4.1 then uses real users’ evaluations
to support this sub-hypotheses and the evaluation results demonstrate that our market-
place does give different constituent recommenders an equal opportunity of displaying
their recommendations across a user population with various interests and browsing
contexts.
The second sub-hypotheses is that the market is always able to converge so that it
is able to give clear incentives of the upqs of recommendations to the recommender
agents. To this end, sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 demonstrate that the market converges to
different equilibria with respect to different advertisement side bar slots. In addition, to
evaluate the convergence of economical equilibria (a point where supply crosses demand)
of advertisement slots, section 6.4.2 looks into the bidding price convergence with respect
to different upqs of recommendations and shows that the market does indeed converge
with respect to high upq recommendations. With the market convergence in place,
a constituent recommender agent is able to reason about the amount of reward and
the bidding price it is likely to receive and should bid over the recommendations with
certain inqs. After the market converges, the rewards an agent receives reflect the upqs
of its recommendations, whereas the optimally adjusted bidding prices reflect the value
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 131
of advertising these items. In this way, the market correlates the recommenders’ inqs
to the upqs of their recommendations.
The third sub-hypotheses is that the marketplace quickly and frequently identifies the
best recommendations to the users. To this end, section 4.4 attempts to validate the
marketplace’s ability to identify the best recommendations. To improve the efficiency of
this identification ability, chapter 5 describes a reinforcement learning strategy to assist
the agent to make the best recommendations quickly and frequently. The simulations
in chapter 5 do indeed show that a marketplace with learning agents is able to find
out the best items more quickly and more frequently than one without. Moreover,
armed with three kinds of traditional filtering agents with our learning capability, the
user evaluations of the real market-based recommender system in sections 6.4.3 and
6.4.4 help demonstrate this sub-hypotheses from two perspectives. The evaluations in
section 6.4.3 show from the marketplace’s internal point of view, the way in which the
market-based recommender is always able to perform as good as the best constituent
recommender. In contrast, the evaluations in section 6.4.4 show, from the users’ point
of view, that the marketplace is indeed able to quickly and frequently identify the top
upq recommendations and display them in the top position of the recommendation side
bar.
Taking the evidence shown by the experiments we carried out in chapters 4, 5 and 6
against the market-based mechanism designed in chapter 3, we are now in a position
to conclude that the market-based approach to recommender systems is indeed a very
effective means of coordinating multiple different recommendation methods in one single
system and that it is a very effective way of dealing with the problem of information
overload by selecting only the best items from whatever methods to be displayed to
users. In other words, the market-based approach to recommender systems is neither
a new recommendation algorithm, nor a new filtering technique, but rather it is a new
paradigm for economic-oriented approaches to recommendations.
7.2 Future Work
Despite the success of the system we have developed, there are a number of ways in
which it can be improved still further. Given this, we outline the main direction of
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future work.
7.2.1 Improving the Speed of Market Convergence
As can be seen from the experiments demonstrated in chapters 4, 5 and 6, market
convergence is the backbone that makes the marketplace work in terms of recommending
effectively. If a marketplace fails to converge, it is unable to give incentives of upqs of
recommendations to the constituent recommenders, the constituent recommenders are
unable to learn the users’ interests, nor are they able to correlate their bidding prices to
the upqs and the inqs of their recommendations.
Therefore, it is important to develop methods and techniques that can be developed in
the marketplace in order to speed up convergence. Such methods enable a market-based
recommender to quickly give clear incentives to the constituent recommender agents and
enables the agents to learn the users’ interests quickly. However, except for validating the
suitability and effectiveness of using market-based mechanisms as means of coordinating
multiple recommendation methods, this thesis did little on developing techniques to im-
prove the speed of market convergence. In more detail, our simulations in chapter 4 aim
to assert the suitability of our system for an environment with full competition (mean-
ing with a large number of constituent recommenders and source recommendations).
However, the comparatively large number of price iterations (because of a large degree
of competition) make the convergence slow. To kick start the convergence, the experi-
ments in chapter 6 use constant equilibria instead of finding the equilibria of historical
average prices by the marketplace itself. This approach makes convergence quicker and
quickly differentiates recommendations in terms of upqs by their corresponding prices.
However, it is rigid to equilibria prices since with different system configurations the
equilibria tend to change and we do not know this change.
Therefore, a future direction of work in this area is to improve the degree of automation
of finding the market convergence across different system configurations such as the
number of constituent recommenders, the number of upq levels and the number of
shortlisted recommendations to be displayed to the users at a time. Relevant methods
that could be considered in this context include the principles of supply and demand
(i.e. the market equilibrium) [Varian, 2003].
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7.2.2 Dealing with Dynamically Changing User Interests
This thesis deals with information overload in a static user environment (meaning that
the user does not change his browsing interest and context while interacting with the
system). However, in more general cases, a user may have multiple, different topics of
interest such as music, fashion and food. Furthermore, a user’s interest topic within a
broad area may change from one sub-area to another, such as from classical music to pop
music, from spring fashion to summer fashion, and from Italian to French food. In some
even more complex environments, a user may have multiple parallel browsing sessions on
different topics. Now all these issues undoubtedly make it more difficult for the market-
based mechanism (and all other mechanisms) to suggest as good recommendations as
those it makes in a static user environment. To deal with this, techniques such as user
interest profile management [Case et al., 2003, 2001] and Bayesian decision theory [Duda
et al., 2000] are potential candidates because the former provides a means of managing
users interests when they have multiple interesting topics and the latter provides the
confidence for recommenders to detect the status of the changing user interest.
7.2.3 Improving the Sharing of Information
When learning the users’ interests and making recommendations, each constituent rec-
ommender needs to collect a large amount of data such as the users’ topics of interest and
the Web documents’ keywords. From the overall system’s point of view, this collection
process can be highly repetitive since the different recommenders cover large amounts of
collected data. Such duplication also unavoidably damages the computational efficiency
of the individual recommenders and the overall system. Therefore, providing a means of
sharing such information between the different constituent recommenders will undoubt-
edly save computational resources and improve computational efficiency. However, the
kind of information that can be should be shared among the different recommenders
and different users has privacy implications. This is because users may not be willing to
share their private information with others and, on the other hand, the self-interested
recommender agents may not be willing to share their knowledge with others since they
work in a competitive manner and their knowledge affects their profits directly. There-
fore, providing a means of information sharing to improve the system’s computational
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efficiency, while not destroying privacy among the users and among the constituent rec-
ommenders is an interesting potential future research topic. Here promising work can
be found in [Lau et al., 1999].
7.2.4 Improving the Degree of Personalization
Personalization plays an important role in dealing with information overload. Generally
speaking, in our context, personalization is the adoption and arrangement of information
that is tailored to a single user or a group of users. This is, therefore, undoubtedly a
research issue for market-based recommender systems. However, while we described
the big picture of the general issues of the market-based approach, we did little in this
aspect. In this context, there are two aspects of personalization research that come
to the fore: (i) the individual constituent recommendation methods’ personalization
and (ii) the marketplace’s personalization. The former has been extensively studied in
traditional recommender system research (e.g. [Sheth and Maes, 1993, Mladenic, 1996,
Zuno, 1997, Lynch, 2001]) and is an ongoing line of enquiry. However, the latter needs
further investigation and should focus on issues related to improving the speed of market
convergence, information sharing and security issues.
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